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Abstract
This thesis examines determinacy and E-stability of economic policy in mon-
etary union models. Monetary policy takes the form of either a contemporaneous
or a forecast based interest rate rule, while scal policy follows a contemporane-
ous government spending rule. In the absence of asymmetries, the results from
the closed economy literature on learning are retained. However, when introducing
asymmetries into monetary union frameworks, the determinacy and E-stability con-
ditions for economic policy differ from both the closed and open economy cases.
We nd that a monetary union with heterogeneous price rigidities is more
likely to be determinate and E-stable. Specically, the Taylor principle, a key sta-
bility condition for the closed economy, is now relaxed. Furthermore, an interest
rate rule that stabilizes the terms of trade in addition to output and ination, is more
likely to induce determinacy and local stability under RLS learning. If monetary
policy is sufciently aggressive in stabilizing the terms of trade, then determinacy
and E-stability of the union economy can be achieved without direct stabilization
of output and ination.
A scal policy rule that supports demand for domestic goods following a
shock to competitiveness, can destabilize the union economy regardless of the in-
terest rate rule employed by the union central bank. In this case, determinacy and
E-stability conditions have to be simultaneously and independently met by both
scal and monetary policy for the union economy to be stable. When scal pol-
iv
Abstract v
icy instead stabilizes domestic output gaps while monetary policy stabilizes union
output and ination, scal policy directly affects the stability of monetary policy.
A contemporaneous monetary policy rule has to be more aggressive to satisfy the
Taylor principle, the more aggressive scal policy is. On the other hand, when
monetary policy is forward looking, an aggressive scal policy rule can help induce
determinacy.
JEL Classications: E5; E6; F4
Keywords: Currency Area; Learning; Expectational stability; Determinacy;
Monetary and Fiscal Policies; Optimal Monetary policy; Terms of trade
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Introduction
Background and Motivation
The relationship between the expectations of economic agents and the economy in which
they operate makes identifying how expectations are formed key for successfully modelling
an economy. Some of the earlier economic frameworks assumed perfect foresight and thus
equated expectations with actual outcomes. However, this assumption was soon deemed
to be too strong, since it is both unrealistic and fails to explicitly emphasize the role of
expectations. The notion of rational expectations (RE) was characterized by Muth (1961)
and is today a benchmark assumption in macroeconomics.1 Under RE, it is assumed that
agents know the structure of the economy as well as the values of the structural parameters.
This differs from perfect foresight in that under RE, agents do not know the future values
of random shocks to the economy. That is, agents know the probability distribution of
future endogenous variables conditional on exogenous variables, but they do not know the
specic values of future exogenous variables.
Rational expectations has been a key assumption in New Keynesian dynamic sto-
chastic general equilibrium (DSGE) models used to derive policy feedback rules with wel-
fare optimizing properties.2 These models are often reduced by log-linearization around
1 While it has been argued that Hurwicz (1946) was the rst in using the terminology "rational expecta-
tions", he does not offer an explicit denition of the term, but instead touches on what we refer to as learning
in this thesis.
2 See Clarida et al. (1999) and Woodford (2003) for examples.
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some dened steady state, with policy recommendations based on the welfare properties of
an associated rational expectations equilibrium (REE). However, economic policy recom-
mendations based on the assumption of RE could lead to undesired levels of volatility and
instability for two main reasons.
First, as discussed by e.g. Clarida et al. (2000), Rotemberg &Woodford (1998,1999)
and Woodford (1999), if a policy leads to more than one stationary REE, then it could
be the case that either an inferior equilibrium is attained or that agents fail to coordinate
towards any one equilibrium. It may also be the case that no stationary REE exists for a
given policy rule and under such a policy the economy would follow an explosive path.
Given this, a policy rule should only be considered if it leads to a unique stationary REE or
determinacy.
Second, although RE is a useful benchmark since it simplies analysis signicantly,
it is a strong and restrictive assumption. In practice, economic theory puts forward frame-
works attempting to describe the structure of the economy, while econometricians estimate
actual parameter values. The notion of agents behaving like econometricians by using some
least squares method (most commonly recursive least squares (RLS)) to estimate parame-
ter values, rather than having RE, is known in the literature as learning. Given that small
forecast errors are likely to occur, so that the economy could temporarily deviate slightly
from the REE path, the question is whether the state of the economy approaches the REE
over time. That is, if agents' estimates of the economic parameter values approach and
eventually reach their true values as more data becomes available. The E-stability principle
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states that an REE is locally asymptotically stable under recursive least squares learning if
and only if it is expectationally stable (E-stable).3 If a policy rule leads to an REE that is
not E-stable, then under recursive least squares learning, economic agents can collaborate
towards this REE with a probability of zero. Such a policy rule should hence be avoided
by policy makers, even if it results in high welfare gains under RE.
While determinacy and E-stability conditions for economic policy rules, in particular
monetary policy rules, have been derived using both closed and open economy models as
discussed below, there is a gap in the literature as determinacy and E-stability of policy
has not yet been considered in the framework of a monetary union. In this thesis we aim
to close this gap by examining determinacy and E-stability in two-country monetary union
models. We show that in the absence of certain asymmetries in a monetary union, the results
from the closed economy literature on learning are retained. However, when different
asymmetries are introduced, the requirements for determinacy and E-stability of economic
policy differ from those found in both the closed and open economy literature.
The following section describes some key economic issues of a monetary union and
gives an overview of how these can be modelled. This is followed by a brief discussion of
the monetary policy rules of the type considered in this thesis. We then summarize related
work on determinacy and E-stability from the closed and open economy literature. An
outline of the thesis is then given before presenting a summary of the main ndings and
contribution of this thesis.
3 See Evans & Honkapohja (p.30, 2001).
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A Monetary Union
Key Characteristics
A monetary union consists of two or more countries that share a common currency and a
common central bank. Although the member countries do not have sovereignty of monetary
policy, they do have sovereign scal authorities. There are both potential costs and benets
of being in a monetary union and these should be considered carefully before joining.
The main benets of a monetary union are the elimination of exchange rate uncer-
tainty and transaction costs when trading with other member countries, improved price
transparency and thereby price convergence, and economic and nancial integration. If
the common central bank is hard-nosed, i.e. very ination averse, then a monetary union
could also imply improved price stability for its member countries. While exchange rate
transaction costs can be estimated, other benets of a monetary union, such as economic
integration, are less tangible. It is hence difcult to quantify the benets of a monetary
union in practice. Nonetheless, it is clear that the higher the level of intra-union trade,
the greater are the benets of joining a monetary union. This is because more trade im-
plies greater gains from not having exchange rate transaction costs and from not needing to
hedge against exchange rate volatility.
The main cost of joining a monetary union is losing sovereignty of monetary policy.
Countries often have fundamentally different economic structures and levels of efciency,
which implies that they are affected differently by economic shocks. In a monetary union,
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a country cannot use monetary policy to tackle these shocks according to the specic needs
of the domestic economy. There is also a cost in not having an exchange rate to restore
competitiveness within the monetary union, following asymmetric economic shocks. As
pointed out by Mundell (1961) in his pioneering work, the cost of giving up control of
national monetary policy and hence of joining a monetary union is lower, the more syn-
chronized member countries' business cycles are. This is because a higher correlation be-
tween business cycles implies a lower relative magnitude of country-specic to union-wide
shocks and while the union central bank has no means of tackling country-specic shocks
it can mitigate the effects of union-wide shocks. There are contrasting views about the ef-
fect of trade on the correlation between business cycles and hence about its effect on the
cost of joining a monetary union. Krugman (1993) argues that a higher level of integration
results in more specialization and hence in a lower correlation of shocks. The views of the
European Commission (1990) in a publication promoting the launch of a European single
currency contrast this however, as trade is argued to lead to a higher level of synchroniza-
tion of shocks. Empirical evidence presented by Babetskii (2005) support the viewpoint of
the European Commission with trade found to have a positive impact on the correlation be-
tween the demand shocks of the 10 EU accession countries and those of the EU-15. The
evidence on the effect of trade on supply shocks is less conclusive however. In chapter 1
of this thesis, we put forward a monetary union framework with trade in inputs and show
analytically that a higher level of trade increases the correlation between union members'
supply shocks.
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Given that countries of a monetary union do not have sovereignty of monetary policy,
scal policy takes a greater role as a stabilization instrument of domestic shocks. Sargent
& Wallace (1981) point out the importance of scal and monetary policy coordination and
show that if monetary policy targets price stability, then excessive levels of unnanced
government expenditure can lead to speculative hyperination. The convergence criteria
of the European Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) therefore stipulates a limit on
budget decits of 3% of GDP and on government debt of 60% of GDP. However, although
additional restrictions may be imposed on scal policy in a monetary union, it plays an
important role as an instrument for economic stabilization.
Modelling a Monetary Union
Monetary union models emphasize some of the key features that distinguishes a monetary
union economy from that of an individual country. Although the member countries of a
monetary union share the same currency and central bank, they are subject to different
exogenous shocks and face other economic asymmetries. In this thesis we use different
two-country monetary union models to examine the impact that such asymmetries has on
determinacy and E-stability of economic policy.4 We dene asymmetries as economic
characteristics that make the two member countries distinguishable in some fundamental
way. In the absence of such asymmetries, the union economy can be regarded as one
4 While multiple country models have been put forward, see for example Clausen & Wohltmann (2005),
two-country models have been found to be both useful and convenient for examining key features of monetary
unions.
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country for the purposes of economic policy. In that case, there is no cost of having a
monetary union.
The seminal paper by Benigno (2004) presents a micro-founded two-country mon-
etary union model with sticky prices and shows that heterogeneous price rigidities has
important implications for optimal monetary policy. In particular, he nds that it is welfare
improving for policy to attach a higher weight to a country with a higher degree of price
stickiness, than the weight suggested by its economic size. This is because a shock to the
economy of the country with the higher degree of price rigidity causes larger distortions
to the union economy. Benigno (2004) also nds that it is welfare improving for mone-
tary policy to stabilize the terms of trade in addition to output and ination in this case.
The assumption of heterogeneous price rigidities is supported by empirical evidence put
forward by Benigno & Lopez-Salido (2006) suggesting that price rigidities do in practice
vary across countries, with Italy and the Netherlands having more exible prices than Ger-
many, France and Spain. In chapter 3 of this thesis, we examine how heterogeneous price
rigidities affect determinacy and E-stability of monetary policy.
Using a static new Keynesian model of a monetary union, Bonger & Mayer (2007)
show that scal policy has an important role as a stabilizer of idiosyncratic shocks in a
monetary union. Beetsma & Jensen (2005) extend the model of Benigno (2004) by al-
lowing for scal policy to be used to stabilize shocks. They conclude that when monetary
policy stabilizes union-wide output and ination, government spending rules that support
demand for domestic goods following shocks to competitiveness, can improve welfare in a
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monetary union. In chapter 4, we consider the effects of such policy coordination on the
determinacy and E-stability of the monetary union economy.
The economic frameworks are combined with government policy rules to give the
economic environment. We focus on interest rate feedback rules in particular.
Monetary Policy Rules
Taylor (1993) identied that a simple interest rate rule, in which the nominal interest rate
is adjusted to deviations in output and ination from their target levels, closely tracked the
federal funds rate between 1987 and 1992. Following this, interest rate feedback rules that
stabilize macroeconomic variables are referred to as Taylor rules in the literature. More re-
cent evidence by Molodtsova et al. (2009) suggests that the policy rates of both the Federal
Reserve and the European Central Bank closely followed simple Taylor rules reacting to ei-
ther contemporaneous or expected future values of output and ination, between 1999:Q4
and 2007:Q4. They nd that the interest rate rule reacting to expected future values gives
a closer t than that reacting to contemporaneous data. Furthermore, a feedback Taylor
rule was found to better describe movements in the ECB's policy rate than the Federal Re-
serve's. Taylor (1999) nds that since the 1980s, the Federal Reserve has followed a Taylor
rule in which the policy interest rate is adjusted by more than one-for-one to changes in in-
ation. This is known as the Taylor principle and implies that interest rates are increased
sufciently to increase real interest rates and thus to contract the economy, following a rise
in ination.
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While there previously was an explicit role for money supply targeting in the litera-
ture of monetary economics, the consensus today is to supplement a model economy with
a Taylor rule, as pointed out by Friedman (2003). In this thesis, as in the majority of related
research, we will derive determinacy and E-stability conditions for different Taylor rules.
We consider both contemporaneous and forecast based interest rate rules. While contem-
poraneous Taylor rules serve as an interesting benchmark case and a natural starting point,
evidence suggests that central banks do consider expectations in their policy analysis.5 We
now summarize the existing literature on determinacy and E-stability.
Determinacy and E-stability
This thesis examines determinacy and E-stability conditions for economic policy rules in
New Keynesian DSGE models of a monetary union. In each case, we log-linearize the
model economy around some dened steady state under the assumption of sticky prices
and consider the rational expectations equilibria that result when different policy rules are
implemented. For determinacy, we then require that there exists a unique stationary REE.
If a policy rule results in several stationary REE (indeterminacy) or none at all, then this
will lead to an undesirable economic outcome. Such policy rules should hence be avoided
by policy makers. Furthermore, even if an equilibrium is stationary under rational expecta-
tions, it is not necessarily stable under recursive least squares learning. Results by Evans &
Honkapohja (1999, 2001) show that E-stability is the necessary and sufcient condition for
5 As pointed out by Honkapohja &Mitra (2005), the ination reports of the Bank of England discuss private
sector forecasts, while the monthly bulletin of the European Central Bank considers both internal and external
forecasts (see Bank of England (2003) and European Central Bank (2003), respectively).
Introduction 10
an REE to be locally asymptotically stable under recursive least squares learning. In this
thesis, we consider E-stability of stationary minimal state variable (MSV) solutions derived
under the RE assumption. Although explosive solutions could be E-stable, such equilibria
should still be avoided by policy makers and are hence not considered here.6 Consistent
with related research, our results on the stability under adaptive learning are local.
We propose to only use policy feedback rules that are both determinate and E-stable.
A useful result by McCallum (2007) suggests that determinacy is sufcient but not neces-
sary for E-stability, when current period data is in the information set. He proves this for
a large class of models permitting any number of lags and leads. The models we consider
here fall into this category, but since there could exist multiple stationary REE that are all
E-stable, we examine both determinacy and E-stability. Our results for a monetary union
are compared with those from the closed and open economy literature summarized below.
Closed Economy Models
The seminal paper by Bullard & Mitra (2002) examines determinacy and E-stability condi-
tions for monetary policy rules in the closed economy forward-looking sticky price model
of Woodford (1999). Employing the methodology of Evans & Honkapohja (1999, 2001),
they consider four different specications of an interest rate rule that stabilizes the out-
put gap and ination. It is found that for a contemporaneous or forecast based policy rule,
the Taylor principle is both necessary and sufcient for E-stability. While this is true for
determinacy of the contemporaneous Taylor rule, a forward looking rule must satisfy an
6 See Evans & Honkapohja (2001, p. 219) for a discussion about learning stability of explosive solutions.
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additional constraint in order to induce a unique stationary REE. Specically, the interest
rate rule must not be too aggressive, in particular in its stabilization of the output gap. Con-
sequently, for a forecast based monetary policy rule, there exists a region for which policy
is indeterminate and E-stable.
Bullard & Mitra (2007) nd that including lagged values of the interest rate in the
Taylor rule, so as to smoothen the path of interest rates, increases the determinate and
E-stable region for monetary policy. In contrast to inertia in the interest rate rule, Wang
& Wong (2005) examine the effect of inertia in the Phillips curve on determinacy and E-
stability of monetary policy. They nd that the higher the degree of inertia is, the more
aggressive policy needs to be to ensure a unique stationary and E-stable REE.
Rather than looking at general specications of Taylor rules, Evans & Honkaphoja
(2003) use the closed economy model of Clarida et al. (1999) to examine determinacy and
E-stability of different specications of a monetary policy rule derived as optimal under RE.
They nd that a fundamentals based rule, in which the central bank adjusts interest rates
to exogenous shocks, is neither determinate nor E-stable. However, an interest rate rule
that also reacts to expected future changes in ination and output is found to govern both
a unique stationary REE and local stability under adaptive learning. Evans & Honkaphoja
(2003) argue that this result is a case for the monetary authorities to explicitly consider
the expectations of the private sector when setting policy.7 Honkapohja & Mitra (2005)
show that if the central bank instead uses internal forecasts in the policy rule, this may be
7 While Evans &Honkaphoja (2003) consider the case of discretionary monetary policy, Evans &Honkaphoja
(2006) extend the result to optimal monetary policy under commitment.
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an additional source of instability. Preston (2008) considers the case in which economic
agents form their decisions based on forecasts into the indenite future rather than one
period ahead and concludes that this could make the optimal policy rule, considered E-
stable by Evans & Honkaphoja (2003), unstable under RLS learning. He proposes price
targeting policy as more likely to induce stability under adaptive learning than an ination
targeting rule.
Open Economy Models
In recent years, the analysis of adaptive learning stability has been extended to the open
economy literature. The open economy introduces some additional features that have im-
plications for the determinacy and E-stability of monetary policy rules.
First, the issue of what ination the central bank should target, that in producer prices
or that in consumer prices, now becomes of relevance. Bullard & Schaling (2006) nd
that, for the two-country model of Clarida, Galí & Gertler (2002), determinacy and E-
stability conditions must be met by each country in isolation when policy targets ination in
producer prices. On the other hand, when the central banks stabilize ination in consumer
prices, determinacy and E-stability of monetary policy has international spill-over effects.
Llosa & Tuesta (2008) employ the small open economy of Galí & Monacelli (2005) and
demonstrate that an aggressive forecast based interest rate rule reacting to consumer prices
rather than producer prices, is more likely to induce unstable equilibria under RLS learning.
Second, monetary policy in the open economy also chooses an exchange rate regime.
Wang (2006) examines learning stability in the two-country model of Benigno & Benigno
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(2006). He nds that if a country pegs its interest rate to that of the other country, then
the determinacy and E-stability of both countries depends on the policy rule of the sec-
ond country. This coincides with the results of Bullard & Schaling (2006). Furthermore,
Llosa & Tuesta (2008) show that when the exchange rate is stabilized in addition to the out-
put gap and ination, then the Taylor principle known from the closed economy does not
need to hold for there to exist a unique stationary REE that is stable under RLS learning.
Wang (2006) also nds that a managed exchange rate can relax the conditions required for
determinacy and E-stability.
Finally, the degree of openness in trade has implications for stability of policy. Bullard
& Schaling (2006) interpret the size of home country as being its degree of openness, so
that when it approaches one it becomes a closed economy, while as it approaches zero it
becomes a small open economy. They nd that the smaller a country is in size, i.e. the
more open it is in terms of trade, the more aggressive does monetary policy have to be to
guarantee determinacy and E-stability. Llossa & Tuesta (2008) nd similar results.
Fiscal Policy and Learning
Introducing scal policy as an instrument for tackling exogenous economic shocks has an
effect on both determinacy and learning stability of monetary policy.
Leeper (1991) considers combinations of scal and monetary policy rules in which
policy is either active or passive. He denes passive scal policy as one where the scal
authorities adjust taxes to nance spending, while active scal policy does not adhere to
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a balanced budget.8 Similarly, passive monetary policy adjusts the money supply to sup-
port scal spending, while active monetary policy pursues aggressive ination stabilization
independently of scal policy, so as to satisfy the Taylor principle. It is concluded that
determinacy results when either policy is active while the other is passive. So, the Tay-
lor principle does not have to be satised by the monetary authorities if scal policy is
sufciently aggressive in stabilizing prices. If both monetary and scal policy are passive
however, the system becomes indeterminate with multiple stationary rational expectations
equilibria. On the other hand, if the interest rate rule satises the Taylor principle, while
scal policy ignores the budget constraint, then there exists no stationary solutions to the
system. Although Leeper (1991) examines determinacy, he does not consider learning sta-
bility.
Evans & Honkapohja (2005) introduce learning into a exible price model to analyse
liquidity traps. They nd that while the superior of two equilibria is stable under adaptive
learning, the liquidity trap is not.9 Large negative economic shocks can therefore lead to
deationary spirals with falling prices and output. Switching to a more aggressive monetary
policy rule at low ination levels was found to be an effective measure for preventing
this. However, when prices are sticky rather than exible, Evans, Guse & Honkapohja
(2008) show that relying solely on aggressive monetary policy is not sufcient to avoid
a downward spiral of output and ination, following a large negative shock. They thus
introduce a scal policy rule in the form of the tax feedback rule considered by Leeper
8 Under active scal policy, taxes are increased to at least cover interest payments on newly issued debt.
9 Eusepi (2007) nds that liquidity traps are indeed learnable for some forward looking policy rules in a
non-linearized global framework.
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(1991). A joint stabilization effort of monetary and scal policy is found to be sufcient
to prevent a destabilization of the system. Indeed, as pointed out by Evans (2008), an
aggressive scal policy is on its own sufcient to prevent the economy from reaching the
liquidity trap.
Thesis Outline
Before examining determinacy and E-stability of economic policy, we put forward a mon-
etary union model derived from micro-principles under the assumption of RE, in chapter
1. The reduced form of this model takes the same form as those models considered in later
chapters and it gives some useful insights about the key features of monetary union mod-
els and thereby serves as a useful benchmark. The model extends the two-country open
economy model of Clarida et al. (2002), by allowing for intermediate goods or inputs to be
traded and by giving it monetary union characteristics. The latter implies eliminating the
bilateral exchange rate and introducing a common central bank. While allowing for trade in
inputs we also assume home bias in production of nal goods, so that rms in general use
inputs produced domestically more efciently than they use those produced abroad. This
has both empirical merit and also allows us to isolate the specic effects that trade in inputs
has on our results, as explained in chapter 1.10
We derive the loss function of the union central bank by aggregating the expected
utility of households. We then look at optimal discretionary monetary policy as the union
10 See for example McCallum (1995), Wolf (2000), Hillbury & Hummels (2002) and Lopez, Pagoulatos &
Gonzalez (2006) for evidence from North American data and Head & Mayers (2000) for evidence of home
bias within the EU.
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central bank minimizes its loss function subject to the constraint of only having one interest
rate to tackle shocks from both union countries. Different specications of the optimal
interest rate rule are then derived under the assumption of RE.
The assumption of rational expectations is relaxed in chapter 2 as we examine de-
terminacy and E-stability for general specications of Taylor rules and the optimal interest
rate rules derived under discretion in chapter 1. The Taylor rules considered adjust interest
rates to either contemporaneous or expected future values of union ination and the union
output gap. We are specically interested in how the level of trade in inputs affects our
results and how these differ from those from the closed economy literature.
In chapter 3, we will examine the effect of heterogeneous price rigidities on the
determinacy and E-stability of monetary policy.11 To do this, we make use of the two-
country model put forward by Benigno (2004), in which one country is assumed to have a
higher degree of price rigidity than the other. When price rigidities differ across countries,
monetary policy has an impact on relative variables such as the terms of trade, since prices
in each country adjust by different amounts, following a change in the interest rate. We
hence consider contemporaneous and forward looking Taylor rules reacting to the terms of
trade in addition to ination and the output gap. Using the framework of Benigno (2004)
simplies our analysis signicantly since the model already incorporates heterogeneous
price rigidities. However, we conjecture that the effects that heterogeneous price rigidities
11 While we consider heterogeneous price rigidities, we assume homogeneous learning in that all agents use
the same learning algorithm. Honkapohja & Mitra (2006) consider the case of learning heterogeneity and
concludes that when such heterogeneities are persistent rather then transient, then RLS learning stability may
not result even if the characteristics of all individual agents and the aggregate economy are consistent with
E-stability.
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has on determinacy and RLS learning stability in chapter 3would also prevail for the model
considered in chapters 1 and 2, as well as for a general class of monetary union models.
While the analysis of preceding chapters focuses on monetary policy, the role of
scal policy is of particular interest in a monetary union. Hence, in chapter 4 we will
employ the model of Beetsma & Jensen (2005) and explicitly investigate the determinacy
and E-stability of a monetary union economy when monetary and scal policy are both
actively responding to exogenous shocks. While monetary policy stabilizes shocks to union
output and ination, scal policy uses government expenditure to support domestic demand
following asymmetric shocks. We will consider three different government spending rules;
one where government spending is adjusted to changes in the terms of trade, one where it
reacts to relative ination and one that stabilizes the domestic output gap. Each of these
is combined with a contemporaneous and a forward looking Taylor rule in turn, giving six
different policy combinations to consider.
Contribution and Main Results
In chapter 1, we will show that the optimal discretionary monetary policy rule in a monetary
union is isomorphic to that familiar from the closed economy literature.12 While interest
rates are adjusted to changes in the union output gap and ination, it has no means of
tackling country-specic shocks. A higher level of trade in inputs is found to increase the
12 See Clarida, Galí & Gertler (1999) for an example of an optimal discretionary monetary policy rule for a
closed economy model.
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correlation between such shocks and thereby reduce the cost of not having two independent
central banks.
In chapter 2, we will show that the results from the closed economy literature on
learning are retained for the monetary union model derived in chapter 1. Looking at dif-
ferent specications of the optimal interest rate rule, our results replicate those of Evans
& Honkapohja (2003), suggesting that a fundamentals based policy rule is both indeter-
minate and unstable under RLS learning, while an optimal policy rule that explicitly takes
into account the expectations of the private sector, induces a unique stationary and E-stable
REE. When looking at general Taylor rules, the results by Bullard &Mitra (2002) are repli-
cated and the Taylor principle is found to be a required condition for both determinacy and
E-stability. We nd that these results are unaffected by the relative sizes of the union coun-
tries and the level of trade in inputs. Hence, even with home bias in production, a monetary
union can be regarded as a closed economy concerning the learning stability of monetary
policy. In following chapters we introduce other asymmetries for which these results do
not hold.
When introducing heterogeneous price rigidities in chapter 3, we nd that the Taylor
principle, is no longer a required condition for determinacy and E-stability. In fact, the
greater the asymmetry in price rigidities, the larger is the stability region for monetary
policy. An interest rate rule that stabilizes the terms of trade in addition to output and
ination further increases the stability region for monetary policy. If interest rates are
sufciently aggressive in its stabilization of the terms of trade, then no stabilization of
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output or ination is needed to induce a determinate and E-stable equilibrium. While Llosa
& Tuesta (2008) obtain similar results for a contemporaneous Taylor rule that stabilizes
the exchange rate in addition to output and ination, they nd that if the interest rate rule
is forecast based and aggressive, then it is actually less likely to induce determinacy. In
our case, the determinacy and E-stability region increases for both a contemporaneous and
forward looking policy rule. Our results support the argument for a central bank to take the
terms of trade into consideration when setting policy.
Our most interesting nding highlights the importance of prudent scal spending in a
monetary union. In chapter 4, we nd that when scal policy rules react to either the terms
of trade or relative ination, then monetary and scal policy have to satisfy determinacy
and E-stability conditions independently of one another, for the union economy to induce
a unique stationary REE that is stable under RLS learning. While the stability conditions
for monetary policy in this case are those known from the closed economy literature, an
overly aggressive scal policy rule can eliminate all stationary equilibria, regardless of the
monetary policy rule employed. This contrasts the ndings by Leeper (1991) who suggests
that both monetary and scal policy must be aggressive simultaneously, for the system to
be explosive. Furthermore, when a relative ination scal policy rule is combined with a
forward looking Taylor rule, then scal policy also directly affects the learning stability
of monetary policy. Specically, if monetary policy is indeterminate but E-stable, then an
aggressive scal policy rule can make monetary policy unstable under RLS learning.
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When scal policy instead stabilizes the domestic output gaps while monetary pol-
icy reacts to shocks in union output and ination, then scal policy does not have to satisfy
stability conditions independently of monetary policy. Instead, scal policy increases the
indeterminate and E-unstable region for which the Taylor principle is violated. Hence, the
determinacy and E-stability region for a contemporaneous interest rate rule is smaller, the
more aggressive scal policy is in its stabilization efforts. Thus instead of eliminating un-
stable liquidity traps, as in the case investigated by Evans et al. (2008), aggressive scal
policy can destabilize the economy of a monetary union. However, if monetary policy is
forward looking and sufciently aggressive to satisfy the Taylor principle, then an aggres-
sive scal policy rule can actually help induce determinacy.
Chapter 1
A Monetary Union Model with Input Trade
Chapter Overview
This chapter presents a two-country general equilibrium model of a monetary union. In
addition to trade in nal goods, we also allow for trade in intermediate goods. This causes
labour markets to have spillover effects on the neighboring economy. As a result of this,
the correlation between the union members' supply shocks increases with the level of trade,
which in turn decreases the cost of having relinquished sovereignty of monetary policy.
We look at optimal discretionary monetary policy under the assumption of sticky
prices and nd that the central bank stabilizes union-wide shocks since it has no means of
tackling country-specic shocks.
The assumption of rational expectations is maintained throughout this chapter. How-
ever, this assumption will be relaxed in chapter 2, when we use the model presented here
to look at determinacy and E-stability of different monetary policy rules. The results found
in the following chapter will then be used as a benchmark case in later chapters, when
considering learning in monetary union models with heterogeneities.
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1.1 Introduction
The potential costs and benets of forming a monetary union have long been debated
among economists and with the introduction of the euro in January 1999, this became
more than merely an academic exercise.
While the benets of introducing a single currency include the elimination of ex-
change rate uncertainty and transaction costs, as well as improved price transparency and
nancial integration, there is a cost in that countries relinquish the sovereignty of monetary
policy. This also eliminates the use of a exible exchange rate to stabilize shocks to com-
petitiveness and leaves scal policy as the sole instrument at a country's disposal to offset
country-specic shocks.
However, because budgets are determined by a large set of variables being mainly
partisan, scal policy is a less exible instrument for economic stabilization than monetary
policy is. Furthermore, sustainable budget decits can undermine the credibility of the
union single currency, since a monetary expansion may be expected to pay off government
debt.1 The convergence criteria of the EMU therefore stipulates a limit on budget decits
of 3% of GDP and on government debt of 60% of GDP.
Given that scal policy is less than a perfect substitute for monetary policy, a country
should join a monetary union only if the expected long term benets of doing so exceed
the long term costs of not having independent monetary policy.
1 Sargent & Wallace (1981) present a model in which a sustainable scal decit forces the central bank to
provide seigniorage, which in turn leads to self-fullling levels of hyper ination.
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As pointed out by Mundell (1961) in his pioneering work, the cost of giving up
control of national monetary policy is lower, the more synchronized member countries'
business cycles are. This is because a higher correlation of business cycles implies a lower
relative magnitude of country-specic to union-wide shocks, ceteris paribus. While union-
wide shocks can be tackled by a union central bank, this is not true of country-specic or
asymmetric shocks.2
It has been suggested that mobility of labour and price exibility could reduce the
costs of forming a monetary union for countries with asymmetric shocks.3 In our model,
trade in inputs causes a direct link between the domestic labour market and foreign output
and prices. Furthermore, we nd that a higher level of input trade, induced by a lower
level of home bias in nal goods rms' production technology, increases the correlation
between member countries' supply shocks and hence increases business cycle correlations.
This lowers the magnitude of country-specic to union-wide shocks and thereby reduces
the cost of having relinquished sovereignty of monetary policy.
We extend the two country model put forward by Clarida, Gali & Gertler (2002)
(CGG (2002), hereafter) to include trade in intermediate goods or inputs and we also mod-
2 This is partly because a change in the interest rates affects prices and output similarly in all countries
when price rigidities are the same for all union members. In chapter 3 we will look at the case of heteroge-
neous price rigidities. In that case, monetary policy does affect relative variables and can therefore stabilize
asymmetric shocks, to an extent. However, the current target ination of the ECB, the Harmonized Index of
Consumer Prices (HICP), suggests that overall price stability is the main concern of the ECB.
3 Mundell (1961) assumed stationary expectations in addition to labour immobility and rigidities in wages
and prices. This seminal paper became a key reference point for the opponents of a single European currency
(see for example Murray et al. (2003)). However, in later work, Mundell (1973) allowed for private sector
expectations to be conditional on the exchange rate regime. He then suggests that a common currency, which
eliminates exchange rate uncertainty, would lead to a higher level of international portfolio diversication
through nancial markets. Hence, Mundell was ultimately a proponent of a European single currency.
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ify it by giving it monetary union characteristics.4 The latter implies eliminating the bilat-
eral exchange rate and introducing a common central bank. We further introduce home bias
in input trade, which can both be justied empirically and also allows us to isolate the spe-
cic effect that trade in inputs has on our results. We use two extreme cases as benchmarks;
one in which there is no trade in inputs and complete home bias, and the other in which
there is no home bias and complete openness in trade. While the former case is isomor-
phic to the cooperative case in CGG (2002), the latter is isomorphic to a closed economy.
In this chapter, we assume that all agents have rational expectations. This assumption will
be relaxed in the following chapter.
In the following section we set up the micro foundations of our model and in turn
introduce three different types of agents; households, nal goods rms and intermediate
goods rms. Section 1.3 then identies the equilibrium steady state of the model and look
at deviations from this under the assumptions of exible and sticky prices. We introduce
the central bank's loss function, derived from micro principles, in section 1.4 and use this
to derive optimal discretionary monetary policy under the assumption of sticky prices à la
Calvo (1983). Section 1.5 concludes the chapter.
1.2 The Model
We present a two-country monetary union model consisting of a continuum of agents
spread over the unit interval, of which [0; n) reside in home country (H) and (n; 1] re-
4 CGG (2002) show that cooperation between the two countries' independent central banks is welfare im-
proving of the Nash equilibrium case in which each central bank takes the other's actions as exogenous.
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side in foreign country (F ). Following CGG (2002) we introduce three types of agents in
each country: (i) households, (ii) intermediate rms and (iii) nal goods rms.
Households supply labour domestically, while indiscriminately consuming nal goods
produced in both countries.
Intermediate rms use domestically supplied labour to produce inputs, or intermedi-
ate goods, which are sold to nal goods rms. We assume that intermediate rms produce
inputs under monopolistic competition. In addition, intermediate rms face a xed proba-
bility  of changing their price in each period as proposed by Calvo (1983).
Final goods rms are perfectly competitive and have home bias in technology so
that in general they use domestically produced inputs more efciently than they use inputs
produced abroad. Consequently, they have a higher demand for domestic intermediate
goods.
The higher the level of home bias in technology of nal goods rms is, the lower is
the level of trade in inputs. At the two extremes we have; no trade in inputs and complete
home bias in production, or no home bias and complete openness in trade. The former of
these two benchmarks is the case considered in CGG (2002), while the latter case mimics
a closed economy, as will be shown later in this chapter.
We assume that the number of households, intermediate rms and nal goods rms
is the same in each country. That is, n for home country and (1  n) for foreign country.
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1.2.1 Households
The representative household of home country faces the lifetime utility function:
Ut(h) = Et
 1

s=t
s t

U(CHs (h)) + L

Ms(h)
PHs

  V (NH;s(h))

(1.1)
Where Et denotes household expectations given the period t information set,  
(0; 1) is the household discount factor, Ms(h)
PHs
is the holdings of the union currency deated
by the domestic consumer price index and NH;s(h) is the amount of labour hours supplied.
While U() and L() are assumed concave, V () is taken to be convex.
Consumer preferences are given by a Cobb-Douglas function as in Obstfeld & Rogoff
(1998);
CHt 
(CHH;t)
n(CHF;t)
1 n
nn(1 n)1 n ,
implying the cost minimizing price index;
PHt  (PHH;t)n(PHF;t)1 n.
Households in foreign country face an analogous utility function with their prefer-
ences specifying their consumption index as;
CFt 
(CFH;t)
n(CFF;t)
1 n
nn(1 n)1 n ,
and with the corresponding price index;
P Ft  (P FH;t)n(P FF;t)1 n.
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Here Cji;t denotes the consumption by households in country j of goods produced in
country i and P ji;t is the price paid by the consumer in country j when purchasing one unit
of the good produced by country i, where i; j = H;F .
Assuming no transportation costs of exporting consumer goods and given that prices
are set considering the monetary union as a common market, the identical preferences
imply that the law of one price holds.
That is, PHi;t = P Fi;t for i = H;F and we can denote the general price level in both
countries by Pt.
We further dene the terms of trade as relative prices of consumer goods, that is:
Tt  PF;t=PH;t
Given the Cobb-Douglas type preferences for consumption goods, utility maximiza-
tion implies that expenditure on each good is proportional to the size of the economy in
which the product is produced. Since the consumer price indices of both countries are the
same, i.e. PHt = P Ft = Pt = P nH;tP
1 n
F;t = T
 n
t PF;t = T
1 n
t PH;t, it follows that:
CHH;t = nT
1 nCHt and CHF;t = (1  n)T nCHt (1.2)
A set of analogous conditions holds for foreign country consumption, CFt .5
To simplify, nancial markets are assumed to offer complete risk diversication both
domestically and internationally, as in Devereux & Engel (2000). Benigno (2004) assumes
5 For foreign country we have: CFH;t = nT 1 nCFt and CFF;t = (1  n)T nCFt .
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complete nancial markets domestically but allows for households of the two countries to
take a position in a union bond. It is shown that under reasonable assumptions this bond is
redundant and that there is perfect risk sharing of consumption across countries also in that
case.6 Hence, our assumption simplies the analysis without being overly restrictive.
It follows that consumption is guaranteed to be equal for all consumers across the
monetary union at any given date, that is CHt = CFt = Ct.
Let At;t+1 denote the random payoff in period t + 1 from the portfolio of assets pur-
chased at time t and dene the associated stochastic discount factor as Qt;t+1. Households
pay lump sum taxes of t and obtain returns from ownership of prot making intermediate
rms, Ft. The representative domestic household is thus faced with the following budget
constraint:
Et(Qt;t+1At;t+1(h)) +
Mt(h)
Pt
+ Ct(h) (1.3)
  t(h) +WH;t(h)NH;t(h) + Ft  t
Where  t(h)  At 1;t(h)+ Mt 1(h)Pt 1 , and where foreign households face an analogous
constraint.
Given that households are monopolistically competitive suppliers of labour, demand
for labour is given by the constant elasticity function:
6 Appendix A of Benigno (2004) shows that, assuming no initial holdings of the internationally traded
bond, it becomes redundant.
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NH;t(h) =

WH;t(h)
WH;t
 H;t
NH;t (1.4)
This is consistent with cost minimization given that the basket of labour hours em-
ployed is a CES function. The parameter H;t is the wage elasticity of labour hours de-
manded and is assumed to be the same for all households in countryH , but can vary across
countries as well as over time.
Each household seeks to maximize its lifetime utility function (1:1) by choosing
consumption levels, holdings of real money balances and its supply of labour subject to the
budget constraint (1:3) and demand for its labour (1:4). In addition to equation (1:2), which
gives the optimal amount to spend on each consumer good for a given level of consumption,
we have the following rst order conditions:
WH;t(h)
Pt
= (1 + wH;t)
V 0(NH;t(h))
U 0(Ct)
(1.5)
The market power of households as monopolistically competitive suppliers of labour
is reected by the mark-up of real wages, where wH;t  1=(H;t   1). Since wages are
exible and preferences identical for all households, it follows that all households within
a country work the same amount of hours and hence earn the same wage, i.e. WH;t(h) =
WH;t and NH;t(h) = NH;t for h[0; n] , and WF;t(h) = WF;t and NF;t(h) = NF;t for
h[n; 1].
1.2 The Model 30
Dening the price of a one-period discount bond as R 1t = Et(Qt;t+1) , optimal
consumption planning is determined by the familiar Euler equation:
UC(Ct) = RtEt

UC(Ct+1)
Pt
Pt+1

(1.6)
Finally, we have the marginal utility of holding one unit of real money being equal to
its opportunity cost, that is:
LM=P

Mt
Pt

=
 
1 R 1t

UC(Ct) (1.7)
Note that the money supply is set to satisfy this condition given the interest rate
chosen by the union central bank, Rt. Furthermore, since consumption is guaranteed for
all households across the union, it follows that the above two equations (1:6) and (1:7)
are identical for all households within the monetary union, while (1:5) is identical for all
households within a given country.
1.2.2 Final goods rms
Each country has a continuum of nal goods rms that produce the goods consumed by
households. The number of these rms is equal to the number of households and they
are hence distributed over the interval [0; n) in home country and (n; 1] in foreign country.
Final goods rms operate under perfect competition and the consumer goods differ only
depending on the country in which they are produced. In contrast to CGG (2002), we as-
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sume that rms use input baskets supplied by both countries' intermediate rms to produce
nal goods. The production function of home country rms is given by:
Y sH;t = A
H
t

(1  H) 1v (XHH;t)1 
1
v + (H)
1
v (XHF;t)
1  1
v
 v
v 1 (1.8)
Where Y sH;t is the output produced by the representative nal goods rm in home
country, while XHi;t is the basket of inputs produced in country i and used by home country
rms, all in per capita terms. The technology parameter AHt , determines the efciency
of the production process and v gives the level of substitutability between domestic and
foreign input baskets. We have dened H  (1   n)!, where ! takes a value between
zero and one and measures the degree of home bias in technology.
When there is no home bias, then ! = 1 and rms use a proportion of inputs from
home country equal to its economic size n. The other benchmark case is when there is
complete home bias in technology and ! = 0. In this case rms only use domestically
produced intermediate goods in their production process. Allowing for ! to take a value
between 0 and 1 also enables us to fully identify the specic effect that trade in inputs has
on our model.
The level of home bias in technology and the level of trade in intermediate goods are
inversely related, so that when there is complete home bias then there is no trade in inputs,
and when there is no home bias then there is complete openness in trade of intermediate
goods.
1.2 The Model 32
Benigno & Theonissen (2008) use one traded and one non-traded intermediate good
in a production process isomorphic to ours and use this together with incomplete nan-
cial markets to explain the consumption-real exchange rate anomaly. There is empirical
evidence to support the presence of home bias within the European Union.7
Country F 's nal goods rms are distributed over the interval [n; 1] and face an anal-
ogous problem with the production technology:
Y sF;t = A
F
t

(1  F ) 1v (XFH;t)1 
1
v + (F )
1
v (XFF;t)
1  1
v
 v
v 1 (1.9)
Where 1   F  n!, the technology parameter is given by AFt and where XFH;t and
XFF;t are the home and foreign countries' input baskets used by foreign country's rms to
produce consumer goods Y sF;t.
The input baskets are made up of inputs produced by a continuum of intermediate
rms in both countries according to the following CES functions:
XHH;t 
"
1
n
 1

Z n
0
xHH;t(f)
1  1
 df
# 
 1
, (1.10)
XHF;t 
"
1
1  n
 1

Z 1
n
xHF;t(f)
1  1
 df
# 
 1
7 Head & Mayers (2000) nd evidence of a preference for domestic products within the EU. The European
countries have been free from trade tariffs since 1969 and the European Single Market Act helped to eliminate
non-tariff barriers of trade by the end of 1992. Nevertheless, biases in trade are still evident and hence
attributed to differences in preferences.
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With similar functions for foreign country, and where  > v > 1 so that input goods
of the same country are closer substitutes than the country H and country F input baskets
are. Cost minimization, taking the input baskets demandedXd;iH;t andX
d;i
F;t as given, implies
the following demand functions for intermediate rm f ´s products:
xd;iH;t(f) =
 
IPH;t(f)
IPH;t
! 
Xd;iH;t and x
d;i
F;t(f) =

IPF;t(f)
IPF;t
 
Xd;iF;t (1.11)
Where the price indices of Country H and F input baskets, IPH;t and IPF;t respec-
tively, are given by:
IPH;t =
"
1
n
 1

Z n
0
IPH;t(f)
 1df
# 1
 1
, (1.12)
IPF;t =
"
1
1  n
 1

Z 1
n
IPF;t(f)
 1df
# 1
 1
Note that we assume, as with consumer prices, that the law of one price holds so that
nal goods rms of both countries pay the same price for input baskets.
Minimizing costs, while taking the price PH;t(PF;t) of the consumer good YH;t(YF;t)
in countryH(F ) as given and noting that all nal goods rms within a country are identical
gives the aggregate demand functions for the input baskets as functions of their prices and
given levels of output:8
8 The aggregate demand functions are given by:
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XdH;t =

IPH;t
PH;t
 v
(1  H)Y
s
H;t
AHt
+

IPH;t
PF;t
 v
H
Y sF;t
AFt
, (1.13)
XdF;t =

IPF;t
PH;t
 v
(1  F )Y
s
H;t
AHt
+

IPF;t
PF;t
 v
F
Y sF;t
AFt
Where the aggregate demand for import baskets in per capita terms is dened as
Xdi;t  Xd;Hi;t + Xd;Fi;t and where output Y si;t is also given in per capita terms. Finally, we
have the price of one unit of country H(F )'s consumption good being determined by the
index:
PH;t =

(1  H)IP v 1H;t + HIP v 1F;t
 1
v 1 , (1.14)
PF;t =

(1  F )IP v 1H;t + F IP v 1F;t
 1
v 1
Hence, when there is no trade in inputs and ! = 0, nal goods prices in both countries
are equal to the prices of the domestic intermediate good indices. When ! = 1 and home
bias is absent, nal goods prices in both countries are equal. In general however, the higher
! is, the lower is the degree of home bias and the closer are the price levels of the two
countries.
nXdH;t =

IPH;t
PH;t
 v
(1  H)nY
s
H;t
AHt
+

IPH;t
PF;t
 v
(1  F ) (1 n)Y
s
F;t
AFt
and
(1  n)XdF;t =

IPF;t
PH;t
 v
H
nY st
AHt
+

IPF;t
PF;t
 v
F
(1 n)Y sF;t
AFt
Dividing these through by n and (1 n) respectively, to get the functions in per capita terms gives (1:13).
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1.2.3 Intermediate goods rms
Intermediate rms use domestically supplied labour to produce inputs or intermediate
goods. These inputs are traded internationally and are used in the production process of
nal goods rms in both home and foreign country, depending on the level of home bias in
technology as discussed in the previous section.
We assume, without loss of generality, that the number of intermediate rms in each
country is the same as the number of households and consumer goods rms. That is,
country H has a continuum of rms over [0; n) and country F over the (n; 1] interval.
A representative rm f of country H and F respectively, faces the following linear
technology:
xsH;t(f) = B
H
t NH;t(f) and xsF;t(f) = BFt NF;t(f) (1.15)
Here, BHt (BFt ) is a technology parameter of intermediate rms in country H(F );
while the basket of labour hours employed NH;t(f)(NF;t(f)) by rm f in home (foreign)
country is given by:
NH;t(f) 
h
1
n
R n
0
NH;t(h)
1  1
H;t dh
i H;t
H;t 1 and NF;t(f) 
h
1
1 n
R 1
n
NF;t(h)
1  1
F;t dh
i F;t
F;t 1
The wage indices are given by:
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WH;t 
"
1
n
 1

Z n
0
Wt(h)
1  1
H;t dh
# H;t
H;t 1
(1.16)
WF;t 
"
1
1  n
 1
1 
Z 1
n
Wt(h)
1  1
F;t dh
# F;t
F;t 1
Where the parameter i;t is the wage elasticity of labour hours demanded.
Choosing labour to minimize costs conditional on output yields the real marginal
cost:
MCH;t =
(1  H)WH;t=PH;t
BHt
=
(1  H)(WH;t=Pt)T 1 nt
BHt
(1.17)
MCF;t =
(1  F )(WF;t=Pt)T nt
BFt
where  i is a government subsidy provided to intermediate rms of country i = H;F .
Following Calvo (1983), we assume staggered price setting so that rms in country
H(F ) get to adjust their price every period with a xed probability of 1  H (1  F ) and
hence keep prices xed while adjusting output to accommodate demand with a probability
of H(F ).
Domestic rms setting their price in period t; choose the price IP 0H;t by solving the
following program:
Max
fIP 0H;tg
: Et
1

s=t
(H)s tQt;sxH;s(f)

IP 0H;t(f)  PH;sMCH;s(f)

(1.18)
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subject to xdH;s(f) =

IPH;s(f)
IPH;s
 
XdH;s
with intermediate rms in country F optimizing an analogous program.
If rms could set their price in each period with certainty, that is if  = 0, they would
choose:
IP 0H;t(f) =
 
1 + pH;t

MCH;tPH;t (1.19)
That is, they would choose a price that is a mark-up over the nominal marginal cost,
where pH;t 
 
1
 1

is a result of the product differentiation of inputs and the market power
of intermediate rms. As  increases and intermediate goods become closer substitutes, the
mark-up approaches zero.
For a positive , we have domestic rms adjusting their price IP 0H;t in period t to
satisfy:
Et
1

s=t
(H)s tQt;sxH;s(f)

IP 0H;t(f)  (1 + pH;t)PH;sMCH;s(f)

= 0 (1.20)
Given an analogous problem and solution for intermediate rms located in country
F , we have the price indices of the two countries' input baskets determined by:
IPH;t 
"
1
n
 1
 
H(nIPH;t 1)1  + (1  H)(nIP 0H;t)1 
# 11 
, (1.21)
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IPF;t 
"
1
1  n
 1
 
F ((1  n)IPF;t 1)1  + (1  F )((1  n)IP 0F;t)1 
# 11 
1.3 Equilibrium
This section characterizes the rational expectations equilibrium of the monetary union
model outlined above. The equilibrium conditions for households, intermediate rms and
nal goods rms are all simultaneously satised in this general equilibrium. As is stan-
dard for New Keynesian DSGE models used for policy analysis, we dene three different
specications for the REE that differ only due to their assumptions about the presence of
exogenous shocks and the exibility of prices.9 In the dened steady state equilibrium,
there are no shocks and the economy is at a state of rest. The exible price equilibrium
then introduces the presence of exogenous shocks while maintaining the assumption of
exible prices. Finally, we introduce price rigidities à la Calvo (1983) into the model with
exogenous shocks. In this case, prices are sluggish to adjust to economic shocks, causing
distortions to output. It is then the role of monetary policy to steer the economy towards
the equilibrium that would have prevailed under exible prices and in the absence of distor-
tions to output. Consequently, we focus on the sticky price equilibrium of the model when
looking at monetary policy in the following section. Nevertheless, it is important to clearly
9 See Woodford (2003, Ch. 3 and Ch. 4) and Galí (2008, Ch. 1 and Ch. 2) for an overview of New
Keynesian DSGE models.
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identify the steady state and exible price equilibrium to which the sticky price equilibrium
is compared.
We start by specifying consumption, the terms of trade and the marginal cost of
intermediate rms as functions of domestic and foreign levels of output. We then derive
output as a function of exogenous parameters under the assumption of exible prices. We
further specify the deterministic steady state of our model in which there are no shocks to
the economy. A log-linearization around this steady state under the assumption of sticky
prices then gives us familiar IS schedules and New Keynesian Phillips Curves (NKPCs).
These are used in the following section to identify optimal discretionary monetary policy.
We dene the per capita aggregate demand for home (foreign) country's nal goods
as Y dH;t(Y dF;t) and use (1:2) to obtain the market clearing conditions:10
Y dH;t = T
1 n
t Ct and Y dF;t = T nt Ct (1.22)
Hence, although consumption is guaranteed output can vary across countries due to
disturbances to the terms of trade.
The equilibrium of our model is given by the aggregate demand block described
in section 1:2:1 and the supply side of the economy is determined by intermediate rms
of section 1:2:3, the nal goods rms outlined in section 1:2:2 and households´ labour
10 The aggregate demand for home goods nY dH;t is from (1:2) given by:
nY dt = nC
H
H;t + (1  n)CFH;t = n2T 1 nCt + (1  n)nT 1 nCt = nT 1 nCt
Since consumption is guaranteed. Dividing throug by n gives country H´s market clearing condition in
per capita terms: Y dt = T 1 nCt. The foreign market clearing condition is derived analogously.
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supply decisions. Specically, the Euler equation (1:6), the condition for money market
clearing (1:7) and the above market clearing conditions (1:22) together with the condition;
CHt = C
F
t = Ct, determine the sequence for
n
Ct;Mt; Rt
o
given the sequence of consumer
prices fPtg and the initial condition P 1.
By combining the market clearing conditions for home and foreign country and by
imposing the equilibrium condition Y dt = Y st = Yt, we can determine per capita consump-
tion as a function of output:
Ct = Y
n
H;tY
1 n
F;t (1.23)
We also have the terms of trade stabilizing differences between output per capita in
the two regions, that is:
Tt =
YH;t
YF;t
(1.24)
To simplify our analysis in what follows we impose iso-elastic preferences on house-
holds:
U(Ct)  V (Nt) = C
1 
t
1    
Nt(h)
1+
1 + 
(1.25)
Where  is the relative risk aversion of households, while  measures workers' disu-
tility from working.
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On the supply side, the sequence for prices is determined by the optimal price setting
condition for intermediate rms (1:20), the condition determining the input prices (1:21)
and the relationship between input prices and the prices of nal goods (1:14). Further-
more, combining labour supply (1:5) and intermediate rms condition for cost minimiza-
tion (1:17), yields the condition for marginal cost:11
MCH;t = (1  H)(1 + wH;t)
NH;tC

t T
1 n
t
BHt
(1.26)
and
MCF;t = (1  F )(1 + wF;t)
NF;tC

t T
 n
t
BFt
(1.27)
We aggregate the labour hours used as inputs by intermediate rms in home country:
NH;t = n
 1
nZ
0
Nt(f)df =
n 1
nZ
0
xt(f)df
BHt
(1.28)
we further make use of;
xH;t(f) =

IPH;t(f)
IPH;t
 
XH;t
dene the dispersion of intermediate goods prices as:
11 Recall that wi;t  1=(i;t   1) where i;t is the wage elasticity of labour.
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Vt  n 1
nZ
0

IPH;t(f)
IPH;t
 
df
The aggregate production function is then given by:
XSH;t =
NtB
H
t
Vt
(1.29)
We combine this aggregate production function (1:29) with the demand function for
input baskets (1:13) and the equilibrium condition Y dt = Y st = Yt to obtainNt as a function
of output. Further using the above conditions for consumption (1:23) and the terms of trade
(1:24), gives the marginal cost as a function of output, prices and exogenous variables:
MCH;t = (1  H)(1 + wH;t)YH;t(1 n )+nYF;t( 1)(1 n )
 
BHt
 (1+) (1.30)
V t
 
IPH;t
PH;t
 v
(1  H)YH;t +

IPH;t
PF;t
 v
HYF;t
!
With an analogous condition holding for foreign country.12 Note that we have made
the simplifying assumption; AHt = AFt = 1.
The marginal cost is affected by both domestic and foreign output, as in CGG (2002).
12 Specically we haveMCF;t = (1  F )(1 + wF;t)V F;t
 
BFt
 (1+)
YH;t
n( 1)YF;t n( 1)
IPH;t
PF;t
 v
(1  F )YH;t +

IPF;t
PF;t
 v
FYF;t
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Output affects the marginal cost and hence prices through three different channels:
(i) the wealth effect, (ii) the terms of trade effect and (iii) through workers' required com-
pensation for working longer hours.
As output increases, households become wealthier and consume more, which in-
creases the marginal rate of substitution between consumption and labour and thus has an
incremental effect on wages and the marginal cost. Because of consumption risk sharing
across the union, both domestic and foreign output affect the marginal cost through this
channel. Since a proportion of the wealth effect (1   n) now comes from foreign output,
the effect from domestic output is smaller here than in the closed economy case (n times
as large).
Domestic and foreign output affect the marginal cost in different directions through
the terms of trade. While the terms of trade effect of domestic output on the domestic
marginal cost is positive, an increase in foreign output depreciates the terms of trade and
hence also the real marginal cost facing domestic intermediate rms.
Finally, an increase in output requires that workers work longer hours, which in-
creases their disutility from working and thereby their required compensation, i.e. their
wages. Our model differs from CGG (2002) in that foreign output affects the domestic
marginal costs through this last channel. Only in the special case of complete home bias
(! = 0) does our marginal cost reduce to that of CGG (2002).
With trade in intermediate goods, foreign nal goods rms use domestically pro-
duced intermediate goods as inputs. As domestic intermediate rms increase their use of
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domestic labour to accommodate a higher demand for their products from foreign nal
goods rms, their marginal cost increases. Consequently, with ! > 0 we have a positive
correlation between foreign output and the domestic marginal cost even with logarithmic
utility ( = 1). This is in contrast to the model of CGG (2002), in which logarithmic util-
ity of consumption implies that foreign output is neutral on the marginal cost as the wealth
effect and the terms of trade effect cancel each other out.
1.3.1 Flexible price equilibrium
In this section we consider the case of exible prices ( = 0) and assume that the wage
mark-up is xed at i
w, where i = H;F , as in CGG (2002). This is practical for two
reasons: it allows us to consider uctuations in output that are not due to changes in the
degree of labour market efciency and it also makes sense if we consider variations in the
wage mark-up as a proxy for wage rigidities, since wages are assumed exible here.
Note that in the exible price equilibrium all intermediate rms within a region
charge the same price and produce the same amount of output, that is Vt = 1. The ag-
gregate production function then becomes XSH;t = NtBt.
We consider the symmetric case in which both the subsidies and the technology of
intermediate rms are the same in both union countries, i.e. H = F =  and BHt =
BFt = Bt.13 It follows from (1:17) that the nominal marginal costs are the same in both
13 See Appendix 1B for derivation of the level of subsidy supporting welfare maximisation of union house-
holds. The subsidy H = F is taken to be (1+w)(1+p) 1 and is hence effectively a subsidy that offsets
the distortions to production arising from mark-up pricing by intermediate rms and the mark-up wages of
households.
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countries, i.e. PH;tMCH;t = PF;tMCF;t. This implies from (1:19) that intermediate rms
across the union set the same price in each period, so IP 0t (f) = IPH;t = IPF;t.
Finally, having used (1:21), equation (1:14) implies that consumer goods prices are
equal in the two countries IPH;t = IPF;t = PH;t = PF;t. The marginal cost is then given
by:
____
MCH;t =
____
MCF;t = (1 + 
p
t )
 1 (1.31)
Combining (1:39) and (1:31) yields the natural level of output as a function of ex-
ogenous parameters:
((1  H)
_
Y H;t + 
H
_
Y F;t)

_
Y H;t
(1 n )+n =
_
Y F;t
(1 )(1 n )B(1+)t
(1  ) (1 + pt ) (1 + wH)
(1.32)
((1  F )
_
Y H;t + 
F
_
Y F;t)

_
Y
(1 n )+n
F;t =
_
Y H;t
n(1 )B(1+)t
(1  ) (1 + pt ) (1 + wF )
The simultaneous equations in (1:32) solve for equilibrium output of both countries.
Although we cannot offer an explicit solution for output we can get some insight into the
relationship between output and the exogenous variables as well as the relationship between
foreign and domestic output.
The effect of foreign output on domestic is ambiguous and depends on the relative
magnitudes of ; ; ! and n. Again we have the three effects by which foreign output
affects the domestic marginal cost at work.
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The likelihood of foreign output having a negative effect on domestic output increases
with the level of trade in inputs. This is because an increase in foreign output now increases
the demand for and hence the cost of inputs that are also used by domestic nal goods rms,
causing a reduction in domestic production, ceteris paribus.
An increase in the government subsidy  or intermediate rms' productivityBt raises
output, while an increase in workers' or intermediate rms' monopolistic market power
lowers it.
1.3.2 The steady state
Here we characterize the symmetric and deterministic steady state equilibrium of our model.
We drop the time subscript when considering the steady state value of variables.
In the steady state there are no shocks to the economy and the technology parameters
BH andBF are both equal to one. Ination rates in both countries are zero and the common
central bank anchors the interest rate at the inverse of the household discount factor, so that
R 1 = .
In the steady state the terms of trade is equal to one (T = 1), consumption is constant
at C by the Euler equation (1:6) and real money balances are determined by (1:7). This
implies, by the market clearing conditions (1:22), that the steady state level of output per
capita is equal to consumption per capita in both union countries, i.e. Y H = Y F = C.
It is straightforward to solve for the steady state level of output as:
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Y H = Y F = [(1  ) (1 + p) (1 + w)] 
1
+ (1.33)
Note that since the level of subsidy in the steady state is given by  = 1   (1 +
w) 1 (1 + p) 1 (see appendix 1B) it follows that the steady state level of output and
hence also consumption is equal to one.
We now proceed to consider the case of staggered prices setting as in Calvo (1983),
allowing for small perturbations in the vicinity of our steady state.
1.3.3 Log-linear equilibrium uctuations
In this section we reduce our model to a system consisting of a union IS schedule and
New Keynesian Phillips Curves (NKPC) for each union country. We do so by allowing for
small deviations from our steady state equilibrium under the assumption of sticky prices, as
suggested by Calvo (1983). Dene xt as the log-deviation of the generic variable Xt from
its steady state value X . The deviation from our dened steady state arises because we are
allowing for both the presence of shocks and for prices to be sticky. That is, xt =
 
xt +

xt
where  xt is the log-deviation from the steady state arising under exible prices while

xt
denotes the percentage uctuation from the exible price equilibrium due to prices being
sticky. We dene world variables as the union average; XW  nXH + (1  n)XF and
relative variables as the difference between foreign and domestic, i.e. XR  XF  XH .
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Consider rst aggregate demand, while the money market clears according to (1:7)
given the interest rate set by the union central bank, the log-linear version of the Euler
equation (1:6) is given by:14;15
ct = Et(ct+1)   1

rt   Et(Wt+1)

(1.34)
Where the interest rate is dened as rt  (Rt   1) and Wt is the union average
domestic ination rate or equivalently the individual countries' c.p.i. ination rates and
is given by ln

Pt
Pt 1

or nHt + (1   n)Ft , which are the same in this model due to the
identical preferences of country H and country F consumers and the law of one price.
We now make use of the log-linearized versions of equation (1:23); ct = nyHt +(1 
n)yFt = y
W
t . Substituting this expression into (1:34) yields the union IS schedule:

ct =

y
W
t = Et(

y
W
t+1)   1

rt   Et(Wt+1)  rrt

(1.35)
Where the natural rate of interest is a function of changes to the natural rate of output,
specically rrt = Et(
 
y
W
t+1). This is similar to the cooperative case in CGG (2002) in
that we make the output gaps of both countries endogenous when linearizing. It differs
from their results under Nash competition in which they take foreign variables as given.
14 See Friedman (2003) for a discussion about the abandonment of the LM curve in the macroeconomic
literature.
15 Generally speaking,  is the relative risk aversion of households, that is  =  U `(C)
_
C
U\(C) .
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Equation (1:35) resembles an IS curve of a closed economy if you consider the mon-
etary union as one large country and it is also equivalent to the IS schedules in the monetary
union model of Benigno (2004).16
We now turn to the supply side of our framework and derive the NKPCs. Combining
the optimal price setting condition for intermediate rms (1:20) with the input price index
evolving according to the Calvo (1983) model (1:21) and log-linearizing around the steady
state yields:17;18
H;t = mct + Et(H;t+1) (1.36)
Where H;t is the price ination of country H`s input goods and where:
  [(1  )(1  )] =
as the discount rate used by rms R 1 is assumed to be the same as for households,
i.e.  (recall our dened steady state).19
Log-linearising the expression for marginal cost (1:30) using a linear approximation
of the aggregate production function (1:29), where xt = nt + bt and combining this with
16 Key to obtaining this result is the assumption of complete nancial markets leading to guaranteed con-
sumption for all households within the monetary union. In the model of Benigno (2004), consumption is also
guaranteed as mentioned in section 1:2:1.
17 We focus on the domestic case here, but the case for foreign country follows analogously.
18 Note here the difference in notation, ination of input prices IPi;t is denoted by i;t, while ination of
nal goods prices Pi;t is denoted by it
19 See Woodford (2003, Ch. 3) for derivation and proof of the general case.
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the linearized version of the demand for the input baskets (1:13), yields the expression for
the marginal cost:
mcH;t = 
w
t + 
Hy
H
t + 
H
0

y
F
t (1.37)
where we have dened H  (1 n)+n+(1 H) and H0  ( 1)(1 n)+H.
Note that we have made use of the log-linearized version of the domestic natural level of
output (1:33);
^
y
H
t =

(1 + )bH;t   0^y
F
t
 
H
 1
Combining (1:36) and (1:37) gives the New Keyenesian Phillips curve for domestic
intermediate goods ination:

H;t
= H

y
H
t + 
H
0

y
F
t + Et(H;t+1) + uH;t (1.38)
where H  H , H0  H0 and where the cost push shock is a function of varia-
tions in the wage mark-up, uH;t = wH;t.
The analogous case for country F `s input ination is given by:
F;t = 
Fy
H
t + 
F
0

y
F
t + Et(F;t+1) + uF;t (1.39)
where uF;t  F;t, F  F , F0  F0 , with F = n(   1) + (1   F ) and
F0 = (1  n) + n+ F.
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We assume that the labour market shocks follow a stable AR(1) process;
i;t = %i;t 1 + "t i = H;F
where 0 < % < 1 and where "t is an i.i.d random shock with zero mean.
To obtain ination in output prices from ination in input prices, we make use of the
log-linearized version of the price indices (1:14):
Ht = (1  H)H;t + HF;t and Ft = (1  F )H;t + FF;t (1.40)
Hence, we have the supply schedules for the two union members given by:
H
t
= H

y
H
t + 
H
0

y
F
t + Et(
H
t+1) + u
H
t (1.41)
F
t
= F

y
H
t + 
F
0

y
F
t + Et(
F
t+1) + u
F
t
where we have dened:
H  (1  H)H + HF ; F  (1  F )H + FF ;
H0  (1  H)H0 + HF0 ; F0  (1  F )H0 + FF0 ;
uHt  (1  H)uH;t + HuF;t; uFt = (1  F )uH;t + FuF;t.
As the level of trade in inputs increases (! "), H and F approach (1   n). There
is hence convergence of consumer ination levels, with increasing trade. Furthermore,
the foreign country labour market shock uF;t now has a direct effect on domestic ination
through the domestic supply shock uHt . This is because a shock to domestic wages changes
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the price of domestic intermediate goods, which are used in the production process of
foreign nal goods rms. More generally, we have the following result.
Proposition 1 The correlation between domestic and foreign supply shocks, uHt and uFt ,
increases with the level of trade in inputs, i.e. Corr(u
H
t ;u
F
t )
!
> 0.
Proof. See appendix 1A.
Figure 1.1 illustrates how the correlation coefcient between supply shocks increases
with the level of input trade. With complete home bias and no trade in inputs the supply
shocks are completely independent of one another, while with complete openness in trade
they are equal to each other.
Fig. 1.1. The graph shows that the correlation coefcient between supply shocks increases
with the level of trade in intermediate goods (!).
This result is signicant since evidence suggests that trade between euro zone coun-
tries has increased since the launch of the EMU.20 If this higher level of trade, as concluded
20 According to Ottaviano et al. (2009), the value of exports and imports of goods within the euro zone
increased from 26% to 33% of GDP between 1998 and 2007. In the same period, that of services increased
from 5% to 7%. Even when controlling for exogenous effects, trade seems to have had a modest but signicant
increase.
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here, increases the correlation between exogenous shocks, the cost of relinquishing inde-
pendence of monetary policy could decrease over time.21 Hence, even if the benets of
joining a monetary union do not exceed the costs ex ante, they may still do so after having
joined the monetary union.22
Our result also suggests that labour markets can have spill over effects on output and
prices of nal goods of other countries and that this effect increases with the level of trade,
as long as the intermediate goods sector is labour intensive.
It is clear from equation (1:40) that also ination levels become more correlated and
consequently business cycles become more synchronized with a higher level of trade in
intermediate goods. In the following section, we show that ination and output can be
expressed as functions of the supply shocks.
Looking at the supply schedules, it is useful to consider two benchmark cases, the
rst with complete home bias and no input trade (! = 0), and the second with no home
bias and complete openness for trade (! = 1). We then illustrate graphically how the effect
that the output gap has on ination changes with the level of home bias.
1 Complete home bias
With no trade in intermediate goods we have:
! = 0;
21 This is essentially what Frankel & Rose (1998) refers to as the endogeneity of the optimum currency area
criteria.
22 Of course there may also be other benets from increased trade in terms of efcient resource allocation
etc.
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H =
 
1  F  = 0; 
1  H = F = 1.
It follows that the supply schedules of the two countries reduces to that of CGG
(2002), where international policy cooperation is assumed. Specically, we have:
H =  [(1  n) + n + ], H0 =  [(   1)(1  n)] ;
F =  [n(   1)] and F0 =  [(1  n) + n+ ]
so the wealth and terms of trade effects cross borders, but there is no effect on the
domestic marginal cost and hence not on domestic ination, from the disutility of foreign
workers. Given that nal goods rms are perfectly competitive, intermediate prices are
equal to consumer goods prices by (1:14);
H
t
= H;t ; 
F
t
= F;t and uHt = uH;t; u
F
t
= uF;t,
so supply shocks are now completely uncorrelated and there are no direct spill-over
effects of domestic labour markets on foreign output or ination.
2 No Home bias
Consider now the case in which there is no home bias in production and complete
openness in trade of intermediate goods, so that:
! = 1
H = F = 1  n 
1  H =  1  F  = n.
Since rms face the same technology and are perfectly competitive, by (1:14) nal
goods prices will be equal in both countries:
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H
t
= F
t
= W
t
and uH
t
= uF
t
= uW
t
The supply schedules in (1:41) now become a union supply schedule of the form:23
W
t
= Y

y
W
t + Et(
W
t+1) + u
W
t (1.42)
where Y   [ + ]. This is identical to a closed economy supply schedule. Hence,
a perfectly symmetric monetary union with identical production technology and prefer-
ences can be considered to be one large economy.
Since prices of nal goods are equal in both countries, the terms of trade is equal to
one. This implies that there are no disturbances to the terms of trade or relative prices and
that the monetary authorities can focus on stabilizing union-wide shocks. In this case there
is no cost of giving up independence of monetary policy.
3 Looking at the general case using calibrated parameter values
We now examine how the level of home bias affects the parameter values in the more
general case of 0 < ! < 1. To do this we use the suggested calibration of Benigno (2004),
which is similar to that of Rotemberg & Woodford (1998) but applied to the Euro zone
economy rather than the US economy and therefore better suits our purpose.
23 Note that in the general case of 0 < ! < 1 the union NKPC can still be obtained, but must be combined
with a condition for relative ination; R
t
=  T

T t+Et(
R
t+1)+u
R
t , where T  (1+(1 !))(1 !),
to fully represent (1:41). See chapter 2:2:1 for derivation of this condition. When ! = 1, then R
t
= 0 and
(1:42) sufces to represent the supply side of the monetary union.
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We set the intertemporal rate of substitution  to 0:99 and since these are assumed
to be quarterly values this implies an annual equilibrium interest rate of 4:1%.24 The co-
efcient of risk aversion  is set to a conventional value of 1=6. Furthermore, assuming
that the elasticity of the average real wage with respect to variation in production is slightly
higher in Europe than in the US and by assuming that the labour share of total income is
equal to 0:75 we have that the elasticity  = 0:67.25 We let the sizes of the two regions of
the monetary union be equal, that is n = 0:5.
The average length of a union price contract is set to four quarters, so that  = 3
4
.
Benigno & Lopez-Salido (2006) provide empirical evidence that support this assumption
for the major European economies.
In gure 1.2 below we show how the Philips curve parameter values vary with the
openness of input trade for the above calibration. With no trade, foreign output initially has
a negative effect on domestic ination as the terms of trade effect exceeds the wealth ef-
fect. With input trade increasing however, the effect of households' disutility from working
increases, which eventually leads to a positive foreign output gap coefcient H0 .
The domestic output gap always has a positive effect on domestic consumer goods in-
ation, however its magnitude decreases when domestic rms start to use foreign inputs in
their production process as this decreases the relevance of domestic wages on the domestic
marginal cost.
24 This is approximately the 20 year German average (see Benigno (2004)).
25 Chang et al. (2007) nd empirical estimates of labour supply elasticity ranging between 0:4 and 1:
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Fig. 1.2. The graph shows that the effect of domestic output on domestic ination de-
creases, while that of foreign output on domestic ination increases, with the level of trade
in inputs (!), as determined by the Phillips curve coefecents.
Note that with the countries being of equal size, i.e. n = 0:5 we have that H = F0
and H0 = 
F , hence an analogous result is obtained for foreign country's supply coef-
cients.
In the following section we present the central bank loss function and derive optimal
discretionary monetary policy.
1.4 Welfare and Optimal Monetary Policy
Given that the union economy is subject to exogenous shocks and given that prices are
slow to adjust to such shocks, there will be distortions to output, consumption and the
welfare of union households. The role for monetary policy in our framework is then to
minimize the reduction in household utility caused by distortions to the economy due to
prices being sticky rather than exible. As such, optimal monetary policy maximizes the
expected aggregate utility of households across the monetary union. Comparing the optimal
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policy in our monetary union to that of a closed economy gives some insight into the costs
of having only one central bank instead of two (one for each country). Furthermore, we
are particularly interested in the effect that the level of trade in inputs has on our results.
Although useful in examining the costs, our model does not allow us to consider the benets
of a monetary union.
While monetary policy seeks to offset the effect that price rigidities has on output,
scal policy acts to neutralize distortions to output arising from mark-ups in prices and
wages due to imperfectly competitive markets. Specically, the optimal subsidy paid to
intermediate rms is given by H =F = 1  (1 + w) 1 (1 + p) 1.26
We assume that liquidity from holding real money balances is small and hence con-
sider the cashless limiting case in which money holdings do not affect welfare. Keeping
in mind that consumption is guaranteed and taking a second order approximation of the
aggregate loss in household utility due to prices being sticky rather than exible gives the
central bank loss function:27
E0
 
LCB

=   
2
E0
1X
t
t=0
8>><>>:
 
Wt
2
+ n(1  n)(1  !) 2  Rt 2
+nH

y
H
t
2
+ (1  n)F

y
F
t
2
+2n(1  n)yHt

y
F
t
9>>=>>; (1.43)
Where we have dened:28
26 See appendix 1B for derivation of this.
27 Appendix 1B derives this expression by a second order approximation of the sum of households' utility
functions.
28 Recall the denition of relative ination; Rt  Ft   Ht .
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H  


(1 + )
 
(1  H)2 + (1  n)n!2  n(1  )
F  

h
(1 + )((1  n)n!2 +  F 2)  (1  n)(1  )i
  


(1 + )!((1  H) + F )  (1  )
In the special case of complete home bias and no trade in inputs (! = 0) this function
reduces to that of the cooperative case in CGG (2002). When there is no home bias (! = 1),
then equation (1:43) is not a valid expression and the loss function becomes that of a closed
economy (see equation (1:A10) of appendix 1B).
We now consider the case in which the union central bank seeks to optimize the
loss function (1:43) by setting the interest rate rt in each period. That is, we look at time
consistent or discretionary welfare optimizing monetary policy.
Proceeding with the optimization problem of the central bank, we initially ignore
the constraint presented by the IS schedule (1:35). This procedure is often used in both
open and closed economy models as the IS curve is then satised by setting the appropriate
interest rate.29 However, in a monetary union we implicitly have the additional constraint
that interest rates in the two countries must be the same and hence that the central bank
only has one policy instrument at its disposal. Clearly, this is not sufcient to stabilize both
union-wide and relative shocks. Nonetheless, proceeding with the same method allows us
to easily compare our results to the case with two independent central banks.
29 See for example Clarida et al. (1999) for a closed economy case and Clarida et al. (2002) for a two-
country model.
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Choosing
n
Ht ; 
F
t ;

y
H
t ;

y
F
t
o
to maximize (1:43) subject to the supply schedules in
(1:41), while taking expectations of future values and exogenous variables as given, yields
the FOCs:
  

h
nH

y
H
t + n(1  n)

y
F
t
i
=   1H    2F
  

h
(1  n)FyFt + n(1  n)

y
H
t
i
=   1H0    2F0
  


n(n+ (1  n)(1  !) 2)Ht + n(1  n)
 
1  (1  !) 2 Ft  =  1
  


n(1  n)  1  (1  !) 2 Ht + (1  n)((1  n) + n(1  !) 2)Ft  =  2
Where  1 and  2 are the Lagrangian multipliers. Further combining these into two
equations gives the relationship between country output gaps and ination levels as:

y
H
t =  	HHt +	H0 Ft (1.44)

y
F
t =  	F0 Ft +	FHt
where 	H  (1+(1 !) n!((2 !)+(1 !)))
(1 !)2(1+) , 	
H
0  ((1 n)!((2 !)+(1 !)))(1 !)2(1+) ,
	F0  (1+(1 !) (1 n)!((2 !)+(1 !)))(1 !)2(1+) and 	F 
(n!((2 !)+(1 !)))
(1 !)2(1+) .
The conditions in (1:44) show the welfare optimizing relationship between country
ination and output gap levels. With no input trade (! = 0) we have 	H =  and 	H0 = 0,
so the optimal policy reaction to an increase in domestic ination would be to contract
the domestic output gap below its natural level, while keeping the foreign output gap un-
changed. As the level of trade increases, the optimal policy suggests adjusting output in
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both countries following a change in domestic ination. This is because there is now a di-
rect spill-over effect of the domestic labour market on the foreign economy. It should be
noted that the total effect of ination on output is independent of the level of trade, since
( 	H +	H0 ) =  .
The optimal policy of (1:44) is not feasible for the central bank of a monetary union
since it has no instrument at its disposal to contract only domestic output, while leaving
foreign output unchanged. This is clear from the IS schedule (1:35), since a change in
the interest rate affects only the average union output gap and has no effect on relative
variables. The central bank of a monetary union can only affect relative variables in the
case of asymmetric price rigidities, as we will show in chapter 3.
Combining the equations in (1:44) gives the following feasible condition for mone-
tary policy:

y
W
t =  Wt (1.45)
Thus, the central bank should adopt a lean against the wind type of policy to tackle
union-wide shocks. This type of rule is common in the literature and the aggressiveness
with which the central bank should contract economic activity in the union following a rise
in ination depends positively on the degree of competitiveness of intermediate goods, .
Equation (1:45) suggests that there is a cost of having a monetary union since country
specic shocks cannot be stabilized. We rewrite (1:44) to illustrate that this cost decreases
with the level of trade in inputs:
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
y
H
t =  # (1 + (1  !))Ht + #! (((2  !) + (1  !)))Wt (1.46)

y
F
t =  # (1 + (1  !))Ft + #! (((2  !) + (1  !)))Wt
where #  
(1 !)2(1+) . It is evident from (1:46) that the weight and hence relevance
of union ination on country output gaps is increasing in !. As trade in intermediate
goods increases, domestic ination levels converge and approach the union average level.
The magnitude of country-specic shocks then decrease, since with a higher level of trade
labour shocks increasingly have cross border effects. Consequently, with no home bias in
production, the welfare optimizing condition in the case of two independent central banks
becomes condition (1:45), that of the monetary union central bank. This leads us to our
second proposition.
Proposition 2 There is a welfare loss of having a monetary union vis-a-vis each country
having monetary independence, because the union central bank has no means of stabiliz-
ing relative or country-specic shocks. This loss decreases as the level of trade in inputs
increases.
The optimal union ination level can be written as a function of the exogenous supply
shocks uHt and uFt . Combining the two supply schedules in (1:41) gives the union average
NKPC (1:42), by then substituting (1:45) while assuming rational expectations, we have:
Wt = (1  % +  ( + )) 1 uWt (1.47)
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So union ination, or equivalently domestic ination in consumer prices, is a function
of union supply shocks.
1.4.1 Specications for the optimal policy rule
We will now derive three different specications for the optimal interest rate rule under
discretion. In the following chapter we will show that the specication of the policy rule is
crucial for both determinacy and E-stability of the union economy.
Substituting (1:45) and (1:42) into the IS curve (1:35) and rearranging, gives the
optimal interest rate rule:
rt = rrt + Et

y
W
t+1

+

1 +

(Y + )

Et
 
Wt+1

+

(Y + )
Et
 
uWt+1

(1.48)
where Y   [ + ]. We will refer to (1:48) as the expectations based optimal
policy rule. Note that the expectations of agents enter explicitly in this policy rule.
An alternative specication is obtained by substituting (1:45) into the IS curve (1:35):
rt = rrt +

1 +
(1  %)
%

Et
 
Wt+1

(1.49)
Hence, we now have the optimal interest rate rule as a function of only expected
future ination. Note that we have imposed the assumption of rational expectations to
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transform the current value of the output gap in (1:35) into its expected future value. The
RE assumption is maintained throughout this chapter and it is crucial for the derivation of
all policy rules considered here. However, the RE assumption was imposed explicitly when
transforming the optimal policy rule into the form of (1:49), while this was not the case for
(1:48). This implies that the two rules are not necessarily equivalent when relaxing the RE
assumption even though they are under RE.30
Since (1 %)
%
> 0, the interest rate policy rule satises the Taylor principle, i.e. the
interest rate is increased by more than one-for-one to a rise in expected ination. Interest-
ingly, the optimal interest rate rule is independent of the level of home bias in production.
Finally, combining (1:47) with (1:48), or otherwise, gives the optimal interest rate
feedback rule as a function of the exogenous supply shocks:
rt = rrt +

%+ (1  %)
1  % +  ( + )

uWt (1.50)
We will refer to this policy rule as the fundamentals based rules since interest rates
are not adjusted to changes in expected future values of output or ination. Note that the
optimal policy is to increase the interest rate to tackle union-wide supply shocks, while not
reacting to relative shocks. The larger relative shocks are, the higher is then the cost of
having a monetary union. Since the magnitude of relative shocks decreases with the level
of trade, by proposition 1, we conjecture that a higher level of trade is welfare improving
in the sense that it reduces the cost of having a common central bank.
30 We note that these policy rules are optimal under RE, this is not necessarily the case when the RE as-
sumption is relaxed.
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In chapter 2 we will examine determinacy and E-stability of the alternative speci-
cations for the interest rate rule. We will show that both determinacy and E-stability of the
policy rule hinges on the specication of the rule considered.
1.5 Conclusion
This chapter has presented a baseline two-country monetary union model with home bias
in the production technology of nal goods rms. We have shown that as this home bias
disappears and consequently as trade in inputs increases, the union economy behaves more
like a large closed economy.
Specically, trade in inputs causes domestic labour market shocks to have direct spill-
over effects on the market for foreign nal goods and vice versa. This has the effect of
increasing the correlation between countries' supply shocks, which in turn synchronizes
the movements of the two countries' consumer price ination levels.
A higher level of trade also reduces the volatility of countries' supply shocks and
hence of ination in consumer prices. Furthermore, with no home bias and complete open-
ness in trade, price levels become equal in both countries and there is no welfare loss in
the monetary union arising from the inability of the central bank to stabilize relative or
country-specic shocks. In general, a higher level of trade leads to a higher level of union
welfare.
The optimal monetary policy rule under discretion puts a weight on each countries'
ination that is equal to its economic size, i.e. n for home country and (1  n) for foreign
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country. It also satises the Taylor principle and hence the real interest rate is increased
to a rise in expected ination. The union central bank stabilizes union-wide shocks, as
the tackling of relative shocks is not feasible. In the following chapter we will examine
determinacy and E-stability of the optimal policy rules derived here and of some more
general Taylor rules. A key difference between our framework and the closed economy
models is that there are relative shocks that cannot be stabilized by the union central bank.
The key question that we consider in chapter 2 is then whether this factor can lead to excess
volatility and an unstable system under recursive least squares learning.
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1.A Appendix: Proof of proposition 1
Recall the following denitions;
H  (1  n)! and (1  F )  n!
The supply shocks are given by (see section 1:3:3);
uHt = (1  H)uH;t + HuF;t and uFt = (1  F )uH;t + FuF;t
where; uH;t = wH;t and uF;t = wF;t,
this implies the correlation coefcient:
Corr(uHt ; u
F
t ) =
(1 H)(1 F )V ar(wH;t)+HFV ar(wF;t)q
(1 H)2V ar(wH;t)+(H)
2
V ar(wF;t)
q
(1 F )2V ar(wH;t)+(F )
2
V ar(wF;t)
which is increasing in the level of trade, !.
Specically, the derivative of the correlation coefcient with respect to ! is given by:
Corr(uHt ;u
F
t )
!
=
(1 !)V ar(wH;t)V ar(wF;t)((1 n)(n(1 !)2+(1 n))V ar(wF;t)+n((1 n)(1 !)2+n)V ar(wH;t))
((1 n!)2V ar(wF;t)+n2!2V ar(wH;t))
3
2 ((1 n)2!2V ar(wF;t)+n2(1 (1 n)!)2V ar(wH;t))
3
2
> 0.
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In this appendix we derive the central bank loss function (1:43) and the welfare optimizing
subsidy rates of the scal governments. The policy maker seeks to minimize the aggregate
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loss in utility of union households caused by distortions to the union economy due to prices
being sticky rather than exible.
We hence derive the loss function by taking a second-order approximation of the
sum of households' utility functions around the exible price steady state equilibrium, cor-
responding to the optimal choice of the subsidy rates H and F . In doing so we maintain
the assumption of rational expectations. As in Benigno (2004) we assume that the liquid-
ity from holding real money balances is small and hence consider the cashless limiting
case in which money holdings do not affect welfare. This implies that the utility of the
representative agent of home and foreign country, at a given date t, is given by:
wHt = U(Ct)  V (NH;t) =
C1 t
1    
NH;t
1+
1 + 
and wFt =
C1 t
1    
NF;t
1+
1 + 
(1:A1)
The central bank assigns a weight to each country proportional to its economic size
so that overall union welfare is:
wWt = U(Ct)  nV (NH;t)  (1  n)V (NF;t) (1:A2)
Note that consumption is the same for all households in the union, given the assump-
tion of perfect risk sharing. Before deriving the second-order approximation of the period
utility function around the steady state, we determine the subsidy rate  i required for wel-
fare optimization. This is obtained by maximizing:
U(C)  nV (NH)  (1  n)V (NF )
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subject to:
C = Y nHY
1 n
F ; NH = (1  )Y H + Y F and NF = (1  F )Y H + FY F
where we have made use of the production function of intermediate rms, given that
the technology parameters are given by; BH = BF = 1 , in our dened steady state. By
substituting the constraints into the objective function and maximizing with respect to Y H
and Y F , or otherwise, we obtain the rst order condition:
U(C)
C
Y
= V(N) (1:A3)
Since per capita consumption is equal to per capita output in the steady state, given
that the terms of trade is equal to one, we have: U(C) = V(N)
We use the condition for the marginal cost:
MC =
(1 + w)V(N)
(1 + )U(C)
substituting (1:A3) and recalling from section 1:3:1 that in the absence of price rigidi-
ties the marginal cost is equal to (1 + p) 1, gives the optimal subsidy solving:
(1  ) = (1 + w) 1 (1 + p) 1
Hence the subsidy serves to offset the distortion caused by the mark-ups in wages
and prices of inputs, specically:
H = F = 1  (1 + w) 1 (1 + p) 1 (1:A4)
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We now proceed to approximate the period union welfare function (1:A2) about the
value that would prevail under exible prices. This will then allow the central bank to
implement monetary policy to drive the economy towards this exible price equilibrium
and offset the distortion to the union economy arising due to staggered price setting condi-
tions of intermediate rms. We start by linearly approximating the rst term, the utility of
consumption, by a second order expansion:
U(Ct) = U(
_
Ct) + U(
_
Ct)
_
Ct


ct +
1
2
(1  )c2t

+ o(k a k3) (1:A5)
= U(
_
Ct) + U(
_
Ct)
_
Ct
2664
n

y
H
t + (1  n)

y
F
t +
1
2
(1  )0@ n2 yHt 2 + (1  n)2 yFt 2
+2n(1  n)yHt

y
F
t
1A
3775+ o(k a k3)
where we have made use of the log-linearized version of the market clearing condi-
tion for consumption (1:23) and where o(k a kn) represents terms that are of order higher
than the nth, in the bound k a k on the amplitude of the relevant shocks. We further lin-
earize U(
_
Ct)
_
Ct around the steady state:
U(
_
Ct)
_
Ct = U(C)C + C
_
ct
h
U(C)C + U(C)
i
+ o(k a k2)
= U(C) (1 + (1  ) _ct) + o(k a k2)
Combining this with (1:A5) above gives:
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U(Ct)  U(
_
Ct) = U(C)C + U(
_
Ct)C
26664
(1 + (1  ) _ct)

n

y
H
t + (1  n)

y
F
t

+1
2
(1  )
0@ n2 yHt 2 + (1  n)2 yFt 2
+2n(1  n)yHt

y
F
t
1A
37775
+t:i:p:+ o( k a k3)
= U(C)C + U(
_
Ct)C
26664
(1 + (1 + )
_
nwt )

n

y
H
t + (1  n)

y
F
t

+1
2
(1  )
0@ n2 yHt 2 + (1  n)2 yFt 2
+2n(1  n)yHt

y
F
t
1A
37775
+t:i:p:+ o( k a k3)
where t:i:p: contains the terms that are independent of policy. Note that under exible
prices (1+) _nWt = (1 )
_
ct, since in this case the linearized marginal cost of home country
gives:

_
ct + 
_
nHt + (1  n)
_
T t = b
H
t
where we are assuming that the optimal subsidy is implemented. Similarly, the mar-
ginal cost of foreign country implies:

_
ct + 
_
nFt   n
_
T t = b
F
t
A linear combination of these two with country weights gives:

_
ct + 
_
nWt = b
W
t
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Combining (1:13) and (1:29) and linearizing about the exible price equilibrium
gives:
_
nHt + b
H
t = (1  H)
_
yHt + 
H _yFt and
_
nFt + b
F
t = (1  F )
_
yHt + 
F _yFt
A linear combination of these two with weights equal to country sizes gives:
_
nWt + b
W
t =
_
yWt
which can be combined with the linearized version of the equilibrium condition for
consumption; _ct =
_
yWt , to obtain: bWt =
_
ct  _nWt .
Finally, we substitute this into:  _ct+
_
nWt = b
W
t , and obtain (1+)
_
nWt = (1 )
_
ct.
We now turn to the remaining components of the union welfare function and log-linearize
the disutility of households from working about the level resulting under exible prices.
For country H , we have:
V (NH;t) = V (
_
NH;t) + V(
_
NH;t)
_
N t


n
H
t +
1
2
(1 + )

n
H
t
2
V (NH;t) + o(k a k3)
where: V(
_
NH;t)
_
NH;t = V(N )N

1 + (1 + )
_
nHt

+ o(k a k2)
keeping in mind that V(N)N
V(N)
= . We substitute the latter equation into the former
and obtain:
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V (Nt)  V (
_
N t) = V(N)N
 
nHt +
1
2
(1 + )

n
H
t
2
+ (1 + )
_
nHt

n
H
t

(1:A6)
+t:i:p:+ o( k a k3)
The log-linearized version of the aggregate production function for intermediate goods
(1:29) is:

n
H
t =

x
H
t + v
H
t
where vHt  log
0@n 1 nZ
0

(IPH;t(f))
(IPH;t)
 
df
1A and IPH;t is the price of the input basket
produced by home country. We combine this with the rst order approximation of the
aggregate demand for inputs (1:13) keeping in mind that yHt =
_
yHt +

y
H
t , hence

n
H
t =
(1  H)yHt + H

y
F
t + v
H
t . We make use of the following lemma.
Lemma
Dene the cross-sectional dispersion of prices;
2IPH;t =
nZ
0
(log(IPH;t(f))  log(IPH;t))2 df ,
then up to a second order approximation: vHt ' (=2)2IPH;t .
Proof
Let;
^
IPH;t(f) = log(IPH;t(f))  log(IPH;t), then:
IPH;t(f)
IPH;t
1 
= exp

(1  )
^
IPH;t(f)

= 1 + (1  )
^
IPH;t(f) +
(1 )2
2
^
IPH;t(f)
2 + o(k a k3)
Furthermore the denition of the price of the input basket implies:
1 =
h 
1
n
 1
1 
R n
0

IPH;t(f)
 1
IPH;t

df
i1 
.
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We combine these two results and take expectations by averaging across rms:
Ef
 ^
IPH;t(f)

= ( 1)
2
Ef
 ^
IPH;t(f)
2

= ( 1)
2
V arf flog(IPH;t(f))g.
Finally, a second order approximation of

IPH;t(f)
IPH;t
 
gives:

IPH;t(f)
IPH;t
1 
= 1 
 ^
IPH;t(f)

+ 
2
2
^
IPH;t(f)
2 + o(k a k3).
Combining the above results implies:
n 1
nZ
0

(IPH;t(f))
(IPH;t)
 
df = 1 + 
2
V arf fIPH;t(f)g.
Taking logs gives our lemma: vt ' (=2)2IPH;t + o(k a k3) 
Using this lemma we have: n
H
t = (1 H)

y
H
t +
Hy
F
t +(=2)
2
IPH;t
, further substi-
tuting this into (1:A6) gives:
V (Nt)  V (
_
N t) = V(N)N
0BBBBB@
(1  )yHt + 

y
F
t +

2
2IPH ;t
+1
2
(1 + )
0@ (1  )2 yHt 2 + 2 yFt 2
+(1  )yHt

y
F
t
1A
+(1 + )
_
nt((1  )y
H
t + 

y
F
t
1CCCCCA
+t:i:p:+ o( k a k3) (1:A7)
Where we have used the above lemma to substitute:

n
H
t =
_
nHt

(1  H)yHt + H

y
F
t

+ o(k a k3)
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Similarly to (1:A7), we can approximate the disutility from working in foreign coun-
try:
V (NF;t)  V (
_
NF;t) = V(NF )NF
0@ nFt + 12(1 + )nFt 2
+(1 + )
_
nFt

n
F
t )
1A+ t:i:p:+ o(k a k3)
We substitute n
F
t = (1  F )

yHt + 
Fy
F
t +

2
2IPF;t into the above expression,
giving:
V (NF;t)  V (
_
NF;t) = V(NF )NF
0BBBBBBB@
(1  F )

yHt + 
Fy
F
t +

2
2IPF;t
+1
2
(1 + )
0@ (1  F )2y2t +  F 2 yFt 2
+F (1  F )

yHt

y
F
t
1A
+(1 + )
_
nt(1  F )y
H
t + 
Fy
F
t
1CCCCCCCA
+ t:i:p:+ o( k a k3) (1:A8)
Noting that n(1   H) + (1   n)H = n and that n(1   F ) + (1   n)F =
(1  n), linearly combining (1:A7) and (1:A8) and substituting this together with (1:A5)
into (1:A2), and recalling that in our dened steady state equilibrium U(C)C = V(N)N ,
we obtain:
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From the above we have:

w
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
2
1X
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where H  


(1 + )
 
(1  H)2 + (1  n)n!2  n(1  )
F  

h
(1 + )((1  n)n!2 +  F 2)  (1  n)(1  )i
  


(1 + )!((1  H) + F )  (1  )
Note that since n(1  H) + (1  n)H = n and n(1  F ) + (1  n)F = (1  n),
we have:
Wt  nHt + (1  n)Ft = nH;t + (1  n)F;t
Furthermore, 
Wt
2
= (nH;t + (1  n)F;t)2 = n22H;t + (1  n)22F;t + 2n(1  n)H;tF;t
= n2H;t + (1  n)2F;t   n(1  n)(H;t   F;t)2
We note that H;t F;t = 
H
t  Ft
1 ! from (1:40), where


Ht  Ft
1 !

!
= 0, since
 
Ht   Ft

is decreasing in ! to the same extent as the denominator. Hence the central bank should re-
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act to changes in relative ination Rt  Ht  Ft only when these are due to changes in the
relative ination of the inputs. As trade in intermediate goods increases, the importance of
reacting to changes in relative input ination diminishes. With no home bias, relative ina-
tion becomes irrelevant since a change in input ination affects both countries in the same
way. We can nally write the central bank loss function as a function of the output gaps
and ination of nal goods,
E0
 
LCB

=   
2
E0
1X
t
t=0
8>><>>:
 
Wt
2
+ n(1  n)(1  !) 2  Rt 2
+nH

y
H
t
2
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F

y
F
t
2
+2n(1  n)yHt

y
F
t
9>>=>>; (1:43)
It is illustrative to consider two special cases:
No trade in inputs (! = 0)
With no trade we get the result of the cooperative case in Clarida et al. (2002) where
the loss function becomes:
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9=; (1:A9)
The other special case is that in which nal goods rms of both country face the same
technology.
No home bias in trade (! = 1)
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With complete openness in trade the union economy becomes isomorphic to a large
closed economy and the resulting loss function is:
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

y
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t
2
(1:A10)
Chapter 2
Learning in aMonetary Union with Home Bias
in Production
Chapter Overview
This chapter examines determinacy and E-stability of different interest rate rules in the
two-country monetary union model with home bias in input trade, presented in chapter 1.
We consider three different specications of welfare optimizing discretionary mone-
tary policy rules derived under RE and nd that the way in which the interest rate rule is
formulated has crucial implications for both determinacy and E-stability. Specically, a
fundamentals based policy rule, in which the interest rate is adjusted to changes in union-
wide supply shocks, is found to be indeterminate and unstable under RLS learning. On the
other hand, an expectations based policy rule is both determinate and E-stable.
We also look at general Taylor rules in which the interest rate is adjusted to either
contemporaneous or expected future values of union ination and the union output gap. We
nd that even though the union central bank fails to stabilize shocks to relative variables,
the necessary and sufcient conditions for a unique stationary rational expectations equi-
librium and RLS learning stability known from the closed economy literature, also hold for
our monetary union model.
In following chapters we will consider monetary union models with asymmetries that
alter the results found in this chapter.
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2.1 Introduction
In chapter 1, we presented a two-country monetary union model with trade in both nal
and intermediate goods. We derived the central bank loss function by aggregating the loss
in household utility arising due to prices being sticky à la Calvo (1993), rather than ex-
ible. Under the assumption of rational expectations we then derived optimal discretionary
monetary policy, in which the union central bank stabilizes union-wide shocks. However,
monetary policy was found not have an impact on relative variables and it can hence not
offset relative shocks.
A key assumption used in the derivation of optimal policy in the previous chapter is
that agents have rational expectations (RE). This implies that they both know the structure
of the economy and the values of all of its parameters. However, there are two main is-
sues with the RE assumption that need to be addressed for the analysis in chapter 1 to be
complete.
First, as pointed out by e.g. Clarida et al. (2000), Bernanke & Woodford (1997) and
Woodford (1999), even if a policy rule could lead to a welfare optimizing equilibrium, it
is not certain that this is the unique stationary equilibrium associated with the given policy
rule. If policy is not determinate we could then either have excess volatility as agents fail
to cooperate towards a specic equilibrium or we could have the economy reaching a less
desirable suboptimal equilibrium. To avoid this, the monetary authorities should only im-
plement a welfare optimizing interest rate rule if it guarantees determinacy. Consequently,
in this chapter we supplement the analysis of the previous chapter by identifying determi-
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nacy conditions for the different specications of the optimal interest rate rule as well as
for some more general specications of a Taylor rule.
Second, as pointed out by e.g. Howitt (1992), interest rate rules derived under the
assumption of RE may be unstable if economic agents instead use an adaptive learning al-
gorithm to update their beliefs about the economy. Howitt therefore recommended that any
monetary policy analysis assuming RE should also be complemented by an investigation
of the stability of such policy under the assumption of learning. The E-stability principle
states that a rational expectations equilibrium (REE) is locally asymtpotically stable un-
der recursive least squares learning if it is E-stable. We will hence use the methodology
of Evans & Honkapohja (2001) to examine the E-stability of the different monetary policy
rules.
Evans & Honkaphoja (2003) use the closed economy model of Clarida et al. (1999)
to show that the specication of the optimal interest rate rule derived under RE has implica-
tions for both determinacy and learning stability. They nd that a fundamentals based rule,
in which the central bank adjusts interest rates to exogenous shocks, is neither determinate
nor E-stable. However, an interest rate rule that also reacts to expected future changes in in-
ation and output is found to govern both a unique stationary REE and stability under RLS
learning. Evans & Honkaphoja (2003) argue that this result is an argument for the mon-
etary authorities to explicitly consider the expectations of the private sector when setting
policy. Bullard & Schaling (2006) show that this result also holds for the open economy
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by looking at the two-country model of Clarida, Gali & Gertler (2002).1 In this chapter we
nd that the result also extends to our monetary union.
The seminal paper by Bullard & Mitra (2002) examines determinacy and E-stability
for different specications of a Taylor rule in the closed economy model of Woodford
(1999). They nd that the Taylor principle, in which interest rates are increased by more
than one-for-one following a rise in ination so as to increase real interest rates, plays an
important role for both determinacy and E-stability of monetary policy.
In recent years, an increasing number of papers have considered learning in open
economy models. This differs from the closed economy case in several ways.
For one, the issue of what ination the central bank should target, that in producer
prices or that in consumer prices, now becomes of relevance. Findings by Bullard & Schal-
ing (2006) and Llosa & Tuesta (2008) suggest that the denition of the target ination rate
has implications for E-stability of monetary policy. In our model, as in a closed economy,
the average union CPI and PPI are the same and hence this is not an issue. This is generally
true for monetary union models.2
The interest rate rule in an open economy can also react to the terms of trade or the
exchange rate. Bullard & Schaling (2006) and Wang (2006) look at two-country models
and nd that if the home country pegs its exchange rate to that of the foreign country,
1 A short coming of Bullard & Schaling (2006) is that they use the supply schedule derived in Clarida et al.
(2002) under the assumption of Nash competition in policy, even when they consider optimal policy under
monetary policy cooperation.
2 It would be an interesting exercise to put forward a monetary union model in which average union con-
sumer prices are not equal to average union producer prices and examine how determinacy and E-stability of
monetary policy is affected by this.
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then the world economy is determinate and E-stable if the monetary policy of the foreign
country meets determinacy and E-stability conditions. We draw a parallel between this case
and our monetary union model.
Finally, the degree of openness in trade now matters. Bullard & Schaling (2006)
interpret the size of home country as being its degree of openness so that when it approaches
one it becomes a closed economy, while as it approaches zero in size it becomes a small
open economy. They nd that the smaller a country is in size, i.e. the more open it is
in trade, the more aggressive does monetary policy have to be to guarantee determinacy
and RLS learning stability. The ndings of Llossa & Tuesta (2008) support this result. In
this chapter we show that the level of trade within a monetary union has no effect on the
stability conditions for monetary policy. Furthermore, we nd that the results from the
closed economy literature hold for our monetary union framework, even though relative
shocks cannot be stabilized by monetary policy. In following chapters we will look at cases
in which this result breaks down.
In the following section we present the environment for our analysis, including an
explanation of the methodology for nding the determinacy and E-stability conditions for
monetary policy. Section 2.3 presents the results, while section 2.4 concludes the chapter.
2.2 The Environment
In this section we set up the environment for our analysis. We start by summarizing the
model presented in chapter 1 in its reduced form and emphasize the key elements needed
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for the analysis in this chapter. We then present the interest rate rules of the union central
bank, that are to be combined with the log-linearized equations of the model to make the
complete system. This is followed by an explanation of the methodology used to examine
determinacy and E-stability. Finally, for convenience we also re-present the calibration of
the underlying parameter values of the model. These are used in following sections as we
complement the analytical representation of our results by also depicting them graphically.
2.2.1 The baseline model
The monetary union consists of two countries; home and foreign. Each country has three
different types of agents; households, intermediate goods rms and nal goods rms. Each
type of agent in the monetary union is spread over the unit interval, with [0; n) residing in
the home country and (n; 1] residing in the foreign country. That is, the size of the home
country is n, while that of the foreign country is (1  n).
Households across the monetary union have the same preferences and consume goods
produced in both countries according to the Cobb-Douglas function:
Ct  (CH;t)
n(CF;t)
1 n
nn(1  n)1 n
Furthermore, nancial markets are assumed to be complete, implying that all house-
holds across the union consume the same amount. Output in the two countries can still
vary however, due to uctuations in the terms of trade, as suggested by the market clearing
conditions:
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Y dH;t = T
1 n
t Ct and Y dF;t = T nt Ct (2.1)
Where the terms of trade has been dened as the ratio of foreign nal goods prices
over domestic, i.e. Tt  PF;t=PH;t.
Intermediate rms use domestically supplied labour to produce inputs under imper-
fect competition. They also face a xed probability (1  ) of changing there prices in
each period as in the Calvo (1983) model. Hence the price rigidities in our framework arise
from the sector of intermediate goods.
Final goods rms are perfectly competitive and use baskets of intermediate goods
produced in both countries according to the production function:
Y si;t = A
i
t

(1  i) 1v (X iH;t)1 
1
v + (i)
1
v (X iF;t)
1  1
v
 v
v 1 (2.2)
Where X ij;t is the basket of inputs supplied by intermediate rms in country j and
used by nal goods rms in country i, for i; j = H;F . There is home bias in production so
that domestic rms generally use domestically produced inputs more efciently than they
use the input basket produced abroad. Specically, we have:
H  (1  n)! and  1  F   n!
where ! takes a value between zero and one and measures the degree of home bias.
The degree of openness in trade of intermediate goods has an inverse relationship with the
level of home bias in production. When ! = 1, there is no home bias in production and
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complete openness in trade and when ! = 0, there is complete home bias and no trade in
intermediate goods.
We dene union average variables as a linear combination of home and foreign values
where each country is given a weight equal to its size:
XW  nXH + (1  n)XF
Relative variables are dened as the difference between foreign and domestic:
XR  XF  XH .
The reduced form of the system is described by the following conditions:3

y
W
t = Et(

y
W
t+1)   1

rt   Et(Wt+1)  rrt

(2:6)
H
t
= Y

y
W
t   (1  n)T

y
R
t + Et(
H
t+1) + u
H
t (2.3)
F
t
= Y

y
W
t + nT

y
R
t + Et(
F
t+1) + u
F
t (2.4)

T t =  y
R
t (2.5)

T t =

T t 1 + Rt (2:9)
Where we have dened Y   ( + ) and T  (1 + (1   !))(1   !) and
where  is the household discount factor,  is the coefcient of relative risk aversion and
3 Note that we have rearranged the supply schedules in (1:41) by using the fact that for the generic variable
X we have: aHXH + aFXF = aWXW + aRXR, where the coefcients solve aW = aH + aF and
aR = naF   (1  n)aH .
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 measures workers' disutility from working. The sensitivity of ination to changes in the
marginal cost is determined by   [(1  )(1  )] = and the natural rate of interest
measures expected changes to the natural level of union output, i.e. rrt  Et( y
W
t+1).
In order to obtain analytical results for determinacy and learning stability in following
sections, we need to partition our system into two independent subsystems. To do this we
rst rewrite the two supply schedules (2:3) and (2:4) by using the denitions for union and
relative variables and by substituting (2:5). The endogenous variables
n
y
W
t ; 
W
t ; 
R
t
;

T t
o
are then determined by:

y
W
t = Et(

y
W
t+1)   1

rt   Et(Wt+1)  rrt

(2.6)
Wt = Y

y
W
t + Et(
W
t+1) + u
W
t (2.7)
R
t
=  T

T t + Et(
R
t+1) + u
R
t (2.8)

T t =

T t 1 + Rt (2.9)
Note that there are two independent subsystems; (2:6) and (2:7) determine union
average variables y
W
t and Wt , while (2:8) and (2:9) determine the relative variables Rt and

T t. Because of this, monetary policy has no impact on relative variables. This distinguishes
our model from a closed economy, and the purpose of this chapter is to examine whether
this alters the results from the closed economy literature on learning.
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To further simplify our analysis, in what follows we combine the two equations de-
scribing the relative system, (2:8) and (2:9), into the following condition for the terms of
trade:

T t =  

T t 1 +  Et

T t+1

+  uRt (2.10)
where   1
1++T
. We now present the Taylor rules that are to be combined with
(2:6), (2:7) and (2:10) when we look at determinacy and E-stability in following sections.
2.2.2 The monetary policy rules
In addition to looking at determinacy and E-stability of the optimal policy rules derived in
chapter 1, we will also consider some more generally specied interest rate rules. Follow-
ing Taylor (1993), interest rate feedback rules have received much attention in the literature
on monetary policy. Bullard & Mitra (2002) examine determinacy and E-stability of Tay-
lor rules that react to output and ination. They consider four different specications; an
interest rate rule with contemporaneous data, lagged data, expected contemporaneous data
and expected future data. In this chapter, as in Llosa & Tuesta (2008), we focus on Taylor
rules with contemporaneous and expected future data. As discussed in the introduction to
this thesis, these type of rules are of empirical merit.
The contemporaneous Taylor rule takes the following form:
rt = '
W
t
+ 'Y

y
W
t (2.11)
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Where interest rates are increased to contract the economy if either ination or output
rises above its natural level, i.e. '; 'Y > 0. Of course, we do not consider an interest rate
rule that includes the terms of trade since interest rates have no effect on the terms of
trade, nor on any other relative variables in this framework.4 We also note that ination
in consumer prices and the union average ination in producer prices are the same in this
framework. This is because the number of households is assumed to be equal to the number
of nal goods rms in each country. Hence, we conjecture that these two denitions of
ination remain equivalent even with home bias in consumer preferences.
The forward looking Taylor rule is given by:
rt = 'Et
W
t+1
+ 'YEt

y
W
t+1 (2.12)
In section 2.3.3. we consider different specications of the optimal policy rule de-
rived in chapter 1.
2.2.3 Methodology
In this section we outline the methodology used throughout this thesis to obtain the deter-
minacy and E-stability conditions for economic policy. We show a method for obtaining
these results for partitioned systems that will simplify the analysis signicantly and enables
us to obtain analytical results.
4 When price rigidities are asymmetric in the two countries, the system can no longer be partitioned and
interest rates do affect relative variables. We will hence consider a Taylor rule including the terms of trade in
chapter 3, when we relax the assumption of homogeneous price rigidities.
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Equilibrium Determinacy
To examine uniqueness of stationary REE, we write the system in the general form:
Etxt+1 = Bxt + wt (2.13)
Where B and  are n  n matrices of coefcients, xt is an n  1 vector of the state
variables and wt is the n  1 vector of exogenous variables or the shocks in our model.
In order to get all variables with the same time index, we have introduced an auxiliary
variable in the place for the terms of trade so that xt =
h
y
W
t ; 
W
t ; 
R
t ;{t
i0
, where we have
dened {t 

T t 1. The terms of trade will be the sole predetermined state variable in all
models considered in this thesis, so this methodology is applied throughout. A standard
result is that a unique stationary rational expectations equilibrium exists when the number
of eigenvalues of B that are outside the unit circle coincides with the number of free state
variables. If the number of eigenvalues outside the unit circle is smaller than the number of
free state variables, then there are multiple stationary REE or indeterminacy. On the other
hand, if the number of eigenvalues outside the unit circle exceeds the number of free state
variables, then there is no stationary REE and the system is explosive.
In order to obtain analytical results, we partition our system into two subsystems.
Let,
xt = [x1;t; x2;t]
0 ; w2;t = [w1;t; w2;t]
0 ; B =

B11 B12
B21 B22

; and  =

11 12
21 22

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We initially consider the system given by (2:6), (2:7), (2:8) and (2:9) and we then
have x1;t =
h
y
W
t ; 
W
t
i0
and x2;t =

Rt ;{t
0. If either or both of B12 and B21 are equal
to zero, then the eigenvalues of B are those of B11 and B22. It follows that for the whole
system to be determinate, we need the number of eigenvalues of B11 and B22 that are
outside the unit circle to correspond to the number of free variables in their respective
subsystems. That is to say, we need each of the two subsystems to be determinate for
the whole system to be determinate. Furthermore, since (2:8) and (2:9) can be combined
into (2:10), it follows from this that determinacy of B22 is satised when the univariate
condition for the terms of trade (2:10) induces determinacy. Evans & McGough (2005)
consider a univariate difference equation of the general form:
yt = Et (yt+1) + yt 1 + vt (2.14)
where yt is the endogenous variable and vt the exogenous variable. They show that
when j+ j < 1 the system is determinate, but if j+ j > 1 it is either indeterminate
and has multiple stationary solutions when jj < jj or it has no stationary solution and is
explosive when jj > jj.5
Learning Stability6
Rather than assuming that agents are fully rational and that they know the values of
the economic parameters, we assume that they know the general structure of the economy
5 See gure 1 of Evans & McGough (2005),
6 This section closely follows Evans & Honkapohja (2001, Ch. 10.3)
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but update their beliefs about the parameter values in each period using recursive least
squares. Hence, the agents of the economy act like econometricians using available data to
run regressions, i.e. they are learning about the economy as more data becomes available.
We assume that the monetary authorities update their beliefs about the economy in the
same way as private agents, so that the expectations entering the Taylor rules are the same
as those of the private sector.7 In this thesis, we use the concept of E-stability to derive
conditions for local stability of REE under recursive least squares learning. In particular,
we focus on the E-stability of minimal state variable (MSV) solutions. Our methodology
follows that of Evans & Honkapohja (2001, Ch. 10.3).
We proceed by writing the economic system in the general form:8
xt =   + 
Etxt+1 + xt 1 +wt (2.15)
wt = %wt 1 + "t (2.16)
Where   is the n  1 vector of constants, 
, ,  and % are n  n matrices of
coefcients, xt is an n  1 vector of the state variables and wt is the n  1 vector of
exogenous variables. We assume that wt follows a stationary VAR, so that % has all of its
eigenvalues inside the unit circle, while "t is an n  1 vector of white noise. Agents are
assumed to have contemporaneous data in their information set so that Etxt+1 is formed as
a linear function of (1; x0t; w0t)
0. Following McCallum (1983), this implies an MSV solution
7 Honkapohja & Mitra (2005) consider the case in which the central bank and private agents have hetero-
geneous forecasting and show that this could be an additional source of instability under adaptive learning.
8 In line with the methodology of Bullard &Mitra (2002), we initially include the vector of constants   and
write (2:15) in a general form, eventhough this is zero for the models considered in this thesis. We note that
even when   is equal to zero, agents do not necessarily know this under learning.
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of the form:
xt = a+ bxt 1 + cwt (2.17)
Where the n  1 vector a, and the two n  n matrices b and c are all determined by
the method of undetermined coefcients. We will refer to (2:17) as the perceived law of
motion (PLM). Taking expectations of equation (2:17) and iterating forward yields:
Etxt+1 = a+ bxt + c%wt (2.18)
substituting this into equation (2:15) and rearranging then gives the actual law of
motion (ALM):
xt = (I   
b) 1(  + 
a) + (I   
b) 1xt 1 + (I   
b) 1( + 
c%)wt (2.19)
Under rational expectations, agents know the true parameter values of the economy
so that the PLM and the ALM coincide. This implies that a, b and c must be such that the
following conditions are satised:
(I   

 
b   
) a =   (2.20)


 
b
2
 
 
b +  = 0 (2.21)
(I   

 
b)
 
c   
 c% =  (2.22)
However, under RLS learning these equations do not generally hold and 0 = (a; b; c)
changes over time. Indeed, for real time RLS learning we have 0t = (at; bt; ct) being
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updated according to:
t = t 1 + t
 1R 1t zt 1
0
t
Rt = Rt 1 + t 1
 
zt 1z0t 1  Rt 1

where z0t =
 
1; x0t 1; w
0
t

and t = yt 1   0t 1zt 1. We are interested in the circum-
stances under which the estimates 0t = (at; bt; ct) converge locally asymptotically to the
stationary MSV solution
 

0
=

 
a;
 
b ;
 
c

that satises (2:20)   (2:22) and has all roots of
 
b inside the unit circle. Proposition 10.4 of Evans & Honkapohja (2001) states that this is
the case when the MSV solution
 

0
is E-stable. Hence in this thesis we derive E-stability
conditions for economic policy to examine local asymptotic stability of REE under RLS
learning. To examine E-stability we consider the mapping from the PLM (2:17) to the
ALM (2:19) as:
T (a; b; c) =
 
(I   
b) 1(  + 
a); (I   
b) 1; (I   
b) 1( + 
c%) (2.23)
E-stability is then determined by the following matrix differential equation in notional
time ():
d
d
(a; b; c) = T (a; b; c)  (a; b; c) (2.24)
AnMSV solution

 
a;
 
b;
 
c

is then E-stable if the system (2:24) is locally asymptoti-
cally stable at this solution. To analyze local stability of (2:24) at the RE solution

 
a;
 
b;
 
c

satisfying equations (2:20) (2:22), we linearize the system of differential equations at this
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REE. Using the rules for vectorization of matrix products, we have:
DTa(
 
a;
 
b) = (I   

 
b) 1
 (2.25)
DTb(
 
b) =

(I   

 
b) 1
0



(I   

 
b) 1


(2.26)
DTc(
 
b;
 
c) = %0 


(I   

 
b) 1


(2.27)
Proposition 10.3 of Evans &Honkapohja (2001) states that anMSV solution

 
a;
 
b;
 
c

is E-stable if all eigenvalues of the matrices DTa(
 
a;
 
b), DTb(
 
b) and DTc(
 
b;
 
c) have real
parts less than 1. If any eigenvalue has a real part larger than 1, then the solution is not
E-stable.
Let us dene; A 

(I   

 
b) 1

and F 

(I   

 
b) 1


. The eigenvalues of
Kronecker products are the products of the eigenvalues of the multiplied matrices.9 This
implies that the eigenvalues of F and the cross products of these eigenvalues with those
of A and % need to have real parts smaller than one for E-stability. We assume that the
exogenous variables are uncorrelated so that % is diagonal. Furthermore, given that it is
already assumed to be stable and assuming that all its entries are positive, it follows that
% has all of its eigenvalues with positive real parts less than one. Therefore, the necessary
and sufcient condition for E-stability is that the eigenvalues of F , and the cross products
of these eigenvalues with those of A, all have real parts less than one.
Our methodology here is similar to that of Wang (2006). However, Wang (2006)
argues that E-stability is assured when both A and F have eigenvalues with real parts less
9 See Magnus and Neudecker (1998).
2.2 The Environment 96
than one, but this is not necessarily true. It could for instance be the case that A and F
have large negative eigenvalues. By themselves, they seem to induce E-stability, but when
multiplied they become positive and larger than one. It could also be that some eigenvalues
of A are larger than one. This could still imply E-stability if the eigenvalues of F are
negative or sufciently small.
As for the case of determinacy, we need to partition our system in order to obtain
analytical results. Noting that we do not have constants in our system, we have:

x1;t
x2;t

=


11 
12

21 
22
 
Etx1;t+1
Etx2;t+1

+

11 12
21 22
 
x1;t 1
x2;t 1

(2.28)
+

11 12
21 22
 
w1;t
w2;t

Where x1;t =
h
y
W
t ; 
W
t
i0
and x2;t =

T t. For the cases we consider in this thesis in
which the economic system can be partitioned, it will be either block-diagonal or block-
triangular. That is, we have either (
21;21;21), or (
12;12;12), or both being equal to
zero. Assume without loss of generality that (
21;21;21) is equal to zero. This yields:
x1;t = 
12Etx2;t+1 + 
11Etx1;t+1 + 12x2;t 1 (2.29)
+11x1;t 1 +12w2;t +11w1;t
x2;t = 
22Etx2;t+1 + 22x2;t 1 +22w2;t (2.30)
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Where the second subsystem (2:30) is independent of the rst. The MSV solution of
this partitioned system is:
x1;t
x2;t

=

a1
a2

+

b11 b12
0 b22
 
x1;t 1
x2;t 1

(2.31)
+

c11 c21
0 c22
 
w1;t
w2;t

To nd the rational expectations solution we then use the partitioned version of
(2:20)  (2:22). For
 
b this implies:


 
b
2
 
 
b +  = 0
)


11 
12
0 
22
24  b11  b12
0
 
b22
352  
24  b11  b12
0
 
b22
35+  11 12
0 22

= 0
which gives the following equations solving for
 
b:


 
b
2
11  
 
b11 + 11 = 0 (2.32)

212
 
b22 + 
11
 
b12
 
b22 + 
11
 
b12
 
b22  
 
b12 + 12 = 0 (2.33)

22
 
b
2
22  
 
b22 + 22 = 0 (2.34)
For a we have (I   

 
b   
) a =   giving the solution  a = 0 in all cases since  
equals zero. Finally, for c we have (I   

 
b)
 
c   
 c% =  or equivalently:24 I1 0
0 I2

 


11 
12
0 
22
24  b11  b12
0
 
b22
3535"  c11  c12
0
 
c22
#
 


11 
12
0 
22
 
c11 c12
0 c22
 
%11 %12
0 %22

=

11 12
0 22

The relevant matrices for E-stability become:
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A 

(I   

 
b) 1

=

I1 0
0 I2

 


11 
12
0 
22
 
b11 b12
0 b22
 1 

11 
12
0 
22

=

(I1   
11b11) 1
11 Z
22 + (I1   
11b11) 1
12
0 (I2   
22b22) 1
22

=

A11 A12
0 A22

and
F 

(I   

 
b) 1


=

(I1   
11b11) 111 Z22 + (I1   
11b11) 112
0 (I2   
22b22) 122

=

F11 F12
0 F22

where Z    (I2   
22b22) 1 (
21b11 + 
22b22) (I1   
11b11) 1, using block-wise
inversion as suggested by Banachiewicz (1937). The eigenvalues of A are the eigenvalues
of A11 and A22, while the eigenvalues of F are those of F11 and F22. Therefore, for E-
stability we need the eigenvalues of F11 and F22, and the cross products of these with the
eigenvalues of A11 and A22, to all have real parts less than one.
2.2.4 Calibration
We use the calibration outlined in chapter 1, which is summarized here for convenience.10
The intertemporal rate of substitution  is set to 0:99. The coefcient of relative risk aver-
sion  is set to a conventional value of 1=6 and that of labour elasticity  is assumed to be
0:67. We assume that price contracts on average last for 4 quarters so that  = 3
4
. This im-
plies an output gap coefcient of Y = 7: 181 1 10 2. Finally, without loss of generality,
we let both countries be of equal size, i.e. n = 0:5.
10 See page 55 of section 1.3 for further motivation for these values.
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2.3 The Results
In this section we present the determinacy and E-stability conditions for monetary policy.
We rst look at the contemporaneous Taylor rule (2:11), we then examine the forward
looking rule (2:12) before considering stability of optimal policy in section 2.3.3. In each
case, we proceed by rst examining determinacy and then E-stability.
2.3.1 The contemporaneous Taylor rule
The system is now given by the IS schedule (2:6), the NKPC (2:7), the Taylor rule (2:11)
and the condition for the terms of trade (2:10). We start by looking at determinacy.
Equilibrium Determinacy
For determinacy of the relative subsystem we require (2:10) to induce a unique equi-
librium for the terms of trade. Writing the union average subsystem in the form of (2:13)
gives:
B11 =

 1
 
'Y + 
 1Y

+ 1  1
 
'    1

  1Y  1

For a unique stationary REE we then need B11 to have both of its eigenvalues outside
of the unit circle, in addition to (2:10) being determinate. This implies the following result.
Proposition 1 The necessary and sufcient condition for determinacy of the contempora-
neous Taylor rule;
rt = '
W
t + 'Y

y
W
t (2:11)
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is that the following Taylor principle condition holds:
Y ('   1) + (1  )'Y > 0 (2.35)
Proof. See appendix 2A.
So the familiar result from the closed economy literature also holds for our monetary
union model. Clarida et al. (2000) present evidence that monetary policy by the Federal
Reserve did not satisfy the Taylor principle in the pre-Volcker period (pre-October 1979)
and attribute excess economic volatility to this fact.
Interestingly, neither the relative size of the two member countries (n), nor the level
of trade in inputs (!) has an effect on the condition for determinacy. Our results thus differ
from those of Bullard & Schaling (2006) and Llosa & Tuesta (2008), who nd that a higher
level of trade reduces the determinacy region of monetary policy. The determinate region
is depicted in gure 2.1 for different values of 'Y and '.
Learning Stability
We now relax the assumption of RE and consider the local stability of monetary pol-
icy under RLS learning. To examine E-stability we use the partitioned version of (2:28).
We emphasize that unlike for determinacy, E-stability of each subsystem does not neces-
sarily guarantee E-stability of the whole system. The derivation of the following result is
given in appendix 2B.
Proposition 2 When monetary policy follows the contemporaneous Taylor rule;
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rt = '
W
t + 'Y

y
W
t (2:11)
then the necessary and sufcient condition for E-stability is that the Taylor principle
holds:
Y ('   1) + (1  )'Y > 0 (2:35)
Proof. See appendix 2B.
As for the closed economy case considered by Bullard & Mitra (2002), the Taylor
principle is the necessary condition for both determinacy and E-stability. McCallum (2007)
shows that when contemporaneous data is in the information set of economic agents, then
determinacy is sufcient but not necessary for E-stability. Our framework falls into this
category and for a contemporaneous interest rate rule all unique stationary REE are learn-
able under RLS, while no multiple stationary equilibria are E-stable. Although there could
be cases where multiple equilibria are learnable under RLS, this is normally not the case
for contemporaneous Taylor rules. The E-stability region is plotted in gure 2.1.
2.3.2 The forward looking Taylor rule
In this section we consider the case in which the monetary authorities adjust interest rates
to expected future levels of the output gap and ination. The system is now represented by
the IS schedule (2:6), the NKPC (2:7), the condition for the terms of trade (2:10) and the
Taylor rule (2:12). We rst proceed by examining determinacy and then E-stability.
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Fig. 2.1. The above graph shows the Taylor principle as the necessary and sufcient condi-
tion for determinacy and E-stability of a contemporaneous interest rate rule.
Equilibrium Determinacy
As above, determinacy of the union economy is determined by the determinacy of the
two partitioned systems. While the determinacy of (2:10) is independent of policy, com-
bining (2:6), (2:7) and (2:12) and writing this in the form of (2:13) implies the following
key matrix:
B11 =
"
1+ 1Y  1(1 ')
(1  1'Y )  
 1(1 ') 1
(1  1'Y )  1Y  1
#
For a unique stationary rational expectations equilibrium we requireB11 to have both
of its eigenvalues outside of the unit circle, since y
W
t and Wt are both free variables. We
have the following result.
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Proposition 3 The necessary and sufcient conditions for determinacy when the union
central bank employes a forward looking interest rate rule of the form:
rt = 'Et
 
Wt+1

+ 'YEt

y
W
t+1

(2:12)
is that the following two conditions are met:
Y ('   1) + (1  )'Y > 0 (2:35)
and
2(1 + ) > Y ('   1) + 'Y (1 + ) (2.36)
Proof. See appendix 2A.
The Taylor principle is still a necessary condition for determinacy, but it is not suf-
cient. An overly aggressive policy, in particular to expected values of output, can induce
multiple equilibria even if the Taylor principle holds. It has been suggested that a low
weight should be given to output due to frequent revisions to GDP data. Here we give
another reason for not reacting aggressively to changes in output.
Our results replicate those of the closed economy presented by Bullard & Mitra
(2002).11 Similarly, Llosa & Tuesta (2008) nd the same determinacy conditions for the
open economy when the central bank targets domestic price ination. In their model, pa-
rameters are affected by open economy factors however. Furthermore, they nd an addi-
tional constraint for the coefcient on ination ('), when the central bank targets ination
in consumer prices. The determinacy conditions are plotted in gure 2.2.
11 Note that although Bullard & Mitra (2002) have a third determinacy condition, this is redundant as it is
satised when (2:35) and (2:36) both hold.
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Learning Stability
To examine E-stability of REE, we write the system in the form (2:28). The following
result is obtained.
Proposition 4 For the contemporaneous Taylor rule;
rt = 'Et
W
t+1
+ 'YEt

y
W
t+1 (2:12)
the necessary and sufcient condition for E-stability of an MSV solution is that the
Taylor principle holds:
Y ('   1) + (1  )'Y > 0 (2:35)
Proof. See appendix 2B.
So, the Taylor principle is both sufcient and necessary for E-stability of a forward
looking Taylor rule. This means that in the case where monetary policy reacts aggressively,
in particular to the output gap, we could have two equilibria that are both learnable. The
E-stable region is depicted below in gure 2.2.
2.3.3 Optimal discretionary monetary policy
In section 1.4.1 of the previous chapter, we derived optimal discretionary monetary policy
of the union central bank and presented three alternative specications of the welfare maxi-
mizing interest rate rule. Here, we revisit each of these three in turn to examine determinacy
and E-stability.12
12 See section 1.4.1 for details on the derivation of these rules.
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Fig. 2.2. The above gure plots the regions for determinacy and E-stability of a forward
looking Taylor rule. There is now the possibility of multiple stable REE.
Consider rst our version of what Evans & Honkapohja (2003) refer to as the funda-
mentals based policy rule:
rt = rrt +

%+ (1  %)
1  %+ Y

uWt (2.37)
This type of feedback rule, that reacts only to exogenous shocks, has been known to
induce multiple equilibria. Evans & Honkapohja (2003) show that this type of policy rule
is also unstable under learning. This result also holds for an open economy, as shown by
Bullard & Schaling (2006). Here we nd that it extends to our monetary union framework
as well.
Proposition 5 A fundamentals based optimal policy rule of the form:
rt = rrt +

%+ (1  %)
1  %+ Y

uWt (2:37)
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is both indeterminate and E-unstable in the monetary union framework considered
here.
Proof. See appendix 2C.
The policy rule (2:37) was derived under the assumption of RE. When instead allow-
ing the expectations of private agents to enter explicitly in the policy rule, it becomes both
determinate and locally asymptotically stable under RLS learning as stated in proposition 6
below. Evans & Honkapohja (2003) thus argue that private sector expectations should enter
the monetary policy rule explicitly to take into consideration that economic agents could
use some learning algorithm to update their beliefs about the economy. Central banks have
in practice shown to take expectations into consideration when forming policy. For exam-
ple, Jean-Claude Trichet, the president of the European Central Bank has stated that "the
ECB also monitors a range of indicators that provide more direct evidence on inationary
expectations in the euro area."13
Proposition 6 An expectations based optimal policy rule of the form:
rt = rrt + Et

y
W
t+1

+

1 +

(Y + )

Et
 
Wt+1

+


Y + 

uWt (2.38)
induces a unique stationary REE that is also E-stable.
Proof. See appendix 2C.
Preston (2008) shows that when economic agents form their decisions based on fore-
casts into the indenite future rather than one period ahead, a policy rule in the form of
13 Speech by Jean-Claude Trichet, 25 February (2005), Monetary policy and private expectations, Zolotas
lecture at the Bank of Greece, www.ecb.int/press.
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(2:38) is not necessarily stable under learning. He nds that in general, a price targeting
policy rule is more likely to induce learning stability than an ination targeting rule. It is
argued that price level anchoring better restrains private sector expectations and thus more
likely prevents self-fullling expectations.
Finally, we consider a policy rule in which interest rates are adjusted only to changes
in expected ination.
Proposition 7 An ination targeting policy rule of the form:
rt = rrt +

1 +
(1  %)
%

Et
 
Wt+1

(2.39)
is always E-stable, but not always determinate.
Proof. See appendix 2C.
Hence, for our monetary union framework, the interest rate rule in the form of (2:38)
is the more desirable of the three specications.
The determinacy and E-stability results of the different specications of the policy
rule; (2:37), (2:38) and (2:39) support the results presented by Evans & Honkapohja (2003)
and Bullard & Schaling (2006).
2.4 Conclusion
We have considered determinacy and expectational stability of monetary policy in a two-
country monetary union model with trade in inputs. It has been shown that the results
known from the closed economy literature hold for our framework and that the presence of
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relative or country-specic shocks has no impact on this result. Furthermore, as opposed to
open economy models, the level of intra-union trade or relative country sizes has no effect
on the regions for determinacy and E-stability.
In accordance with Bullard & Mitra (2002) we nd that the Taylor principle is both
necessary and sufcient for contemporaneous or forward looking interest rate rules to in-
duce E-stability of MSV solutions. While it also guarantees determinacy of a contempo-
raneous Taylor rule, a very aggressive forward looking policy rule could lead to multiple
stationary REE.
We have also concluded that as in the case considered by Evans & Honkapohja
(2003), a fundamentals based optimal policy rule is both indeterminate and E-unstable,
while an expectations based rule guarantees a unique stationary REE that is locally asymp-
totically stable under RLS learning.
Our nding suggests that the monetary authorities should consider the monetary
union as a large closed economy when setting policy. However, we will show in the follow-
ing chapters that this result does not hold when we introduce monetary union frameworks
with additional asymmetries.
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2.A Appendix: Proof of determinacy results
In this appendix we derive the determinacy conditions stated in the above propositions. For
determinacy we need each of the two subsystems in our model to induce a unique stationary
REE. While the rst subsystem is given by (2:6), (2:7) and the relevant interest rate rule,
the relative subsystem is determined by (2:10). Following the determinacy conditions for
(2:14) of section 2.2.3, we have that (2:10) is determinate when:
 1+1++T  < 1
which always holds since T = (1 + (1  !))(1  !) > 0 for 0 < ! < 1.14 Hence
for determinacy of REE in the union economy, we need (2:6), (2:7) and the relevant Taylor
rule to guarantee determinacy of the rst subsystem. Since this forms a 2  2 system, the
characteristic polynomials will be of the form:
p() = 2 + a1+ a0 (2:A1)
For determinacy we then need both of the solutions for  to be outside the unit circle.
This occurs when:15
ja0j > 1 and ja1j < j1 + a0j. We use this result below to derive the determinacy
results for the different monetary policy rules.
14 Note that when ! = 1, ination in both countries is the same and there is no relative subsystem.
15 See LaSalle (1986, p.28)
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2.A.1 Proof of proposition 1
Combining (2:6), (2:7) and (2:11) and writing the system in the form of (2:13) yields:
B11 =

 1
 
'Y + 
 1Y

+ 1  1
 
'    1

  1Y  1

Writing the eigenvalues of B11 in the form of (2:A1) then solves:
a0 = 
 1 1('Y + Y ') + 
 1
and
a1 =   1
 
'Y + 
 1Y
  1   1
Hence we have:
ja0j > 1 =)  1('Y + kY ') >   (1  ), which is satised trivially, while:
ja1j < j1 + a0j =)
Y ('   1) + (1  )'Y > 0 (2:35)
Proof of Proposition 3
For the system given by (2:6), (2:7), (2:10) and (2:12), determinacy requires the
following matrix to have its eigenvalues inside the unit circle:
B11 =
"
1+ 1Y  1(1 ')
(1  1'Y )  
 1(1 ') 1
(1  1'Y )  1Y  1
#
This matrix is obtained by substituting (2:12) into (2:6) and combining this with (2:7)
in the form of (2:13). While B11 determines the system for union average variables, (2:10)
determines that for relative variables. As shown above, (2:10) is independent of policy and
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is always determinate. Hence, the determinacy of the monetary union depends on B11. As
in the proof of proposition 1 we let the characteristic polynomials be in the form of (2:A1),
where:
a0 = 
 1(1   1'Y ) 1
a1 =  
 
1 +  1Y 
 1 (1  ')

(1   1'Y ) 1    1
For determinacy we need; ja0j > 1 and ja1j < j1 + a0j. The rst condition ja0j > 1
gives the following constraint for when a0 is negative:
'Y < 
 
 1 + 1

(2:A2)
The condition ja1j < j1 + a0j implies:
2(1 + ) > Y ('   1) + 'Y (1 + ) (2:36)
if (a0 + 1) and a1 are both negative or positive, and:
0 < (1  )'Y + Y ('   1) (2:35)
in the case where (a0 + 1) is positive and a1 negative, or vice versa. Rearranging
(2:35) gives:   (1  )'Y < Y ('   1), substituting this into (2:36) and rearranging
yields: 'Y < 
 
 1 + 1

. That is, combining (2:35) and (2:36) gives (2:A2), making
it redundant. The necessary and sufcient conditions for determinacy are then (2:35) and
(2:36).
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2.B Appendix: Proof of E-stability results
In this appendix we derive the E-stability results of the above propositions, using the
methodology outlined in section 2.2.3. In this chapter, F and A are block-diagonal and
F11 and A11 are determined by (2:6), (2:7) and the interest rate rule, while F22 and A22 are
determined by (2:10). F22 and A22 are independent of policy and we will derive these for
the generic case here. Solving (2:34) using (2:10) yields:
b22 =
1p1 4 
2 
where;   1
1++T
We note that (1  4 ) is between zero and one and that the negative conjugate of
b22 is always stable, while the positive conjugate never is. For the negative conjugate we
have:
F22 =
2 
(1+
p
1 4 2)
and A22 = 2 
(1+
p
1 4 2)
It sufces to show that A22 is less than one, since F22 = A22 and 0 <  < 1.
A22 =
2 
(1+
p
1 4 2)
< 1
(2   1)2 < 1  4 2
0 < 1 + 2 (1  (1 + ) )
Since 1  2 (1 + ) > 0
It hence follows that F22 and the product of F22 and A22 are both less than one.
Furthermore, since A22 is between zero and one, it follows that the eigenvalues of F11A22
have real parts less than one if those of F11 have real parts less than one. Consequently, for
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E-stability of monetary policy, we need the interest rate rule to induce learning stability of
the rst subsystem, as determined by F11 and A11.
Proof of Proposition 2
Given what is explained above, expectational stability of the union economy is deter-
mined by A11 and F11 as dened in section 2.3.3. It follows from (2:33) that b11 = 0 since
11 = 0. This in turn gives:
F11 =
"

'Y +'Y +
1 '
'Y +'Y +
Y
'Y +'Y +
('Y +)+Y
'Y +'Y +
#
, A11 = 0
For E-stability we require the eigenvalues of F11 to have real parts less than one.
This is equivalent to the matrix (F11   I) having negative real parts, where I is the identity
matrix. Let the eigenvalues be given by:
p() = 2 + c1+ c0 (2:A3)
then these are negative if and only if c0 > 0 and c1 > 0.
Here we have:
F11   I = 1('Y +'Y +)
  ('Y + 'Y ) (1  ')
Y  (1  ) ('Y + )  ('   1)Y

hence:
c0 =
(' 1)Y +'Y (1 )
('Y +'Y +)
c1 = c0 +
'Y +'Y +(1 )
('Y +'Y +)
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The system is then E-stable when c0 > 0, which gives the Taylor principle as the
necessary and sufcient condition for E-stability:
0 < (1  )'Y + Y ('   1) (2:35)
Proof of Proposition 4
We follow the above methodology and note that 11 = 0, implies from (2:33) that
b11 = 0 and hence also that A11 = 0. For E-stability we therefore require that both of the
eigenvalues of F11 have real parts less than one, where;
F11 =

(1   1'Y )  1 (1  ')
Y (1   1'Y )  + Y  1 (1  ')

Writing the eigenvalues of the matrix [F11   I] in the form of (2:A3) then yields:
c0 = 
 1'Y (1  ) + Y  1 ('   1)
and
c1 = 
 1'Y + (1  ) + Y  1 ('   1)
= c0 + 
 1'Y + (1  )
As stated in the above proof of proposition 2, the eigenvalues of the matrix F11 have
real parts less than one when those of [F11 I] have negative real parts, which occurs when
c0;c1 > 0. Since  1'Y +(1  ) > 0, we then require c0 > 0 for E-stability. This solves
for the Taylor principle as the necessary and sufcient condition for E-stability:
0 < (1  )'Y + Y ('   1) (2:35)
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2.C Appendix: Determinacy and E-stability of optimal policy
rules
Proof of Proposition 5
The economic system is now given by equations (2:6), (2:7), (2:37) and (2:10). We
show in the above proofs of propositions 1 and 2, that (2:10) independently determines the
evolution of the terms of trade and the relative subsystem. Furthermore, the condition is
both determinate and E-stable. Hence, for determinacy we substitute (2:37) into (2:6) and
combine this with (2:7) and write it in the form of (2:13):
B11 =

1 +  1 1Y   1 1
  1Y  1

The eigenvalues of B11 are then:
1;2 =
((1+)+Y )
p
((1+)+Y )
2 42
2
It can easily be veried that while the negative conjugate is between zero and one,
the positive is always larger than one. Hence, the policy rule (2:37) is indeterminate.
Considering E-stability we note that11 = 0, implying that b11 = 0 and thatA11 = 0.
For E-stability we therefore need both eigenvalues of F11 to have real parts less than one,
where:
F11 =

1  1
Y  + Y 
 1

and the eigenvalues are given by:
1;2 =
((1+)+Y )
p
((1+)+Y )
2 42
2
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As above, the positive conjugate is always larger than one and the policy rule (2:37)
is therefore not locally asymptotically stable under RLS learning .
Proof of Proposition 6
Combining (2:6), (2:7) and (2:38) and writing this in the form of (2:13) gives the
matrix:
B 111 =
"
0   
(Y +)
0 
(Y +)
#
Note that B 111 is singular and we hence do not obtain B11. Equivalently to having the
eigenvalues of B11 outside the unit circle is having those of B11 inside the unit circle, The
eigenvalues are equal to zero and 
(Y +)
, which is clearly between zero and one. So, the
policy rule (2:38) is always determinate.
Since 11 = 0, we have: b11 = 0 and A11 = 0. This implies that F11 = B 111 and
hence that the policy rule (2:38) is stable under learning.
Proof of proposition 7
We note that the policy rule (2:39) is a special case of (2:12), in which 'Y = 0
and ' =
h
1 + (1 %)
%
i
. From proposition 3, we have that the two conditions (2:35) and
(2:36), must hold for determinacy. Of these, the Taylor principle is always satised since
' =
h
1 + (1 %)
%
i
> 1 given our assumption of 0 < % < 1, while the second constraint is
satised when:
' <
2(1+)
Y
+ 1
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) % < Y
2(1+)+Y
From proposition 4, the necessary and sufcient condition for E-stability of a forward
looking interest rate rule is the Taylor principle (2:35). Hence the policy rule (2:39) is
always locally asymptotically stable under RLS learning.
Chapter 3
Learning in a Monetary Union with
Heterogeneous Price Contracts
Chapter Overview
In this chapter we consider determinacy and E-stability of a two country monetary union
model that allows for asymmetries in price rigidities. While the results of chapter 2 hold
for this model when price contracts are of equal length in both countries, the determinate
and E-stable regions for monetary policy increase when introducing heterogeneous price
rigidities. Specically, the Taylor principle is no longer a required condition. Furthermore,
an interest rate rule reacting to the terms of trade, in addition to output and ination, is
more likely to induce determinacy and local stability under RLS learning.
3.1 Introduction
3.1.1 Overview
In chapter 1, we introduced a monetary union model and demonstrated that the union cen-
tral bank has no means of stabilizing asymmetric shocks, when there is homogeneity in
price rigidities. The previous chapter concluded that the results from the closed economy
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literature on learning also hold for a monetary union model with homogeneous price rigidi-
ties.
Here, we consider a monetary union model in which the assumption of homogeneous
price rigidities is relaxed. This implies that monetary policy now has an effect on relative
variables as a change in the interest rate has different impacts on the ination of different
countries. We examine the effect that this has on determinacy and E-stability by allowing
for the degree of asymmetry in price rigidities to vary. We also consider a Taylor rule that
acts to stabilize the terms of trade in addition to ination and output.
The assumption of asymmetric price rigidities means that the system cannot be par-
titioned as in the previous chapter and consequently we do not obtain analytical results.
Instead, we provide a numerical analysis that produces some clear and interesting results
that are presented graphically.
3.1.2 The model framework
The model put forward in chapter 1 is rather complex in structure and to simplify analysis
we use the model of Benigno (2004) to examine learning in a monetary union with hetero-
geneous price rigidities. The monetary union is made up of two countries; (H)ome and
(F )oreign. Each country has a sovereign scal government but they share a common cen-
tral bank. The monetary union consists of a continuum of economic agents or households
spread along the unit interval, of which [0; n) reside in home country and (n; 1] in foreign
country. Each household produces a unique good monopolistically that makes part of its
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country's consumption bundle, while consuming the consumption bundles of both union
countries.
Following Calvo (1983), each producer of country i faces a xed probability i of
keeping their price xed in each period, for i = H;F . The average length of a contract, 
1
1 i

is therefore the same for all producers within a given country, but generally different
for producers in country H than for those in country F . We keep the union average length
of a price contract xed, while allowing the average contract length in the two member
countries to differ. This allows us to examine the specic effect that asymmetric price
rigidities has on determinacy and E-stability.
3.1.3 Related literature and main results
Using the forward looking closed economy framework of Woodford (1999), Bullard & Mi-
tra (2002) examine determinacy and E-stability of monetary policy. They consider interest
rate rules reacting to ination and the output gap, and nd that the Taylor principle, where
the central bank reacts to movements in ination by more than one-for-one in order to ad-
just the real interest rate, is closely linked with determinacy and E-stability. Bullard &
Mitra (2007) nd that; including lagged values of the interest rate in the Taylor rule, so
as to smoothen the path of interest rates, increases the determinate and E-stable region for
monetary policy.
Wang & Wong (2005) examine the effect of inertia in the Phillips curve on deter-
minacy and learning stability of monetary policy and nd that policy needs to be more
aggressive to ensure stability, when the degree of inertia is higher. In our framework, the
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terms of trade brings inertia into the system. While the terms of trade has no effect on
union output and ination when price rigidities are homogeneous, the whole system ex-
hibits inertia when there is heterogeneity in price rigidities. Nonetheless, we nd that the
larger the difference between the average length of a price contract in the two countries, i.e.
the larger the asymmetry in price rigidities, the larger is the set of policy rules that induce
determinacy and E-stability.
In the open economy, the central bank has the option of stabilizing exchange rates
in addition to output and ination. Using the small open economy framework of Galì
& Monacelli (2005), Llosa & Tuesta (2008) nd that the chosen exchange rate regime
has crucial implications for determinacy and E-stability of monetary policy. Specically,
when interest rates are adjusted to uctuations in the exchange rate, then the Taylor prin-
ciple condition is relaxed. Llosa & Tuesta (2008) point out that the nominal exchange rate
changes one for one with changes in the lagged interest rate by the interest rate parity con-
dition. Thus including the exchange rate in the Taylor rule has a similar effect as using
a smoothened interest rate rule of the type in Bullard & Mitra (2007). However, when
policy is forward looking and stabilizing the exchange rate, the determinate and E-stable
region does not necessarily increase, as further restrictions on the aggressiveness of mone-
tary policy must be satised. Looking at two country open economy models, Wang (2006)
and Bullard & Schaling (2006) nd that when one country pegs its currency to the second
country, stability hinges upon the policy of the second country.
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Here, we show that when monetary policy stabilizes the terms of trade in addition
to ination and the output gap, a less aggressive response to the latter two is required to
guarantee a unique stationary REE and local stability under RLS learning. It is as if the
Taylor principle condition shifts inwards, thus increasing the region for stable policy as in
Llosa & Tuesta (2008). In contrast to their case however, the stability region in our case
also increases when the policy rule is forward looking.
Bullard & Schaling (2006) interpret the size of a country as its degree of openness so
that as it approaches one it becomes a closed economy while when it approaches zero in
size it becomes a small open economy. They nd that the smaller a country is in size, i.e.
the more open it is in trade, the more aggressive monetary policy has to be to guarantee de-
terminacy and learning stability. Findings by Llosa & Tuesta (2008) support this result. In
this chapter we nd that the determinate and E-stable region for monetary policy increases
with the size of the country with the higher degree of price rigidity, keeping the average
level of price rigidity across the union xed.
3.1.4 Organization
In the following section, we set up the environment for our analysis. This includes a pre-
sentation of the reduced form of the Benigno (2004) model, the interest rates rules to be
considered, a brief summary of the methodology used to obtain the determinacy and E-
stability results and a calibration of the model's underlying parameters. In section 3.3
we then present the results for the contemporaneous interest rate rules, while section 3.4
presents those for the forecast based policy rules. Section 3.5 concludes the chapter.
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3.2 The Environment
We rst look at the underlying structure of the Benigno (2004) model and then present it
in its reduced form. The monetary policy rules are then presented, which together with the
core equations of the model give our monetary union system. Finally, we put forward a
calibration for the models underlying parameters, which will be used in following sections
when presenting our results.
3.2.1 The baseline model
Here, we outline the main features of the Benigno (2004) model.1 Consider a monetary
union consisting of two countries; (H)ome and (F )oreign. The union contains a contin-
uum of households spread over the unit interval, where those residing in home country are
spread over [0; n) while residents of the foreign country occupy (n; 1]. That is, the size of
country H is n and that of country F is (1  n). Each household is both a consumer and a
monopolistically competitive producer. For simplicity, the population sizes are assumed to
equate to the economic sizes of the two regions.
The consumer problem
Each household consumes the bundles produced in both countries and the elasticity
of substitution between these two bundles is assumed to be one. In addition, the sov-
ereign governments of the two regions each consume bundles produced in their respective
1 In this section, we summarize the main features of the framework. This serves our purpose and readers
are refered to Benigno (2004) for a more detailed description.
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countries. They also provide nominal lump sum transfers to households while imposing a
proportional tax on nominal income.
Asset markets are complete domestically while positions can be taken in an in-
ternationally traded bond. However, given the assumption of consumption preferences
and assuming no initial holdings of the international bond, it becomes redundant. A
corollary of this is that there is perfect risk sharing of consumption between regions, i.e.
CHt = C
F
t = Ct, for all t.2 Eventhough consumers in both countries are guaranteed the
same level of consumption, output can still vary due to uctuations in the terms of trade
and different levels of government spending. The market clearing conditions are:3
Y Ht = T
1 n
t Ct +G
H
t and Y Ft = T nt Ct +GFt (3.1)
Where the terms of trade is dened as the price of the foreign consumption bundle
over the price of the home country consumption bundle, i.e. Tt  PF;tPH;t .
Firms and price setting
Households produce a differentiated product that makes part of the domestic con-
sumption bundle, where the elasticity of substitution across goods produced within a coun-
try  is greater than one, as in Dixit and Stiglitz (1977).
2 See the companion Appendix A of Benigno (2004).
3 This expression differs from the market clearning conditions of the previous two chapters since there is
now government consumption. In this chapter we assume that government expenditure is not actively used to
stabilize economic uctuations but is instead set at a steady state value. In the following chapter we consider
the case in which scal policy is used in tandem with monetary policy to stabilize shocks.
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Following Calvo (1983), each producer of country i faces a xed probability (1  i)
of changing their price in each period, for i = H;F . The average length of a contract 
1
1 i

is therefore the same for all agents in country i but not necessarily so for agents in
different countries. We then keep the average price contract length xed for the union as
a whole (we dene the union average length of a contract as
 
1
1 H
n   1
1 F
1 n ), while
letting the relative contract length between the two countries vary, we can isolate the effect
that heterogeneous price rigidities has on our results. In this chapter , we will without loss
of generality assume that the home country has a higher degree of price rigidities than the
foreign country.
Log-linearisation around steady state
We now look at the log-linearized form of the model under the assumption of sticky
prices. For the generic variable X , we have dened the log deviation from its steady state
value as x = x +  x, where  x is the exible price value and x the deviation from this
due to prices being sticky. We further dene union average variables as; XW  nXH +
(1  n)XF and relative variables as: XR  XF  XH .
The system is reduced to the following four equations:

y
W
t = Et(

y
W
t+1)   1

(rt   Et(Wt+1))  rrt

(3.2)
Ht = (1  n)kHT (

T t) + k
H
C

y
W
t + Et(
H
t+1) (3.3)
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Ft =  nkFT

T t

+ kFC

y
W
t + Et(
F
t+1) (3.4)

T t =

T t 1 + Ft   Ht   Et
 
T t (3.5)
Where y
W
t is the union output gap, Wt ; Ht and Ft are the union, home and foreign
country's respective ination levels, rrt is the natural rate of interest familiar from the
closed economy literature and can be interpreted as a government expenditure shock over
the natural level of output: rrt  +Et(
 
y
W
t+1   gWt ). The deviation of the terms of
trade from its natural level is denoted by

T t.
The inverse of the relative risk aversion is given by;    UCC
 
C
UC
, while the inverse
of the elasticity of producing goods is dened as:    Vyy
 
C
Vy
. The supply schedule coef-
cients are then given by:
kiC  [(1  i)(1  i)=i] [(+ ) = (1 + )]
and
kiT  kiC [(1 + ) = (+ )] for i = H;F
where  is the elasticity of substitution across goods produced within a region. Equa-
tion (3:2) is an IS type curve for the union as a whole and is similar to those in the closed
economy literature. Equations (3:3) and (3:4) are the supply schedules of the two union
members and the last equation (3:5), is the condition for the terms of trade.
Because the terms of trade enter the supply schedules and hence affects ination,
there are three different distortions to the economy; (i) the deadweight loss from the inef-
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cient price and production levels caused by monopolistic competition, (ii) the rigidity in
prices caused by staggered price setting and (iii) the distortions to the terms of trade caus-
ing disequilibrium of relative prices. Benigno (2004) assumes a subsidy in accordance with
the framework to neutralize the rst of these three distortions.4 Monetary policy can then
achieve an efcient outcome only in the case where nominal rigidities are equal across the
two regions. This is because only homogenous price rigidities implies that deviations of
the terms of trade from equilibrium are neutral for the region as a whole. When this is the
case we have that kHT = kFT = kT and that kHC = kFC = kC , thus using the denition of a
union variable xW  nxH + (1  n)xF we can combine equations (3:3) and (3:4) to get a
union and a relative supply schedule:
Wt = kC

y
W
t + Et(
W
t+1) (3.6)
Rt =  kT

T t

+ Et(
R
t+1) (3.7)
In this case the system can be partitioned, where (3:2) and (3:6) determine the union
variables
n
y
W
t ; 
W
t
o
and (3:5) and (3:7) determine
n
Rt ;

T t
o
. We show below that as in
the previous chapter, the results from the closed economy literature on learning hold for
this model when price rigidities are equal in the two countries.
In the more general case, when the average length of price contracts differ in the two
regions, it is useful to write equation (3:2) as:
4 This implies imposing the subsidy: H = F = (1  ) 1.
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
y
W
t = Et(

y
W
t+1)   1

(rt   nEt(Ht+1)  (1  n)Et(Ft+1))  rrt

(3:20)
This yields a system with four equations determining the four state variables;n
y
W
t ; 
H
t ; 
F
t ;

T t
o
. While the rst three of these are free, the terms of trade is prede-
termined.
3.2.2 Specications for the interest rate rules
In this chapter and throughout this thesis, we will consider both contemporaneous and
forward looking interest rate rules. In practice the European Central Bank (ECB) has the
mission to govern price stability in its member countries and thus safeguard the value of
the single European currency, the euro.5 However, "without prejudice to the objective of
price stability, the European System of Central Banks6 shall support the general economic
policies in the Community with a view to contributing to the achievement of the objectives
of the Community".7 Hence, there is scope for stabilization of output or economic activity
in the EMU. We therefore focus on Taylor rules that react to both ination and the output
gap. Furthermore, the ination target of the ECB is currently the harmonized index of
consumer prices (HICP) of the member countries, where the weight given to each country
is equal to its proportion of union consumption. This is dened as Wt in our model and
hence our baseline Taylor rule is given by:
5 Laid down in article 2 of the Treaty on European Union.
6 The European systems of Central Banks consists of the ECB and the national Central Banks of all the EU
members.
7 Article 105.1 of the Treaty on European Union.
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rt = '
W
t + 'Y

y
W
t (3.8)
Note that it is convenient to rewrite this using the denition of a union variable:
rt = '
 
nHt + (1  n)Ft

+ 'Y

y
W
t (3:80)
We also examine the case where a higher weight is put on home country's ination,
this yields:
rt = '
 
Ht + (1  )Ft

+ 'Y

y
W
t (3.9)
Where [n; 1] gives a higher weight to home country than its size n. Note that chang-
ing the country weights is equivalent to keeping them xed at country sizes while introduc-
ing a new term in the Taylor rule, relative ination Rt  Ft  Ht . If we dene the interest
rate rule as: rt = '
 
nHt + (1  n)Ft

+ 'y

y
W
t   'RRt = '
 
Ht + (1  )Ft

+
'y

y
W
t , it follows that  = n+
'
R
'
.
As shown in the companion appendix B of Benigno (2004), interest rates do not affect
the terms of trade when price rigidities are the same in the two countries, since ination in
both countries would be equally sensitive to movements in interest rates. However, with
heterogeneous price rigidities, monetary policy does have an effect on the terms of trade.
We hence consider a Taylor rule of the form:
rt = '
W
t + 'Y

y
W
t + 'T

T t (3.10)
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The coefcient on the terms of trade 'T is positive because an increase in the interest
rate deteriorates the terms of trade. A rise in rt contracts union output

y
W
t , which has the
effect of lowering ination in the two countries through the supply schedules (3:3) and
(3:4). Assuming that home country has more rigid prices than foreign and that H > F ,
it follows that kHc < kFc . This means that the fall in foreign country ination is greater
than the fall in domestic ination and consequently that the terms of trade depreciates with
contractionary monetary policy.8 Hence, monetary policy is stabilizing of the terms of
trade.
In addition to the above Taylor rules, we consider two forward looking rules of the
types:
rt = 'Et
 
Wt+1

+ 'YEt

y
W
t+1

(3.11)
and
rt = 'Et
 
Wt+1

+ 'YEt

y
W
t+1

+ 'TEt

T t+1

(3.12)
3.2.3 Calibration of parameter values
Using the methodology outlined in section 2.2.3 of the previous chapter, we obtain nu-
merical results that are represented graphically. To obtain these results, we make use of
8 Taken future expectations as given, the relationship between the interest rate and the terms of trade is
dT
dr =
F
yW
yW
r   
H
yW
yW
r =
dF
r   d
H
r = 
 1(kHc   kFc ) < 0 assuming that country H has more
rigid prices than country F . Hence, to offset deviations in the terms of trade from its natural level we have a
positive reaction of interest rates.
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the model parameter values suggested by Benigno (2004). This allows us to examine how
determinacy and E-stability is altered by changes in the policy coefcients. The analysis
was also carried out using the calibration of Rotemberg & Woodford (1998), but as the
qualitative results remain unchanged, these are omitted in what follows.
The parameter values in Benigno (2004) are similar to those suggested by e.g. Rotem-
berg & Woodford (1998), but are more applicable to the European economy rather than to
the US economy. The intertemporal rate of substitution  is assumed to have a value of
0:99, since these are assumed to be quarterly values this implies an annual equilibrium in-
terest rate of 4:1%.9 The producer mark-up is assumed to be 15%, which suggests that
the elasticity of substitution between goods produced within a region  takes a value of
7:66. The coefcient of relative risk aversion  is set to a conventional value of 1=6. Fur-
thermore, assuming that the elasticity of the average real wage with respect to variation in
production is slightly higher in Europe than in the US and by assuming that labours' share
of total income is equal to 0:75, we have that the elasticity  is equal to 0:67. For simplic-
ity, we assume in what follows that the sizes of the two regions of the monetary union are
equal, that is n = 0:5, unless otherwise specied.
Finally, we let the average length of a union contract be four quarters throughout the
chapter, but the results hold for other levels of average price rigidities as well. Benigno
& Lopez-Salido (2006) provide empirical evidence supporting this assumption, looking at
the major European economies. Recall that the probability facing producers in country i of
9 This is approximately the 20 year German average, as pointed out by Benigno (2004).
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keeping their price xed, is given by i. Thus the average length of a price contract is given
by:
 
1
1 i

. We dene the union average length of a contract as the geometric average:

1
1  H
n
1
1  F
1 n
= 4 (3.13)
3.3 Contemporaneous Taylor Rules
In this section we examine determinacy and E-stability of our monetary union framework
when the central bank employs one of the contemporaneous interest rate rules outlined
in section 3.2.2. We rst consider the benchmark case of homogeneous price rigidities
across the monetary union. This is then compared to our results under the assumption of
heterogeneous price rigidities.
3.3.1 Homogeneous price rigidities
As a point of reference, we rst consider the case where price contracts in both countries
of the monetary union last for four quarters on average. That is,
 
1
1 H

=
 
1
1 F

= 4.
This implies that the supply curve coefcients outlined in section 3.2.1 take the same value
for both countries, so that kHT = kFT = kT and kHC = kFC = kC . As explained in section
3.2.1 above, this implies that the system is given by the following equations in addition to
the employed monetary policy rule:

y
W
t = Et(

y
W
t+1)   1

(rt   Et(Wt+1))  rrt

(3:2)
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Wt = kC

y
W
t + Et(
W
t+1) (3:6)
Rt =  kT

T t

+ Et(
R
t+1) (3:7)

T t =

T t 1 + Ft   Ht   Et
 
T t (3:5)
Note that we have two independent subsystems; (3:2) and (3:6) determine union vari-
ables
n
y
W
t ; 
W
t
o
, while (3:5) and (3:7) determine the relative variables
n
Rt ;

T t
o
. Mon-
etary policy only affect the rst of these two subsystems and has no effect on relative
variables. That is, interest rates have no effect on either relative ination nor on the terms
of trade. We consider the contemporaneous Taylor rule;
rt = '
W
t + 'Y

y
W
t (3:8)
and combine this with the system above, which yields the following result.
Proposition 1 Assume that price rigidities in the monetary union are homogeneous. If
monetary policy follows the contemporaneous interest rate rule:
rt = '
W
t + 'Y

y
W
t (3:8)
then the necessary and sufcient condition for both determinacy and E-stability is
that the Taylor principle is satised:
kC('   1) + (1  )'Y > 0 (3.14)
Proof. See appendix 3A.
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Hence, for this monetary union model, as for the monetary union model of the pre-
vious two chapters, the condition for a unique stationary and expectationally stable REE is
that the Taylor principle holds. This is also the determinacy and E-stability condition for
the closed economy model considered by Bullard & Mitra (2002). The stability region for
monetary policy under equal price rigidities is depicted by the solid line in gure 3.1 below.
We now relax the assumption of homogenous price contracts and consider the case
in which the home country has a higher degree of price rigidity than the foreign country.
3.3.2 Heterogeneous price rigidities
In this section, we consider the case in which the average length of price contracts is dif-
ferent in the two countries of the monetary union. As in the previous section, we assume
that the average length of a contract in the union is xed at 4 quarters, so that: 
1
1 H
n   1
1 F
1 n
= 4
However, we now assume that H > F , or put differently;
Assumption: Home country has more rigid prices than foreign country.
For example if the average contract in home country is 5 quarters then that in foreign
country will be approximately 3 quarters.10;11
10 This is only approximately true since we have dened the average union contract length geometrically.
11 Benigno and Lopez-Salido (2006) nd that price rigidities vary across countries, with Italy and the Nether-
lands having more exible prices than Germany, France and Spain. Their ndings suggest that differences
in the average length of price contracts could be around 2 quarters. Further evidence of differences in price
rigidities is provided by e.g. Nickel (1997), who looks at wage rigidities in major European countries.
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Taylor rule reacting to output and ination
Let the economic system be given by (3:2), (3:3), (3:4), (3:5) and the contemporane-
ous Taylor rule (3:8). Using the methodology outlined in section 2.2.3, numerical results
are obtained in what follows. The relevant matrices of the system are presented in appendix
3B.
We rst consider how the determinacy and E-stability region changes as the degree of
heterogeneity in price rigidities (H F ) increases. The results are illustrated in gure 3.1,
and clearly, a higher level of asymmetry in price rigidities increases both the determinate
and the E-stable region.
Result 1 When the central bank conducts monetary policy according to the contempo-
raneous Taylor rule;
rt = '
W
t + 'Y

y
W
t (3:8)
and when the union average length of a price contract is xed at four quarters;
 
1
1 H
n   1
1 F
1 n
= 4,
then the region for determinacy and E-stability increases with the level of heterogene-
ity in price rigidities.
As is common for contemporaneous interest rate rules, the determinate and E-stable
regions coincide.
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Fig. 3.1. The graph shows that the determinate and E-stable region for monetary policy
increases with the level of asymmetry in price rigidities.
Our result could potentially have implications not only for monetary union models,
but also for closed economy models. As in the model of Aoki (2001), closed economy
models could have sectors with different levels of price rigidities. Not recognizing this, or
simplifying by assuming one sector with the average level of price rigidity, could lead to
underestimates of the stability regions for monetary policy.
We note that the stability region in gure 3.1 changes for the output coefcient 'Y
but not for the ination coefcient '. With homogeneous price rigidities, we have from
the Taylor principle (3:14) that for stability the output gap has to satisfy: 'Y >
kC
(1 ) when
there is no stabilization of ination, ' = 0. Since the coefcient kC is convex in , the
average supply curve coefcient;
kWC  nkHC + (1  n) kFC
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increases with the level of asymmetry in price rigidities. Hence, based on this, the
Taylor principle suggests that the stability region should decrease as we impose hetero-
geneous price rigidities. But, in fact the opposite occurs. In gure 3.2, we assume that
' = 0 and compare the actual determinate and E-stable region for 'Y when the level of
asymmetry in price rigidities changes, to that suggested by the Taylor principle of the form:
'Y >
kWC
(1  )
It is clear that the difference between the Taylor principle and the actual stability
region increases with asymmetry. We conjecture that this result is due to the spill-over
effect of the relative system on the subsystem for union variables. We speculate that the
inertia in the terms of trade could make the system more likely to be determinate and
E-stable. Wang & Wong (2005) suggest that inertia of ination in the supply schedule
reduces rather than increases the determinacy and E-stability region. However, their case
is different in that past ination and expected future ination are a convex combination and
inertia therefore reduces the sensitivity of ination to expected future ination. In our case
the inertia in itself does not alter the values of other coefcients.
We xed the level of asymmetry in price rigidities (H F ) and changed the weight
attached to the ination level of home country  in the policy rule (3:9) and examined if
this had an impact on determinacy and E-stability. As explained in section 3.2.2, this is
equivalent to the case in which the central bank stabilizes relative ination (Rt ) in addition
to union-wide ination (Wt ). Our ndings were that this has no effect on the determinacy
and E-stability region for monetary policy.
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Fig. 3.2. The average length of a price contract across the monetary union is held xed at
4 quarters, while interest rates are assumed to only be adjusted to changes in the output
gap. The determinate and E-stable region is given by the solid line. However, the Taylor
principle only holds above the dotted line, suggesting that it does not have to be satised
for determiancy and E-stability under heterogeneous price rigidities.
However, with heterogeneous price rigidities, the relative sizes of the two countries
now matter. As the size of home country (n) increases, so does the region for determinate
and E-stable values for the policy coefcients. This is illustrated in gure 3.3. Llosa &
Tuesta (2008) and Bullard & Schaling (2006) nd that the determinacy and E-stability
region for monetary policy in an open economy increases with its size, where the size of a
country is interpreted as the inverse of its openness in trade.
Result 2 Keeping the length of an average union price contract xed, the region for
determinate and E-stable monetary policy increases with the size of the country with the
higher level of price rigidity.
Note that in both gure 3.1 and gure 3.3, it is the output gap coefcient 'Y that
changes the determinacy and E-stability region. The cut-off for an interest rate rule reacting
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Fig. 3.3. The gure shows that the determinate and E-stable region increases with the size
of the country with a higher degree of price rigidities. The average duration of a price
contract in the monetary union is xed at 4 and that of home country at 5 quarters, allowing
duration in the foreign country to vary.
only to ination to be stable is still that interest rates are adjusted sufciently to change the
real interest rate, i.e. ' > 1.
Interest rate rule with the terms of trade
This section investigates the case where the central bank adjusts interest rates to sta-
bilise the terms of trade in addition to ination and the output gap. Llosa & Tuesta (2008)
examine determinacy and RLS learning stability for a Taylor rule with ination, output and
the nominal exchange rate. They nd that when reacting to the nominal exchange rate,
the standard Taylor principle of the form (3:14) does no longer need to hold for determi-
nacy and E-stability. In fact, their results suggest a parallel shift of the indeterminate and
E-unstable region in f'; 'Y g space towards the origin as the stabilization of exchange
rates becomes more aggressive.
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The system is given by the IS schedule (3:2), the two supply schedules (3:3) and
(3:4), the condition for the terms of trade (3:5), and the interest rate rule:
rt = '
W
t + 'Y

y
W
t + 'T

T t (3:10)
Using the methodology of section 2.2.3, we nd the restrictions on the policy coef-
cients for a unique stationary REE and local stability under recursive least squares learn-
ing.12 We illustrate our results for the case where the sizes of the economies are equal
(n = 0:5) and where the difference in the average length of price contracts is 2 quarters.
Figure 3.4 shows the combinations of the policy coefcients 'Y and ' that induce stabil-
ity, given different values of the policy coefcient on the terms of trade 'T .
As in Llosa & Tuesta (2008), the determinate and E-stable region increases by a
parallel shift towards the origin as 'T increases. The magnitude of these shifts also increase
with the degree of heterogeneity in price rigidities. If the stabilisation of the terms of trade
is sufciently aggressive, then interest rates do not need to react to ination nor to the
output gap to achieve stability. That is, if 'T is large enough, then 'Y and ' can be zero
and monetary policy will still be both determinate and E-stable. Again, the determinate and
E-stable regions exactly coincide.
Result 3 When the monetary union is subject to heterogeneous price rigidities, while
monetary policy stabilizes the terms of trade in addition to output and ination accord-
12 The matrices describing the system are presented in appendix 3B.
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Fig. 3.4. The gure shows the determinate and E-stable region for the output gap and ina-
tion policy coefcients in the Taylor rule (3:10) for different values of the policy coefcient
on the terms of trade 'T . Note that we are assuming heterogeneous price rigidities for this
policy rule.
ing to;
rt = '
W
t + 'Y

y
W
t + 'T

T t (3:10)
then the larger 'T is, the smaller will the policy coefcients ' and 'Y need to be
to induce determinacy and E-stability. If 'T is sufciently large, then determinacy and
E-stability is guaranteed for all non-negative values of 'Y and '.
Bullard & Mitra (2007) nd that including the lagged interest rate in the Taylor rule
increases the determinate and E-stability region. Here, the terms of trade is determined by
the condition:
Tt = Tt 1 + Rt
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As mentioned above, adjusting interest rates to changes in relative ination (Rt ) has
no effect on determinacy and E-stability. The increased stability must therefore be a result
of the rst term (Tt 1) in the above condition indirectly entering the interest rate rule via the
contemporaneous terms of trade (Tt). We hence conjecture that it is the inertia in the interest
rate rule, brought about by the inertia in terms of trade, that increases the stability region
with 'T . Llosa & Tuesta (2008) draw a similar conclusion for the Taylor rule including the
nominal exchange rate, with the motivation that the current exchange rate has a one-for-one
relationship with the lagged interest rate by the uncovered interest parity.
We now examine if our results are altered when the central bank is forward looking
in its policy.
3.4 Forward Looking Taylor Rules
In this section, we look at determinacy and E-stability of the forward looking Taylor rules
presented in section 3.2.2. As above, we rst consider the case of homogeneous price
rigidities and then impose the assumption of home country having a higher degree of price
rigidity than foreign country.
3.4.1 Homogeneous price rigidities
In order to assess the effect that heterogeneity in price rigidities has on the determinacy
and E-stability of forward looking monetary policy, we must rst establish the stability
conditions under symmetric price rigidities. As in section 3.3.1, we can partition the system
into two independent subsystems, since H = F implies that kHC = kFC = kC and that
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kHT = k
F
T = kT . The union variables
n
y
W
t ; 
W
t
o
are determined by (3:2), (3:6) and the
Taylor rule:
rt = 'Et
 
Wt+1

+ 'YEt

y
W
t+1

(3:11)
The relative variables
n
Rt ;

T t
o
are independent of policy and determined by (3:5)
and (3:7). The subsystem for the union variables is isomorphic to a closed economy model
and as in section 3.3.1, we obtain the same conditions for determinacy and E-stability as
Bullard & Mitra (2002).
Proposition 2 When both union countries have the same level of price rigidity, while
monetary policy is forward looking according to:
rt = 'Et
 
Wt+1

+ 'YEt

y
W
t+1

(3:11)
Then, the necessary and sufcient condition for E-stability is that the Taylor principle
holds:
kC('   1) + (1  )'Y > 0 (3:14)
In addition to (3:28), the following condition must hold for determinacy:
2(1 + ) > kC ('   1) + 'Y (1 + ) (3.15)
Proof. See appendix 3C.
It can thus be concluded that for quite general specications of the Taylor rule em-
ployed by the central bank, a monetary union model with homogeneous price rigidities has
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the same determinacy and E-stability conditions for monetary policy as a closed economy
model. We note that this result was obtained in chapter 2 for a model that is similar to the
one treated here in terms of its reduced form, but quite different in terms of its foundations.
The determinacy and E-stability regions for homogeneous price rigidities are depicted by
the solid lines in gure 3.5.
3.4.2 Heterogeneous price rigidities
We have shown above that the Taylor principle (3:14) is not necessary for determinacy
and E-stability when price rigidities are asymmetric and policy follows a contemporaneous
interest rate rule. However, when policy is forward looking there is an additional constraint
on determinacy, as stated in proposition 2. Here, we examine how both constraints in
proposition 2 are affected by heterogeneity in price rigidities. The union average length of
a price contract is xed at 4 quarters as in equation (3:13), but we set that of home country
at 5 quarters making that of foreign country approximately 3 quarters.
Taylor rule reacting to output and ination
Our monetary union framework is now given by (3:2), (3:3), (3:4), (3:5) and the
forward looking Taylor rule (3:11). The methodology of section 2.2.3 is used to obtain
numerical results, with the relevant matrices presented in appendix 3B.
We nd that the E-stable region is the same as in the case of a contemporaneous inter-
est rate rule. That is, the E-stability region pivots around the horizontal axis as the level of
asymmetry in price rigidities increases. This is illustrated by the dotted blue line in gure
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Fig. 3.5. The solid lines shows the determinacy and E-stability regions for monetary policy
under homogeneous price rigidities, while the dotted blue lines show the stability regions
under heterogeneous price rigidities.
3.5. Interestingly, the additional constraint on determinacy (3:15) is relaxed when hetero-
geneity in price rigidities is introduced, although only marginally so. It can be concluded
that the determinate and E-stable region increases with different levels of price rigidities
also for a forward looking Taylor rule.
Result 4 For the forward looking Taylor rule:
rt = 'Et
 
Wt+1

+ 'YEt

y
W
t+1

(3:11)
The determinate and E-stable region increases with the degree of asymmetry in price
rigidities.
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Interest rate rule with the terms of trade
The central bank now employs the forecast based interest rate rule that stabilizes the
terms of trade in addition to output and ination (3:12). This Taylor rule together with
equations (3:2), (3:3), (3:4) and (3:5) describe the union economy. The key matrices of
section 3.2.3 for this case are given in appendix 3B.
In section 3.3.2, we proposed that an interest rate rule that stabilizes the terms of trade
in addition to output and ination is more likely to induce determinacy and E-stability of
REE. This nding is similar to a result by Llosa & Tuesta (2008) who nd that the Taylor
principle is relaxed when including the exchange rate in the interest rate rule of a small open
economy. However, the authors nd that the determinacy region decreases when policy is
forward looking as stabilizing the exchange rate tightens condition (3:15). As a result, the
indeterminate and E-stable region increases in their case.
The results are plotted in gure 3.6, where the difference in the length of price con-
tracts is xed at 2 quarters. The blue dotted lines show the determinacy and E-stability
regions for the policy rule (3:12) when 'T = 0:15 and the solid back lines show those
for 'T = 0. As above, the Taylor principle shifts in towards the origin when the terms of
trade is stabilized by policy. In contrast to the ndings by Llosa & Tuesta (2008) however,
including the terms of trade in the Taylor rule has no effect on the second determinacy con-
dition (3:15). Stabilizing the terms of trade can therefore help eliminate multiple stationary
REE even when policy is forward looking.
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Fig. 3.6. The graph compares the stability regions of forward looking monetary policy
when 'T = 0 (black solid line) to the case where 'T = 0:15 (blue dotted line). Stabi-
lization of the terms of trade increases the determinate and E-stable region for monetary
policy in ('; 'Y ) space.
Result 5 When there is heterogeneity in price rigidities in the monetary union, while
policy is conducted according to the rule;
rt = 'Et
 
Wt+1

+ 'YEt

y
W
t+1

+ 'TEt

T t+1

(3:12)
then the set of determinate and E-stable combinations of f'; 'Y g increases with 'T .
3.5 Conclusion
We have examined determinacy and E-stability of monetary policy in the two-country mon-
etary union model of Benigno (2004). With homogeneous price rigidities, we replicated
the results presented for the closed economy case by Bullard & Mitra (2002).
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However, keeping the average price rigidity across the union xed, while allowing
the level of asymmetry in price rigidities to vary, the results from the closed economy
are altered. Due to a spill-over effect of relative variables on union average variables, the
determinate and E-stable region increases with heterogeneity in price rigidities. This is true
regardless of whether policy reacts to contemporaneous data or whether it is forecast based.
Furthermore, the larger the country with the more rigid prices, the larger is the determinacy
and E-stability region for monetary policy, ceteris paribus.
Finally, with heterogeneous price rigidities it is possible to use monetary policy to
stabilize uctuations in the terms of trade. We nd that a monetary policy rule that stabi-
lizes the terms of trade is more likely to induce a unique and E-stable stationary rational
expectations equilibrium. If the adjustment of interest rates to disturbances in the terms of
trade is sufciently aggressive, then policy can achieve determinacy and E-stability with-
out stabilizing output and ination. Llosa & Tuesta (2008) nd that an interest rate rule
that stabilizes the exchange rate, relaxes the Taylor principle and hence increases the de-
terminate and E-stable region for a contemporaneous policy rule. However, when policy is
forward looking, stabilization of the exchange rate can actually reduce the set of determi-
nate and E-stable policy combinations in their model. In our framework, the determinacy
and E-stablity region becomes larger even when policy is forecast based. Bullard & Mitra
(2006) show that inertia in the interest rate rule increases the determinate and E-stable re-
gion for monetary policy. We hence conjecture that it is the inertia in the terms of trade,
bringing inertia into the interest rate rule, that causes the stability region for policy to in-
crease in our case.
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3.A Appendix: Proof of proposition 1
Determinacy
To examine determinacy we write the system in the partitioned form of (2:13) of
section 2.2.3. As in chapter 2, we then need both subsections to induce determinacy for the
whole system to be determinate. Consider rst the system for union variables; equations
(3:2), (3:6) and the interest rate rule (3:8). We have the following matrix:
B11 =

 1
 
'Y + 
 1kC

+ 1  1
 
'    1

  1kC  1

For determinacy, B11 must have both of its eigenvalues outside of the unit circle.
Using the methodology of appendix 2A, we have:
a0 = 
 1 1('Y + kC') + 
 1
and
a1 =   1
 
'Y + 
 1kC
  1   1
where:
ja1j < j1 + a0j =)
kC ('   1) + (1  )'Y > 0 (3:14)
Consider now the subsystem for relative variables given by (3:5) and (3:7). Combin-
ing these two yields:

T t =

(1 +  + kT )
Et

T t+1

+
1
(1 +  + kT )

T t 1   (1  %)
(1 +  + kT )

 
T t (3:A1)
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Given the determinacy condition for (2:14), the general version of (3:A1) described
in section 2.2.3, we need the following condition to hold: 1(1++kT ) + (1++kT )  < 1
which always holds since kT > 0. The necessary and sufcient condition for a unique
stationary REE is therefore that the Taylor principle (3:14) holds.
E-stability
As in chapter 2, we partition the system in the form of (2:28) and for E-stability we
then need the eigenvalues of Fii and the products of these and those of Ajj to have real
parts less than one, for i; j = 1; 2. The second subsystem is given by (3:A1), hence solving
(2:34) using this yields:
b22 =
1p1 4 
2 
where;   1
1++kT
We refer back to appendix 2B where it is shown that this implies that:
F22 =
2 
(1+
p
1 4 2)
and A22 = 2 
(1+
p
1 4 2)
Further, since F22 = A22 and 0 <  < 1, it follows that A22 is less than one if F22
is less than one. Appendix 2A shows that this is the case since 1  2 (1 + ) > 0.
Hence, need the eigenvalues of F11 and the products of these with those of A11 to
have real parts less than one. For the subsystem of union variables, made up of (3:2), (3:6)
and (3:8) there are no lagged variables and 11 = 0. This implies that b11 = 0, giving the
following matrices:
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F11 =
"

'Y +'kC+
1 '
'Y +'kC+
kC
'Y +'kC+
('Y +)+kC
'Y +'kC+
#
, A11 = 0
For E-stability we require the eigenvalues of F11 to have real parts less than one.
Using the method of appendix 2B gives:
c0 =
(' 1)kC+'Y (1 )
('Y +'kC+)
c1 = c0 +
'kC+'Y +(1 )
('Y +'kC+)
Hence, the system is E-stable when c0 > 0, which gives the Taylor principle as the
necessary and sufcient condition for E-stability:
0 < (1  )'Y + kC ('   1) (3:14)
3.B Appendix: The key matrices
In this appendix, we present the matrices describing the economic system for the different
interest rate rules. We specify B needed to examine determinacy, and 
 and  needed to
examine E-stability. These matrices are dened for the general case in section 2.2.3.
For the policy rule: rt = 'Wt + 'Y

y
W
t
B =
2664
 n 1  n 0
0  0 0
0 0  0
0 0 0 1
3775
 1 2664
+ 'Y 'n '(1  n) 0
 kHC 1 + (1  n)kHT  (1  n)kHT  (1  n)kHT
 kFC  nkFT 1 + nkFT nkFT
0  1 1 1
3775

 =
2664
+ 'Y 'n '(1  n) 0
 kCH 1 0  (1  n)kTH
 kCF 0 1 nkTF
0 1  1 1
3775
 1 2664
 n 1  n 0
0  0 0
0 0  0
0 0 0 0
3775
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 =
2664
+ 'Y 'n '(1  n) 0
 kCH 1 0  (1  n)kTH
 kCF 0 1 nkTF
0 1  1 1
3775
 1 2664
0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0
0 0 0 1
3775
For the policy rule: rt = 'Wt + 'Y

y
W
t + 'T

T t
B =
2664
 n 1  n 0
0  0 0
0 0  0
0 0 0 1
3775
 1 2664
+ 'Y 'n  'T '(1  n)'T 'T
 kHC 1 + (1  n)kHT  (1  n)kHT  (1  n)kHT
 kFC  nkFT 1 + nkFT nkFT
0  1 1 1
3775

 =
2664
+ 'Y 'n 'n 'T
 kCH 1 0  (1  n)kTH
 kCF 0 1 nkTF
0  1 1 1
3775
 1 2664
 n 1  n 0
0  0 0
0 0  0
0 0 0 0
3775
 =
2664
+ 'Y ' '(1  ) 'T
 kCH 1 0  (1  n)kTH
 kCF 0 1 nkTF
0 1  1 1
3775
 1 2664
0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0
0 0 0 1
3775
For the policy rule: rt = 'Et
 
Wt+1

+ 'YEt

y
W
t+1

B =
2664
  'Y n (1  ') (1  n) (1  ') 0
0  0 0
0 0  0
0 0 0 1
3775
 1
2664
 0 0 0
 kHC 1 + (1  n)kHT  (1  n)kHT  (1  n)kHT
 kFC  nkFT 1 + nkFT nkFT
0  1 1 1
3775

 =
2664
 0 0 0
 kCH 1 0  (1  n)kTH
 kCF 0 1 nkTF
0 1  1 1
3775
 1 2664
  'Y n (1  ') (1  n) (1  ') 0
0  0 0
0 0  0
0 0 0 0
3775
 =
2664
 0 0 0
 kCH 1 0  (1  n)kTH
 kCF 0 1 nkTF
0 1  1 1
3775
 1 2664
0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0
0 0 0 1
3775
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For the policy rule: rt = 'Et
 
Wt+1

+ 'YEt

y
W
t+1

+ 'TEt

T t+1

B =
2664
  'Y n (1  ') + 'T (1  n) (1  ')  'T 0
0  0 0
0 0  0
0 0 0 1
3775
 1
2664
 'n  'T '(1  n) + 'T 'T
 kHC 1 + (1  n)kHT  (1  n)kHT  (1  n)kHT
 kFC  nkFT 1 + nkFT nkFT
0  1 1 1
3775

 =
2664
 0 0 0
 kCH 1 0  (1  n)kTH
 kCF 0 1 nkTF
0  1 1 1
3775
 1 2664
  'Y n (1  ') (1  n) (1  ')  'T
0 0  0
0  0 0
0 0 0 0
3775
 =
2664
 0 0 0
 kCH 1 0  (1  n)kTH
 kCF 0 1 nkTF
0 1  1 1
3775
 1 2664
0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0
0 0 0 1
3775
3.C Appendix: Proof of proposition 2
In this appendix we prove proposition 5 of chapter 3. The economy is now described by
two independent subsystems. Union variables
n
y
W
t ; 
W
t
o
are determined by (3:2), (3:6)
and the policy rule (3:11), while relative variables
n
Rt ;

T t
o
are determined by (3:5) and
(3:7) or equivalently (3:A1). As shown in the above proof of proposition 1 in appendix
3A, the relative subsystem induces both determinacy and E-stability independently of mon-
etary policy. Hence, for determinacy and E-stability of the monetary union, we derive the
determinacy and E-stability conditions for the subsystem given by (3:2), (3:6) and (3:11).
Determinacy
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To examine determinacy we write the system in the partitioned form of (2:13) as in
section 2.2.3. We have:
B11 =
"
1+ 1kC 1(1 ')
(1  1'Y )  
 1(1 ') 1
(1  1'Y )  1kC  1
#
Using the methodology of above we have:
a0 = 
 1(1   1'Y ) 1
a1 =  
 
1 +  1kC 1 (1  ')

(1   1'Y ) 1    1
From ja1j < j1 + a0j, we have the two determinacy conditions:
0 < kC ('   1) + (1  )'Y (3:14)
and
2(1 + ) > kC ('   1) + 'Y (1 + ) (3:15)
E-stability
Proceeding as in appendix 3A, we have:
F11 =

(1   1'Y )  1 (1  ')
kC(1   1'Y )  + kC 1 (1  ')

, A11 = 0
For E-stability F11 needs both of its eigenvalues to have real parts less than one. We
then need: c0 > 0 and c1 > 0 for E-stability, where:
c0 = 
 1'Y (1  ) + kC 1 ('   1)
and
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c1 = 
 1'Y + (1  ) + kC 1 ('   1)
= c0 + 
 1'Y + (1  )
Hence, the monetary union is E-stable when c0 > 0. This solves for the Taylor
principle:
0 < kC ('   1) + (1  )'Y (3:14)
Chapter 4
Learning in AMonetary Union with Fiscal and
Monetary Policy
Chapter Overview
So far, we have considered determinacy and E-stability of monetary policy under the as-
sumption that scal policy has no role in stabilizing shocks. In this chapter, we study
learning when scal policy stabilizes relative or country-specic shocks, while monetary
policy stabilizes union-wide shocks. We use the general equilibrium sticky price model put
forward by Beetsma & Jensen (2005) to consider three different specications of a govern-
ment spending rule and the combinations of each of these with either a contemporaneous
or a forward looking Taylor rule.
It is found that when scal policy reacts to the terms of trade, it needs to satisfy
determinacy and E-stability conditions independently of monetary policy. On the other
hand, when the scal authorities stabilize domestic output gaps, this has a direct effect
on the determinacy and E-stability of monetary policy. Finally, a relative ination scal
policy rule needs to satisfy stability conditions independently, but could at the same time
also affect the E-stability of monetary policy.
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4.1 Introduction
4.1.1 Overview
In joining a monetary union, countries relinquish independence of monetary policy as an
instrument for stabilizing domestic shocks. We showed in chapter 1 that the union central
bank has no means of stabilizing relative shocks, when price rigidities are homogeneous
across the monetary union. Even in the heterogeneous case, there is a trade off between
stabilizing relative and union-wide shocks. Furthermore, with several countries in the mon-
etary union, monetary policy becomes a futile tool for tackling country-specic shocks.
Given this, scal policy becomes more important in a monetary union as an instru-
ment for stabilizing domestic shocks. Consequently, in this chapter we consider a monetary
union model in which the union central bank implements policy to stabilize union-wide
shocks, while scal policy is employed to support the domestic economies in the event of
relative shocks.
We examine determinacy and E-stability of a monetary union model in which the
central bank sets interest rates according to either a contemporaneous or a forward looking
Taylor rule, while the national scal authorities adjust government spending to either the
terms of trade, relative ination or domestic output. This hence gives six different policy
combinations to consider. While a scal policy reacting to the output gap aims to offset
shocks, this is not the case for a policy rule reacting to the terms of trade or relative ination.
Rather, such a rule acts to support domestic demand when the terms of trade or relative
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prices make domestic goods less competitive. This has the effect of reinforcing shocks
to competitiveness and differs from the interest rate rule considered in chapter 3, which
actually stabilized the terms of trade by offsetting shocks to competitiveness.
4.1.2 The model framework
The model considered here is that of Beetsma & Jensen (2005) and is an extension of
the Benigno (2004) model to allow for scal policy to actively stabilize macroeconomic
shocks.
The monetary union is made up of a continuum of households spread over the unit
interval. Of these we have [0; n) residing in home country and (n; 1] residing in foreign
country. Households consume baskets of goods produced in both countries, while produc-
ing differentiated goods under monopolistic competition. Fiscal governments only con-
sume goods produced domestically. We assume that Ricardian equivalence holds, as pub-
lic spending is nanced by either debt issuance or by lump sum taxes. Financial markets
are complete internationally, so that consumption is guaranteed for all households within
the monetary union. However, output can still differ in the two member countries due to
uctuations in the terms of trade and government expenditure.
Producers face a xed probability (1  ) of changing their prices in each period,
following Calvo (1983). We assume that both countries have the same level of price rigidity.
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4.1.3 Related literature and main results
Sargent & Wallace (1981) emphasize the importance of scal and monetary policy coordi-
nation and show that an unbalanced scal budget can lead to speculative hyperination. In
light of this, the convergence criteria of the EMU puts upper bounds on the budget decits
and government debt levels of its member countries.1
Leeper (1991) considers combinations of scal and monetary policy rules in which
policy is either active or passive. He denes passive scal policy as one where the scal
authorities adjust taxes to nance spending, while active scal policy does not adhere to
a balanced budget.2 Similarly, passive monetary policy adjusts the money supply to sup-
port scal spending, while active monetary policy pursues aggressive ination stabilization
independently of scal policy, so as to satisfy the Taylor principle. It is concluded that de-
terminacy results when either policy is active while the other is passive. So, the Taylor
principle does not have to be satised by the monetary authorities if scal policy is suf-
ciently aggressive in stabilizing prices. If both monetary and scal policy are passive,
the system becomes indeterminate with multiple stationary equilibria. On the other hand,
if the interest rate rule satises the Taylor principle while scal policy ignores the budget
constraint, then all solutions to the system are explosive.
As pointed out by Krugman (1998, 2000), scal policy has been regarded as a use-
ful tool to excerpt economies from liquidity traps. This idea is based on the notion that a
1 Article 104 of the convergence criteria states that budget decits may not normally exceed 3%, while
government debt is limitied to 60% of GDP (see www.ecb.int).
2 Under active scal policy, taxes are increased to at least cover interest payments on newly issued debt.
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liquidity trap is an inferior low-ination steady state, where monetary policy is ineffective
since interest rates are restricted to being non-negative. Evans & Honkapohja (2005) intro-
duce learning into a exible price model to analyse liquidity traps. They nd that while the
superior of two equilibria is stable under learning, the liquidity trap is not. Large negative
shocks can therefore lead to deationary spirals with falling prices and output. Switching to
a more aggressive monetary policy rule at low ination levels was found to be an effective
measure for preventing this. However, when prices are sticky rather than exible, Evans,
Guse & Honkapohja (2008) conclude that relying solely on aggressive monetary policy is
not sufcient to avoid a downward spiral of output and ination, following a large negative
shock. Instead, aggressive monetary policy must be accompanied by an aggressive scal
policy rule.3;4
In this chapter, government consumption increases the demand for domestic goods
and thereby increases domestic output, while the government budget constraints are as-
sumed to be satised so that spending is nanced by either debt issuance or lump sum
taxes. The scal policy rules considered here do not have the objective of stabilizing nei-
ther the terms of trade nor relative ination. Rather, scal policy supports demand for
domestic goods following shocks to relative prices. This implies that following a deteri-
oration of the terms of trade, government expenditure is increased, which deteriorates the
terms of trade further. Consequently, in contrast to Evans, Guse & Honkapohja (2008),
we nd that an excessively aggressive scal policy rule reacting either to relative ination
3 The scal policy rule considered is a tax feedback rule that Leeper (1991) classies as passive.
4 As pointed out by Evans (2008), an aggressive scal policy is by its own sufcient to prevent the economy
from reaching the liquidity trap.
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or the terms of trade could eliminate all stable equilibria regardless of the monetary pol-
icy pursued by the central bank.5 This also contrasts our ndings in the previous chapter,
where a Taylor rule that stabilizes the terms of trade was found to both help induce de-
terminacy and E-stability. Furthermore, determinacy and E-stability conditions in this case
must be met simultaneously and independently by both scal and monetary policy. The sta-
bility conditions for monetary policy replicate those of chapter 2, with one exception.6 If
monetary policy is forward looking, while scal spending is aggressively adjusted to uc-
tuations in relative ination, but not sufciently so to induce an explosive system, then the
indeterminate and E-stable region for monetary policy could become unstable under RLS
learning.
In addition to the aforementioned scal policy rules, we consider one in which gov-
ernment spending is used as a means to stabilize the domestic output gaps. In this case,
determinacy and E-stability hinges upon monetary policy, but scal policy has a direct im-
pact on the stability of monetary policy. The more aggressive scal policy is, the more
aggressive does monetary policy need to be to guarantee E-stability.
4.1.4 Organization
The following section presents the monetary union model in its reduced form as well as the
economic policy rules. We then outline the results for each scal policy rule in turn; section
5 Note that in the Leeper (1991) model, an aggressive (or active) scal policy rule eliminates all stable
equilibria only when monetary policy is aggressive as well. Here, the system becomes explosive regardless
of monetary policy.
6 Recall that these are the closed economy results presented by Bullard & Mitra (2002). Chapter 3 con-
cluded that these results also hold for the Benigno (2004) model when price rigidities are homogeneous in
the monetary union. An assumption that is maintained throughout this chapter.
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4.3 looks at the terms of trade scal policy rule, section 4.4 examines the relative ination
scal policy rule and nally we present the results for the output gap scal policy rule in
section 4.5. In each of these cases we rst consider determinacy and then E-stability and
present our results both algebraically and graphically. The chapter is concluded by section
4.6.
4.2 The Environment
This section summarizes the main features of the monetary union model and presents it in
its reduced form. This is followed by a description of the set of monetary and scal policy
rules that we examine in following sections. We also provide a calibration for the model
parameters in order to complement our analytical results with graphical illustrations.
4.2.1 The baseline model
We make use of the two country monetary union model put forward by Beetsma & Jensen
(2005). This extends the framework of Benigno (2004), by allowing the two countries'
sovereign governments to actively use scal policy to support the domestic economy fol-
lowing country-specic shocks. The monetary union is inhabited by a continuum of agents,
or households spread over the unit interval. Of these, n [0; 1] reside in the home country
while (1  n) reside in the foreign country. Each household produces a unique product
under imperfect competition, while consuming bundles of consumer goods produced both
domestically and abroad. The distortions to the economy from imperfect competition in
production are offset by a government subsidy paid to producers. Financial markets are as-
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sumed to be complete internationally, implying perfect risk sharing of consumption for all
agents across the monetary union. Public spending is nanced by either debt issuance or
by lump sum taxes so that Ricardian equivalence holds. Each government consumes only
domestically produced goods so that even with perfect risk sharing of consumption, output
in the two countries can differ both due to government expenditure or the terms of trade.
In this chapter we only outline the log-linearized equilibrium dynamics of the model
under sticky prices à la Calvo (1983). This will serve our purpose and we refer readers
wanting to examine the model in more detail to Beetsma & Jensen (2005). We denote
home(foreign) country variables by superscript H(F ) and dene union and relative vari-
ables as: XW  nXH + (1  n)XF andXR  XF  XH , respectively. We further dene

x as the log deviation ofX under sticky prices from the value that would prevail under ex-
ible prices  x. That is; x = x    x, where x is the log deviation of X from its steady state
value.7
Following Beetsma & Jensen (2005, p. 329) market clearing implies:

y
H
t = c
h
(1  n)

T t +

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W
t
i
+ (1  c)

G
H
t (4.1)
and
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
T t +
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+ (1  c)

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t
7 We have simplied the notation here in that x is what Beetsma & Jensen (2005) refer to as
 ^
X  
~
X

.
Note that we will for convenience denote the terms of trade and government spending by capital letters,
although these have the same denition as x.
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Where yt is the output gap,

c
W
t is consumption,

Gt government expenditure and
where c is the steady state consumption share of output. The terms of trade is dened as
the ratio of the foreign price index over the domestic, i.e. T  PF
PH
.
The IS schedule, the new Keynesian Phillips curves and the condition for the terms
of trade are given by:

c
W
t = Et(

c
W
t+1)   1c
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rt   Et(Wt+1)
  rrt (4.2)
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T t 1 + Rt  
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Here, the interest rate set by the common central bank is given by rt, while t denotes
ination. The natural level of the nominal interest rate is given by:
rrt = Et

 
c
W
t+1  
 
c
W
t

+
 
DWt+1  DWt

,
where DWt is proportional to the demand shock. The coefcient of relative risk aver-
sion is given by   UCC(
 
C; 0)
 
C=UC(
 
C; 0), and   vY Y
 
(Y ; 0)
 
Y =vY (
 
Y ; 0) is a function
of workers disutility from working. The discount factor is dened as  and  is the elastic-
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ity of substitution across goods produced within a country.8 Finally, we have the Phillips
curve coefcients: kH  (1 H)(1 H)
H(1+)
and kF  (1 F )(1 F )
F (1+)
where (1  i) is the
probability with which a rm in country i adjusts its price in any given period.9
We combine the two market clearing conditions (4:1) and obtain an expression for
consumption as a function of output and government expenditure:
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We now substitute (4:6) into (4:2) (4:5) to eliminate consumption. Then, by rewrit-
ing the two supply schedules making use of the denitions for union ination W
t

nH
t
+ (1   n)F
t
and relative ination R
t
 F
t
  H
t
, we obtain the reduced form
of the system:10
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T t + kGR

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8 As  is the source of the distortion to production, caused by mark-up pricing, it is assumed to be offset
by subsidies. Specically, 
( 1)(1 H) =

( 1)(1 F ) = 1 where 
H and F are the tax rates. This leaves
economic policy in the form of monetary policy and government expenditure to tackle inefciencies arising
due to staggered price setting and disturbances to the terms of trade.
9 In this chapter we assume that H = F , so that kH = kF .
10 Substituting (4:6) eliminates consumption and the two market clearing conditions, while rewriting the
supply schedules into a condition for union and one for relative ination allows for the system to be parti-
tioned, as shown in section 4.2.3. This is necessary to obtain analytical results.
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T t =

T t 1 + Rt  
 
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Where we have assumed that price rigidities in the two countries are equal, that is
H = F and hence that kH = kF = k. Furthermore we have dened kGW  k(1  
c)
 1
c , kGR  k(1   c), kT  k(1 + c) and kY  k( 1c  + ). We can regard
the above system as two subsystems; equations (4:7) and (4:8) contains the union variablesn
y
W
t ; 
W
t
o
, while equations (4:9) and (4:10) only include relative variables
n
T t; 
R
t
o
. We
will refer to these as the union and relative subsystems throughout this chapter. These four
equations, together with the interest rate policy rule of the union central bank and the scal
policy rules of the national governments, dene our system. We now proceed to present the
policy rules.
4.2.2 The policy rules
In this section we present the Taylor rules employed by the union central bank and the
government spending rules of the scal authorities. We consider both contemporaneous
and forward looking Taylor rules that react to union ination and the union output gap.
While the monetary authorities seek to offset union wide shocks, scal policy reacts to
relative shocks by either adjusting expenditure to uctuations in the terms of trade, relative
ination or the domestic output gap.
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Monetary policy rules
We consider two standard Taylor rules where the central bank adjusts interest rates to
uctuations in the output gap and ination. The contemporaneous Taylor rule is given by:
rt = '
W
t
+ 'Y

y
W
t (4.11)
In this chapter we only consider Taylor rules that react to union variables, since as
explained in chapter 1, in the absence of asymmetric price rigidities monetary policy has
no impact on relative variables. Furthermore, article 105 of the Treaty on European Union
states that maintaining price stability is the Eurosystem of Central Banks' main objective.
The target ination of the ECB is the Harmonized Index of Consumer Prices in which each
country is given a weight equal to its proportion of union consumption, which is equivalent
to W
t
in our model. Furthermore, the ECB has some scope to support economic activity of
the Euro Area as long as this is not done at the expense of price stability. Hence the above
policy rule includes the union output gap in addition to union ination.
In addition to (4:11), as in previous chapters we consider an interest rate rule that is
forecast based:
rt = 'Et
 
W
t+1

+ 'YEt

y
W
t+1

(4.12)
The relative importance the central bank attaches to ination and output is determined
by the relative magnitudes of ' and 'Y .
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In what follows, we will denote the cases where (4:11) is employed by the superscript
C for contemporaneous, while the superscript F will be used when monetary policy is
forward looking according to (4:12).
Fiscal policy rules
While restrictions on EMU members' scal policy have been put in place to ensure
stability of the euro-zone economy, scal policy can still be used, to some extent, to offset
country-specic or relative shocks. The greater the asymmetry of shocks in a monetary
union, the more important is the role of scal policy as an instrument for stabilization.
Below we consider some simple government spending rules for the two countries of
our monetary union model. These policy rules differ from the tax rule considered by Evans
et al. (2008), in that scal policy is fully nanced in our case.11
We consider three scal policy rules in turn, each to be combined with each of the
two Taylor rules outlined above, giving six different policy combinations.
Consider rst the case in which government expenditure reacts to the terms of trade.
A deterioration of the terms of trade makes goods produced in home country less competi-
tive in relation to those produced in the foreign country. Fomestic government expenditure
is therefore increased following such shocks. The policy rule is given by:

G
H
t =  gHT

T t and

G
F
t = g
F
T

T t (4.13)
11 Note that Evans et al. (2008) use the tax rule of Leeper (1991).
4.2 The Environment 169
We stress that (4:13) does not stabilize the terms of trade, but rather hinders stabiliza-
tion. This is in contrast to the interest rate rule considered in chapter 3, which stabilized
the terms of trade.
As an alternative to the terms of trade scal policy rule, we consider a rule in which
the scal authorities react to relative ination. As with the terms of trade, rather than off-
setting relative ination, governments use expenditure to support economic activity altered
by a shock to relative ination. The scal policy rule takes the form:

G
H
t =  gHRRt and

G
F
t = g
F
R
R
t
(4.14)
Finally, we consider the case in which the scal authorities use government expen-
diture to close the domestic output gap. This is perhaps the more realistic case as govern-
ments have been known to use expansionary budgets in downturns while improving public
nances during booms.
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(4.15)
Because the state variables of our partitioned system (4:7) (4:10) are
n
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t ; 
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; R
t
;

T t
o
,
we must manipulate (4:15) to obtain it in terms of these variables. Using the denition of
union and relative variables to rewrite the conditions in (4:15) yields:
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Furthermore, combining the market clearing conditions (4:1) and rearranging gives:

y
R
t
=  c
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We substitute this expression back into the scal policy rules and rearrange before
solving the resulting two expressions simultaneously to obtain union and relative scal
policy as a function of the union output gap and the terms of trade. The resulting policy
rules are:
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where we have dened:
 WY 

gWY  
n(1 n)(1 c)(gRY )
2
1+gWY (1 c)

,  WT 

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,  RY 
h
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and
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h
gWY c
1+gWY (1 c)
i
To obtain analytical results we consider a special case of (4:15a) in which gHY = gFY
and consequently  WT =  
R
Y = 0.
In sum, the scal policy rules dictate that government spending is either adjusted to
the terms of trade (4:13), relative ination (4:14) or uctuations in the domestic output gap
(4:15). We will denote these cases by the superscripts TT, RI and DY, respectively.
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4.2.3 Calibration
To illustrate our results graphically, we assign values to the structural parameters of our
model using the calibration suggested by Beetsma & Jensen (2005). For robustness we
have also examined our results using two alternative calibrations by Benigno (2004) and
Rotemberg & Woodford (1998). We found that our qualitative ndings were not altered,
so in what follows we will present only the parameter values of Beetsma & Jensen (2005).
We set the intertemporal rate of substitution  to 0:99 and the coefcient of relative risk
aversion  is set to a value of 2:5.12 Given that 0:6 and 0:2 are reasonable approximations
of the consumption and government expenditure shares of output respectively, we set the
steady state consumption to be three times larger than the steady state government expendi-
ture, that is c = 0:75. In choosing the labour supply elasticity  and the mark-up , there
is a trade off between getting reasonable values for these and getting a realistic response of
ination to changes in the real variables. By setting  =  = 3, we get a Phillips curve
coefcient of k = 0:0086, implying that the elasticity of ination with respect to the con-
sumption gap is around 0:04.13 Price contracts are assumed to last for a year on average (4
quarters) and hence we set  = 0:75.14 Finally, we assume, where not otherwise specied,
that both countries are of equal size, i.e. n = 0:5.
We now proceed to present our results. We consider each scal policy rule in turn
by rst combining it with the contemporaneous and then with the forward looking interest
rate rule. In each case, we rst examine determinacy and then E-stability.
12 See Beetsma and Schotman (2001).
13 See Beetsma & Jensen (2005, p. 334).
14 This is consistent with empirical evidence by Benigno & Lopez-Salido (2006) for Europe`s main economies.
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4.3 Terms of Trade Fiscal Policy Rule
In this section we look at determinacy and E-stability of the monetary union when the scal
authorities use the terms of trade spending rule:

G
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t =  gHT
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T t and

G
F
t = g
F
T

T t (4:13)
We will in turn consider the cases where this rule is used in combination with the
contemporaneous (4:11) and forward looking (4:12) Taylor rules of section 4.2.2. These
cases are denoted as TT-C and TT-F respectively.
4.3.1 Terms of trade scal policy rule with contemporaneous Taylor
rule
In this section we look at determinacy and E-stability of the monetary union when the terms
of trade scal policy rule (4:13) is combined with the contemporaneous Taylor rule:
rt = '
W
t
+ 'Y

y
W
t (4:11)
We refer to this case as TT-C and rst proceed to look at determinacy and then at
E-stability.
Determinacy: case TT-C
To examine determinacy, use the methodology outlined in section 2.2.3 and the ap-
pendices of the two previous chapters. The system is now given by equations (4:7) (4:10),
the interest rate rule (4:11) and the scal policy rule (4:13). This system is block-triangular,
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since combining (4:9), (4:10) with the government spending rule (4:13), gives an inde-
pendent subsystem that determines relative variables
n
R
t
;

T t
o
. This subsystem must be
determinate, while the subsystem made up of (4:8), (4:8), (4:11) and (4:13) must be deter-
minate in
n
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W
t ; 
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t
o
, for the union economy to have a unique stationary REE. Considering
rst the relative subsystem, we substitute the scal policy rule (4:13) into (4:9) and com-
bine this with (4:10) to eliminate relative ination. We have the univariate condition for
the terms of trade:
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where    1 +  + kT   kGR(gHT + gFT ). For equilibrium determinacy of the
union economy, (4:16) must then be determinate in

T t, while the following matrix has
both of its eigenvalues outside the unit circle:
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This gives our rst result.
Proposition 1 When scal policy reacts to the terms of trade according to:
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while monetary policy follows a contemporaneous Taylor rule of the form:
rt = '
W
t
+ 'Y
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t (4:11)
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then the necessary and sufcient conditions for determinacy are:
0 < (1  )'Y + kY ('   1) (4.17)
and either
gHT + g
F
T <
kT
kGR
(4.18)
or
2(1 + ) + kT
kGR
< gHT + g
F
T (4.19)
Proof. See appendix 4A.
We rst note that monetary and scal policy must both meet determinacy conditions
independently of one another, for the union economy to be determinate. The determinacy
condition for monetary policy is the Taylor principle found as a key condition in previous
chapters. The scal authorities must either only modestly adjust government spending to
changes in the terms of trade or it must be extremely aggressive in its response to uctua-
tions in the terms of trade. When government expenditure is aggressive but not sufciently
so to induce determinacy, the system is explosive and no stationary REE exists. Leeper
(1991) also nds that an aggressive scal policy rule can eliminate all stationary equilibria.
However, in his model this occurs when monetary policy is aggressive as well, to the ex-
tent that it satises the Taylor principle. This is because the government budget constraint
is violated by the authorities in that case, making agents unwilling to hold government
bonds. Here, the budget constraint is satised and scal policy destabilizes the system by
reinforcing shocks to the terms of trade.
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For example, in the absence of scal policy, a deterioration of the terms of trade low-
ers demand for domestic goods from consumers in both countries, which eventually lowers
domestic prices and re-stabilizes the terms of trade . If the scal authorities instead use gov-
ernment expenditure to support demand for domestic goods in this case, to the extent that
the boost in demand from government spending exceeds the reduction in consumption due
to the terms of trade shock, then rather than stabilizing, the terms of trade will deteriorate
further. This in turn increases government spending, leading to an explosive equilibrium
path.
It should be noted that (4:19) implies an extreme and perhaps unrealistic scal re-
sponse to the terms of trade. Specically, it would require combined scal spending to
change by more than six hundred percent to a one percent change in the terms of trade,
given the calibration of section 4.2.3. On the other hand, for (4:18) to be satised, govern-
ment expenditure cannot change by more than four percent to a one percent change in the
terms of trade. We regard the latter as more plausible and hence interpret the result as a
caveat against using government expenditure as an aggressive policy instrument.
This could have implications for the potential costs of joining a monetary union,
since it further restricts the tools available to tackle asymmetric shocks. Llosa & Tuesta
(2008) and Wang (2006) nd that a monetary policy rule that stabilizes the exchange rate
in addition to output and ination can help induce determinacy. This result holds for a
Taylor rule that stabilizes the terms of trade in a monetary union with heterogeneous price
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rigidities, as shown in chapter 3. Fiscal policy does not bring this added stability to the
system, but rather the contrary.
Figure 4.1 plots the determinacy region for monetary policy, while gure 4.2 shows
that for scal policy, given the calibration outlined in section 4.2.3.
E-stability: case TT-C
To examine E-stability we substitute (4:11) and (4:13) into (4:7)   (4:10) and write
the system in the form of equation (2:28) of section 2.2.3. As in the above case for deter-
minacy, we simplify the system by eliminating relative ination. The system is then given
by the independent relative subsystem determining the terms of trade (4:16) and the sub-
system determining union output and ination; (4:7), (4:8), (4:11) and (4:13). The key
matrices of (2:28) become:
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35, TT C11 = 0

TT C22 = 
 1 , and TT C22 = 
 1.
It follows that the conditions for E-stability coincide with the above criteria for de-
terminacy, as shown in appendix 4B.
Proposition 2 Suppose that agents use recursive least squares to update their beliefs
about the economy and that the government spending rule is given by:
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while the monetary policy rule is:
rt = '
W
t
+ 'Y
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W
t (4:11)
then an MSV solution is locally asymptotically stable under learning when the following
conditions hold:
0 < (1  )'Y + kY ('   1) (4:17)
and either
gHT + g
F
T <
kT
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(4:18)
or
2(1 + ) + kT
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F
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Proof. See appendix 4B.
So all unique stationary equilibria are locally stable under RLS learning, while no
multiple equilibria are E-stable. Again, scal and monetary policy must independently
satisfy the stability conditions for the union economy to be E-stable. This implies that the
whole union economy could become unstable if only one of its member countries uses an
unstable scal policy rule.
Sargent & Wallace (1981) show that consistent or excessive budget decits lead to
seigniorage that in turn destabilizes the economy through hyper ination. The EMU has
therefore put restrictions on both the debt levels and the decit levels of its member coun-
tries, as stipulated in the convergence criteria. Our ndings strengthen the argument for
restricting the exibility of scal spending, in particular; an excessive response of govern-
ment expenditure to uctuations in the terms of trade should be avoided. This makes scal
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policy less of a substitute for independent monetary policy of individual countries. Figure
4.1 depicts the determinate and E-stable region for monetary policy, while gure 4.2 shows
that for scal policy. These two must be satised simultaneously for the union economy
to be stable under learning. Note that if scal policy violates stability conditions there ex-
ists no stable equilibrium regardless of whether monetary policy induces stability or not.15
In the case where monetary policy does not satisfy the Taylor principle while scal policy
satises stability conditions, there exist multiple equilibria that are unstable under learning.
Fig. 4.1. The Taylor principle is both necessary and sufcent for determinacy and E-sta-
bility of a contemporaneous interest rate rule. The scal policy rule must simultaneously
satisfy the appropriate conditions for the economy to be determinate and E-stable.
15 We do not consider the E-stability of explosive solutions here, since these policies are to be avoided by
policy makers even if they are learnable under recursive least squares. For a discussion on the E-stability of
explosive solutions see Evans & Honkapohja (2001, Ch 9.6).
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Fig. 4.2. Government expenditure needs to be either only modestly adjusted to changes in
the terms of trade or it needs to be extremely aggressive. Anything in between will lead to
an explosive system with no stationary REE. Note that the outer stability region requires
unrealistically large responses of scal spending to uctuaitons in the terms of trade.
4.3.2 Terms of trade scal policy rule with forward looking Taylor rule
As in the above case, the system is given by (4:7) (4:10) and the scal policy rule reacting
to the terms of trade (4:13), however we now assume that the central bank is forward
looking in its interest rate policy according to:
rt = 'Et
 
W
t+1

+ 'YEt

y
W
t+1

(4:12)
The conditions for determinacy and E-stability under this policy combination is out-
lined in what follows. Note that the case of a terms of trade scal policy rule and a forward
looking Taylor rule is denoted by TT-F.
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Determinacy: case TT-F
Since the interest rate does not affect relative variables, we can use of equation
(4:16) to describe the relative subsystem. The subsystem determining the union variablesn
y
W
t ; 
W
t
o
is now given by (4:7), (4:8), (4:11) and (4:13), giving the key matrix:
BTT F11 =
"
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 1kY  1c(1 ')
(1  1c'Y )  
 1c(1 ') 1
(1  1c'Y )  1kY  1
#
Since the condition determining the terms of trade (4:16) has not changed and since
determinacy of the economy is determined by each subsystem independently, the con-
straints on scal policy are the same as above. However, because monetary policy now
is forecast based, the determinacy conditions for the Taylor rule are the same as for the for-
ward looking interest rate rules of previous chapters. That is, as in Bullard & Mitra (2002),
the Taylor principle must be satised while monetary policy cannot be overly aggressive,
in particular in its stabilization of the output gap.16 We have the following proposition.
Proposition 3 When scal policy reacts to the terms of trade:
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T t (4:13)
while the interest rate stabilizes expected future ination and output:
rt = 'Et
 
W
t+1

+ 'YEt

y
W
t+1

(4:12)
then the necessary and sufcient conditions for determinacy are:
0 < (1  )'Y + kY ('   1) (4:17)
16 Note that although Bullard & Mitra (2002) have an additional condition 'Y < 
 1
c
 
 1 + 1

, for the
forward looking Taylor rule, this is redundant as shown in appendix 4A.
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2 1c (1 + ) > kY ('   1) + 'Y (1 + ) (4.20)
and either
gHT + g
F
T <
kT
kGR
(4:18)
or
2(1 + ) + kT
kGR
< gHT + g
F
T (4:19)
Proof. See appendix 4A.
Hence, regardless of the interest rate rule employed, monetary and scal policy must
meet stability conditions independently, when scal policy supports the economy following
shocks to the terms of trade. The conditions for determinacy of scal policy are depicted
in gure 4.2, while those for monetary policy are shown in gure 4.3.
E-stability: case TT-F
For E-stability of REE under a terms of trade scal policy rule and a forward looking
Taylor rule, we write the system in the form of (2:28), where:

TT F11 =

(1   1c'Y )  1c (1  ')
kY (1   1c'Y )  + kY  1c (1  ')

, TT F11 = 0

TT F22 = 
 1 , and TT F22 = 
 1.
We have the following result.
Proposition 4 Given the government spending rule:

G
H
t =  gHT

T t and

G
F
t = g
F
T

T t (4:13)
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and the Taylor rule:
rt = 'Et
 
W
t+1

+ 'YEt

y
W
t+1

(4:12)
the economy is E-stable when the following conditions hold:
0 < (1  )'Y + kY ('   1) (4:17)
and either
gHT + g
F
T <
kT
kGR
(4:18)
or
2(1 + ) + kT
kGR
< gHT + g
F
T (4:19)
Proof. See appendix 4B.
We conclude that for a scal policy rule that reacts to the terms of trade, scal and
monetary policy must satisfy stability conditions independently, regardless of the monetary
policy rule of the central bank. Furthermore, the determinacy and E-stability conditions
for scal policy coincide. This is not the case for monetary policy however. For a forward
looking Taylor rule, there is a policy region that induces multiple stationary equilibria that
are all stable under RLS learning. The constraints on monetary policy are the same as in
the homogeneous price rigidity case of chapters 2 and 3. That is, for a monetary union
model with a terms of trade scal policy rule, the stability conditions for monetary policy
are the same as for a closed economy.
We emphasize that for this policy combination, each subsystem being E-stable is
sufcient for an E-stable monetary union. While this is always true about determinacy, it is
not necessarily true for RLS learning stability. We will show in the following section that
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when scal spending is adjusted to relative ination while the interest rate rule is forward
looking, there is interdependency of the learning stability of scal and monetary policy.
Figure 4.2 shows the E-stability conditions for scal policy and gure 4.3 shows the
Taylor principle as the necessary and sufcient condition for E-stability of monetary policy.
Fig. 4.3. The Taylor principle is not sufcient for determinacy, but it is sufcient for E-sta-
bility. With an aggressive forward looking Taylor rule there may be multiple stationary and
learnable equilibria. Note that scal policy must also be determinate and E-stable for the
economy to be so.
4.4 Relative Ination Fiscal Policy Rule
Since there is no exchange rate to restore competitiveness following a shock to relative
ination in a monetary union, such a shock leads to larger distortions than it would in
an open economy. As suggested by Beetsma & Jensen (2005), scal policy can assist
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the economy in this case by supporting domestic demand. In this section we consider a
government spending rule that reacts to relative ination according to:17

G
H
t =  gHRRt and

G
F
t = g
F
R
R
t
(4:14)
As in the previous section, we combine the scal policy rule with each of the two
Taylor rules of section 4.2.2 in turn. In each case, determinacy is examined before E-
stability.
4.4.1 Relative ination scal policy rule with contemporaneous Taylor
rule
Here we consider the system (4:7)  (4:10); the scal policy rule (4:14) and the contempo-
raneous Taylor rule (4:11). We establish a set of conditions that scal and monetary policy
must satisfy for determinacy and local stability under recursive least squares learning.
Determinacy: case RI-C
We substitute the scal policy rule (4:14) into (4:9) and combine the resulting con-
dition with (4:10). This eliminates relative ination and gives an independent condition
determining the terms of trade:

T t = 
 1Et

T t+1

+
 
1  kGR
 
gHR + g
F
R

 1

T t 1 (4.21)
   1  kGR  gHR + gFR  %  1 T t
17 Recall that relative ination is dened as: R
t
 F
t
  H
t
.
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where we have dened    1  kGR  gHR + gFR+  + kT . As explained in sec-
tion 4.2.3, since we have a triangular system, it will be determinate when both of the sub-
systems are determinate. Combining the policy rules (4:11) and (4:14)with the IS schedule
(4:7) and the NKPC (4:8) yields:
BRI C11 =

 1c
 
'Y + 
 1kY

+ 1  1c
 
'    1

  1kY  1

For determinacy of the case RI-C we hence require equation (4:21) to induce deter-
minacy. while BRI C11 has both of its eigenvalues outside of the unit circle. Noting that
BRI C11 = B
TT C
11 , it is clear that both eigenvalues are outside the unit circle if and only if
the Taylor principle is satised. Consequently, as in the case of a terms of trade scal pol-
icy rule and a contemporaneous Taylor rule, this is the determinacy condition for monetary
policy. However, the determinacy region for scal policy is now different, as stated in the
following proposition.
Proposition 5 When government expenditure is dictated by a policy rule reacting to rela-
tive ination:

G
H
t =  gHRRt and

G
F
t = g
F
R
R
t
(4:14)
and the union central bank adjusts interest rates according to:
rt = '
W
t
+ 'Y

y
W
t (4:11)
then there exists a unique stationary REE when the following inequalities are satised:
0 < (1  )'Y + kY ('   1) (4:17)
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1 +  + 1
2
kT
kGR
> gHR + g
F
R (4.22)
Proof. See appendix 4A.
When the above condition for scal policy is not met, all MSV solutions are explo-
sive. The intuition for this is the same as for the terms of trade scal policy rule above.
Following a negative shock to relative ination, scal policy is implemented to support de-
mand for domestic goods. However, if the scal expansion is sufciently large, this will
further increase relative prices of domestic goods, leading to an inationary spiral.
The determinacy condition for scal policy here is not as restrictive as condition
(4:18) for the terms of trade scal policy rule. Violation of condition (4:22) requires joint
government expenditure to change by more than three hundred percent to a one percent
change in ination differentials, given the calibration of Beetsma & Jensen (2005) used in
this chapter. On the other hand, here there is no determinacy region for an extremely ag-
gressive scal policy as there was for the terms of trade policy rule when (4:19) is satised.
Nonetheless, given the unrealistically aggressive response to shocks required for (4:19) to
hold, we regard the scal policy rule reacting to relative ination as more likely to induce
a unique stationary REE than the terms of trade scal policy rule.
As in the previous section, scal and monetary policy both need to be determinate
independently of one another for the economy to be determinate. The determinacy condi-
tion for monetary policy is illustrated in gure 4.1, while that for the relative ination scal
policy rule is depicted in gure 4.4.
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E-stability: case RI-C
We write the system (4:7)   (4:10), (4:12) and (4:14) in the form of (2:28). Again,
we reduce the relative subsystem to equation (4:21). We have the following partitioned
matrices:

RI C11 =
24  1c 'Y +'kY + 1c  1 ''Y +'kY + 1c 
 1c kY
'Y +'kY +
 1
c 
('Y + 1c )+kY
'Y +'kY +
 1
c 
35, RI C11 = 0

RI C22 = 
 1 , and RI C22 = 
 1.
Appendix 4B derives the E-stability conditions stated in the following proposition.
Proposition 6 When the scal policy rule:

G
H
t =  gHRRt and

G
F
t = g
F
R
R
t
(4:14)
is combined with the contemporaneous Taylor rule:
rt = '
W
t
+ 'Y

y
W
t (4:11)
then the following conditions are both necessary and sufcient for E-stability:
0 < (1  )'Y + kY ('   1) (4:17)
1 +  + 1
2
kT
kGR
> gHR + g
F
R (4:22)
Proof. See appendix 4B.
This is consistent with the proposition of McCallum (2007), stating that determinacy
is sufcient for E-stability. Furthermore, as is often the case for contemporaneous rules,
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the determinacy and E-stability regions coincide, leaving no region of multiple stationary
REE that are stable under learning.
As in the case of a terms of trade scal policy rule, an aggressive government spend-
ing rule by either country can destabilize the union economy. Given that
 
gHR + g
F
R

in
(4:22) is independent of country sizes, an unstable policy by even a small country can have
implications for the stability of a large monetary union.
The E-stability region for monetary policy is shown in gure 4.1, while gure 4.4
shows the determinate and E-stable region for the relative ination scal policy rule.
Fig. 4.4. An aggressive scal policy rule could lead to an explosive system even if monetary
policy meets stability requirements. In addition to a stable scal policy, the Taylor principle
(see gure 4.1) has to hold for RI-C to have a unique stationary REE that is stable under
RLS learning.
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4.4.2 Relative ination scal policy rule with forward looking Taylor
rule
This section looks at determinacy and E-stability under a relative ination government
spending rule and a forward looking interest rate rule. The assumption of the central bank
being forward looking while scal policy reacts to contemporaneous data is reasonable as
central banks have shown to take forecasts of future values into consideration when setting
interest rates. The system is now given by (4:7)   (4:10), the scal policy rule (4:14) and
the Taylor rule (4:12).
Determinacy: case RI-F
For determinacy of REE we partition the system as in section 2.2.3 and reduce the
system further by using (4:21). The model economy has a unique stationary REE when
(4:21) is determinate and the matrix BRI F11 has its eigenvalues outside the unit circle.
BRI F11 =
"
1+ 1kY  1c(1 ')
(1  1c'Y )  
 1c(1 ') 1
(1  1c'Y )  1kY  1
#
Noting that BRI F11 = B
TT F
11 it is evident that the union subsystem is determinate
when (4:17) and (4:20) are satised (see appendix 4A). The relative subsystem (4:21) is the
same as in the above case of a contemporaneous Taylor rule and is thus determinate when
(4:22) is satised. This means that as in previous cases, monetary and scal policy need to
satisfy determinacy conditions independently of one another for the union economy to be
determinate, which leads us to the following result.
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Proposition 7 When scal policy reacts to relative ination according to:

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t =  gHRRt and

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t
(4:14)
while the interest rate is adjusted to expected future values of ination and the output gap:
rt = 'Et
 
W
t+1

+ 'YEt

y
W
t+1

(4:12)
then, the necessary and sufcient conditions for determinacy are:
0 < (1  )'Y + kY ('   1) (4:17)
2 1c (1 + ) > kY ('   1) + 'Y (1 + ) (4:20)
and
1 +  + 1
2
kT
kGR
> gHR + g
F
R (4:22)
Proof. See appendix 4A.
So neither scal policy nor monetary policy can be too aggressive if the system is
to have a unique stationary REE. Figures 4.5 and 4.6 show the determinacy region for
monetary and scal policy respectively. These two need to be satised simultaneously for
the economy to be determinate. If monetary policy is such that it is in the indeterminate
region of gure 4.5 and scal policy is in the determinate region of gure 4.6, then there
exists two stationary rational expectations equilibria. On the other hand, when scal policy
is not determinate, there exist no stationary solution regardless of the monetary policy
employed by the central bank.
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E-stability: case RI-F
For learning stability we partition the system into a union and a relative subsystem as
in previous sections, giving the matrices for (2:28):

RI F11 =

(1   1c'Y )  1c (1  ')
kY (1   1c'Y )  + kY  1c (1  ')

, RI F11 = 0

RI F22 = 
 1 , and RI F22 = 
 1.
As opposed to the above cases of E-stability, here it is not sufcient for each of
the subsystems to be stable under learning for the whole system to be so. In fact, each
subsystem directly affects the E-stability of the other subsystem. That is, the E-stability
of monetary policy depends not only on the interest rate rule, but also on scal policy and
vice versa. Although learning stability of each subsystem is not sufcient for the monetary
union to be E-stable, it is a necessary condition, as explained in appendix 4B. We have the
following result.
Proposition 8 When the scal policy rule:

G
H
t =  gHRRt and

G
F
t = g
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R
t
(4:14)
is combined with the monetary policy rule:
rt = 'Et
 
W
t+1

+ 'YEt

y
W
t+1

(4:12)
then the necessary and sufcient conditions for E-stability are:
0 < (1  )'Y + kY ('   1) (4:17)
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and either
gHR + g
F
R <
1
kGR
(4.23)
or
1
kGR
<
 
gHR + g
F
R

<
1 +  + 1
2
kT
kGR
(4.24)
and
'Y + kY ('   1) <  1c (3 + ) (4.25)
Proof. See appendix 4B.
As discussed above, for a forward looking interest rate rule there is an indeterminate
and E-stable region. This has been found for the closed economy by Bullard & Mitra
(2002), for an open economy by Llosa & Tuesta (2008) and for a monetary union model
in this thesis. Proposition 8 implies that if scal policy is sufciently aggressive to violate
inequality (4:23) but not (4:24), then a subset of this indeterminate and E-stable region
instead becomes unstable under RLS learning. The interdependence of E-stability for scal
and monetary policy is illustrated in gures 4.5 and 4.6. Note that, when
 
gHR + g
F
R

>
1++ 1
2
kT
k
GR
, all solutions are explosive regardless of the policy coefcients of monetary policy.
4.5 Domestic Output Fiscal Policy Rule
In previous sections we have considered scal policy rules that support domestic demand
in the event of shocks affecting the competitiveness of domestic goods. In this section
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Fig. 4.5. The above graph shows the determinacy and E-stability of a forward looking mon-
etary policy rule when scal policy reacts to relative ination. An aggressive scal policy
rule can make an aggressive monetary policy unstable under RLS learning if it is also in-
determinate. This graph is to be considered jointly with gure 4.6.
we consider the case in which national governments seek to stabilize their economies by
directly adjusting the level of government expenditure to offset shocks to the domestic
output gap. This is perhaps the most realistic and observable government spending policy
in practice. We use the rule outlined in section 4.2.2:

G
H
t =  gHY

y
H
t
and

G
F
t =  gFY

y
F
t
(4:15)
Thus government consumption is increased following a negative shock to domestic
output. This policy rule allows scal policy to stabilize country-specic shocks, while the
monetary authorities stabilize union-wide shocks. In order to obtain analytical results, we
assume that gHY = gFY , implying the following special case for the policy rule (4:15):
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Fig. 4.6. A very aggressive scal policy eliminates all stationary REE. Even if scal policy
is less aggressive, it could cause an aggressive monetary policy rule to become unstable
under RLS learning if that rule is also indeterminate (see gure 4.5).

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t =  gWY

y
W
t
and

G
R
t =

gWY c
1 + gWY (1  c)
 
T t (4:15a)
where gWY  ngHY + (1   n)gFY . Note that this scal policy rule stabilizes the econ-
omy by offsetting shocks. This was not the case for the previous rules considered. We
complement the scal spending rule with an interest rate rule that stabilizes union-wide
shocks.
4.5 Domestic Output Fiscal Policy Rule 195
4.5.1 Domestic output scal policy rule with contemporaneous Taylor
rule
We now combine the domestic output scal policy rule (4:15a) with the contemporaneous
Taylor rule (4:11) and the economic system (4:7) (4:10). We in turn consider determinacy
and E-stability of this system.
Determinacy: case DY-C
We combine (4:9); (4:10) and (4:15a) into:

T t = 
 1Et(

T t+1) +
 1T t 1   1 (1  %)
 
T t (4.26)
where we have dened  
h
1 +  + kT   kGR

gWY c
1+gWY (1 c)
i
. The union subsys-
tem obtained by substituting (4:11) and (4:15a) into (4:7) and (4:8) respectively gives:
BDY C11 =
"
1 +
 1c('Y + 1(kY +kGW gWY ))
1+(1 c)gWY
 1c('  1)
1+(1 c)gWY  1  kY + kGW gWY   1
#
Output now affects ination through two different channels; directly and through its
effect on government expenditure. In this case, scal policy does not only have an impact
on the relative variables but also on the union average. Consequently it has a direct impact
on the determinacy of monetary policy where it decreases the determinacy region as stated
in the following proposition.
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Proposition 9 When monetary policy stabilizes union-wide shocks according to the Tay-
lor rule:
rt = '
W
t
+ 'Y

y
W
t (4:11)
while national governments stabilize the domestic output gap according to:

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
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(4:15)
then the following version of the Taylor principle is both necessary and sufcient for deter-
minacy:
0 <
 
kY + kGW g
W
Y

('   1) + (1  )'Y (4.27)
Proof. See appendix 4A.
Unless the central bank adjusts interest rates by more than one-for-one to uctuations
in ination, an aggressive scal policy could lead to indeterminacy even if the standard
Taylor principle (4:17) is satised by monetary policy. In fact, when ' < 1, the more
aggressively government spending is adjusted to uctuations in domestic output gaps, the
more aggressive will monetary policy have to react to union-wide output shocks for the
system to be determinate.
In contrast to the scal policy rules considered above, for this policy combination,
there are no independent determinacy conditions for scal policy. This is because only
a proportion of the stabilization of the domestic output gap affects relative variables, the
rest feeds through to union variables. Furthermore, the coefcient on the terms of trade in
(4:15a),
h
gWY c
1+gWY (1 c)
i
is concave in gWY and there does not exist a sufciently large value
for gWY to destabilize the relative subsystem. Consequently, for this policy combination
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there always exists at least one stationary REE. That is, there exists no policy parameter
values for which all equilibria are explosive.
Leeper (1991) nds that it is the combination of scal and monetary policy that de-
termines if equilibria are stationary in a closed economy. In his framework, the more ag-
gressive either of monetary and scal policy is, the less aggressive the other has to be for
determinacy. Here we nd just the opposite, the more aggressive scal policy is, the more
aggressive monetary policy needs to be to induce determinacy. The determinacy region for
economic policy is plotted in gure 4.7 in

'; 'Y ; g
W
Y
	
space.
E-stability: case DY-C
Combining the scal policy rule (4:15a), the monetary policy rule (4:11) and (4:7) 
(4:10) and then writing the system in the form of (2:28) yields the following:

DY C11 =
 1(1 + (1  c)gWY )  1 1c(1  ')
 1
 
kY + kGwg
W
Y
  
1 + (1  c)gWY

 +  1
 
kY + kGwg
W
Y

 1c(1  ')

DY C11 = 0; 

DY C
22 = 
 1 and DY C22 =  1
The following result is obtained.
Proposition 10 The requirements for E-stability of the system with the scal policy rule:
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(4:15)
and the interest rate rule:
rt = '
W
t
+ 'Y

y
W
t (4:11)
4.5 Domestic Output Fiscal Policy Rule 198
is that the modied Taylor principle holds:
0 <
 
kY + kGW g
W
Y

('   1) + (1  )'Y (4:27)
Proof. See appendix 4B.
The E-stability condition is the same as the condition for determinacy derived above.
If the central bank is sufciently aggressive in tackling ination, then scal policy will not
destabilize the system under RLS learning. However, if the central bank instead puts a
high weight on the output gap, then aggressive scal policy stabilization by either union
member may destabilize the union economy, as shown in gure 4.7. Note that since it is the
magnitude of gWY  ngHY + (1  n)gFY that inuences determinacy and E-stability, a small
country is less likely to destabilize the union economy than a large country. This was not
the case for the terms of trade and relative ination scal policy rules, since in those cases
the system was destabilized through the relative subsystem. Here scal policy has an effect
through the subsystem for union variables.
4.5.2 Output gap scal policy rule with forward looking Taylor rule
Here we examine the case in which the scal authorities react to current values of domestic
output according to (4:15a), while the monetary authorities are forward looking in their
policy:
rt = 'Et
 
W
t+1

+ 'YEt

y
W
t+1

(4:12)
The determinacy and E-stability results for this case are presented below.
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Fig. 4.7. Fiscal policy reduces the determinate and E-stable region for monetary policy.
The unshaded region shows the set of combinations for the policy coefcients that induce
determinacy and E-stability. The shaded region shows policy that is indeterminate and
unstable under RLS learning.
Determinacy: case DY-F
The system is now given by (4:7)   (4:10), the scal spending rule (4:15a) and the
monetary policy rule (4:12). We partition the system into two subsystems for union and
relative variables, where the latter is given by (4:26) and the former by the following matrix:
BDY F11 =
"
(1+(1 c)gWY + 1 1c(1 ')(kY +kGW gWY ))
(1  1c'Y +(1 c)gWY )
   1 1c(1 ')
(1  1c'Y +(1 c)gWY )  1  kY + kGW gWY   1
#
We have the following result.
Proposition 11 When the central bank of the monetary union is forward looking in its
policy according to:
rt = 'Et
 
W
t+1

+ 'YEt

y
W
t+1

(4:12)
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while the sovereign scal authorities adjust government spending to stabilize uctuations
in the domestic output gap:

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t
and
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G
F
t =  gFY

y
F
t
(4:15)
then the determinacy conditions are given by:
0 <
 
kY + kGW g
W
Y

('   1) + (1  )'Y (4:27)
and
('   1)
 
kY + kGW g
W
Y

+ (1 + )'Y < 2
 1
c (1 + )
 
1 + (1  c) gWY

(4.28)
Proof. See appendix 4A.
As for the contemporaneous Taylor rule, an aggressive scal policy rule may lead to
an indeterminate system if interest rates do not react by more than one-for-one to changes
in ination. However, if the central bank puts a high weight on output in its policy rule,
then an aggressive scal policy can help induce determinacy. This is illustrated in gure 4.8
where the determinacy region shifts out with increases in gWY . Hence, scal policy could
have desirable effects on the determinacy in a monetary union. The policy combination
here is plausible since governments do use spending to smoothen domestic business cycles,
while central banks tend to be forward looking in their policy.18
18 Recall that the evidence of Molodtsova et al. (2009) suggests that a forward looking Taylor rule of the
form (4:12) best explains the past behaviour of the ECB policy rate.
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E-stability: case DY-F
The system is given by (4:7)  (4:10), (4:12) and (4:15a). Partitioning the system as
in (2:28), we have:

DY F11 =
24 (1  1c'Y +(1 c)gWY )(1+gWY (1 c))  1c(1 ')(1+gWY (1 c))
(kY +kGW g
W
Y )(1  1c'Y +(1 c)gWY )
(1+gWY (1 c))
 +
(kY +kGW g
W
Y )
 1c(1 ')
(1+gWY (1 c))
35,
DY F11 = 0; 

DY F
22 = 
 1 and DY F22 =  1
The modied Taylor principle presented in the previous section is then the required
condition for E-stability of REE.
Proposition 12 For the policy rules:
rt = 'Et
 
W
t+1

+ 'YEt

y
W
t+1

(4:12)
and

G
H
t =  gHY

y
H
t
and

G
F
t =  gFY

y
F
t
(4:15)
the modied Taylor principle is both necessary and sufcient for E-stability:
0 <
 
kY + kGW g
W
Y

('   1) + (1  )'Y (4:39)
Proof. See appendix 4B.
Hence, the stability of the system depends on the coordination of scal and mone-
tary policy. For a contemporaneous interest rate rule or a less aggressive forward looking
interest rate rule, scal policy implemented to stabilize shocks is more likely to destabilize
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Fig. 4.8. The unshaded area shows the determinate and E-stable region for policy. The
dark blue area shows the indeterminate and E-unstable region, while the coloured region
has multiple E-stable equilibria. Fiscal policy changes the stability region for monetary
policy. If the Taylor principle is satised, then scal policy allows an interest rate rule to
react more aggressively to uctuations in output.
the economy by inducing indeterminacy and instability under RLS learning. On the other
hand, when the Taylor rule is forward looking and attaches a high weight to stabilizing
uctuations in the union output gap, then scal policy can actually help stabilize the union
economy. We interpret this case as giving a clear message to agents that no deviations in
output, country-specic or union-wide, contemporaneous or future values, are tolerated by
policy makers. A less aggressive monetary policy on the other hand could imply that the
efforts of the scal and monetary authorities are offsetting, thus leading to an ambiguous
change in the union output gap and a destabilization of the union economy.
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4.6 Conclusion
In chapter 1, we showed that monetary policy is ineffective in tackling asymmetric shocks
in a monetary union with homogeneous price rigidities. Hence, in this chapter we intro-
duced scal policy as an instrument that actively supports the domestic economy in the
event of asymmetric shocks. Employing the model proposed by Beetsma & Jensen (2005),
we have examined how the combinations of different monetary and scal policy rules affect
determinacy and E-stability of REE in a monetary union.
We nd that scal policy reacting to either relative ination or the terms of trade, must
satisfy determinacy and E-stability conditions independently of monetary policy, for the
union economy to be determinate and E-stable. The stability conditions for monetary policy
in this case are those known from the closed economymodel considered by Bullard &Mitra
(2002). For scal policy to induce stability, it need not be overly aggressive as this can
eliminate all stationary equilibria regardless of what monetary policy rule is implemented.
Leeper (1991) nds that an aggressive scal policy rule can lead to an explosive
system if monetary policy is aggressive as well. For his framework this is because it would
imply a violation of the government budget constraint, making agents unwilling to hold
government bonds. In our case the instability arises when the scal authorities reinforce
shocks to the competitiveness of domestic goods, by increasing government expenditure to
the extent that this increases domestic prices, making goods even less competitive.
We showed in chapter 3 that in contrast to a scal policy rule that reacts to the terms
of trade, an interest rate rule including the terms of trade can actually help induce both de-
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terminacy and E-stability. This result also holds for open economymodels with Taylor rules
that stabilize the exchange rate, as shown by Llosa & Tuesta (2008). The reason for this
is that monetary policy rules that react to shocks in relative prices actually stabilize these
shocks by restoring prices. On the other hand, scal policy reinforces these shocks by sup-
porting demand for domestic goods. Sargent &Wallace (1981) emphasize the importance
of prudent scal spending when an economy prioritizes price stability. Thus, the conver-
gence criteria of the EMU imposes restrictions on the exibility of the scal spending of
its member countries. Our results serve as additional motivation for these restrictions.
When a scal policy rule reacting to relative ination is combined with a forward
looking Taylor rule, then scal policy directly affects the learning stability of monetary
policy. Specically, if monetary policy is indeterminate but E-stable, then an aggressive
scal policy rule can make monetary policy unstable under learning.
Finally, when scal policy stabilizes the domestic output gaps while monetary pol-
icy reacts to shocks in union output and ination, then scal policy does not have to satisfy
any determinacy or E-stability conditions independently of monetary policy. Instead, scal
policy increases the indeterminate and E-unstable region of the Taylor principle. Conse-
quently, the stability region for a contemporaneous interest rate rule is smaller, the more
aggressive scal policy is in its stabilization efforts. However, if monetary policy is for-
ward looking and sufciently aggressive to satisfy the Taylor principle, then an aggressive
scal policy rule can actually help induce determinacy. Evans et al. (2008) nd that an
aggressive scal policy rule can help prevent the economy from reaching a deationary
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spiral, when a liquidity trap exists. Our result suggests that in some cases it could also help
eliminate multiplicity of stationary rational expectations equilibria.
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4.A Appendix: Proof of determinacy results
In this appendix we prove the determinacy conditions of the paper. We employ the method-
ology outlined in section 2.2.3.
Proof of proposition 1
For determinacy we rst need both of the eigenvalues of
BTT C11 =

 1c
 
'Y + 
 1kY

+ 1  1c
 
'    1

  1kY  1

to be outside of the unit circle. Using the method of appendix 2A, we need
aTT C0  >
1 and
aTT C1  < 1 + aTT C0 , where:
aTT C0 = 
 1 1c('Y + kY ') + 
 1
and
aTT C1 =   1c
 
'Y + 
 1kY
  1   1
Hence we have:
aTT C0  > 1 =)  1c('Y +kY ') >   (1  ), which is satised trivially, while:
aTT C1  < 1 + aTT C0  =)
0 < (1  )'Y + kY ('   1) (4:17)
So the Taylor principle is our rst determinacy condition and puts restrictions on the
interest rate rule of the union central bank. We consider now the relative subsystem given
by (4:16). Using the results presented in section 2.2.3 for the generic condition (2:14), we
have:
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+  = 1+
1++kT kGR (gHT +gFT )
and it follows that
 1+1++kT kGR (gHT +gFT )  < 1 when the following conditions hold:
kT
kGR
> gHT + g
F
T (4:18)
or
gHT + g
F
T >
2 (1 + ) + kT
kGR
(4:19)
Hence one of these two conditions must hold together with the Taylor principle for
the interest rate rule, for the system to be determinate. If one of these holds while the Taylor
principle is not satised, the system is indeterminate with multiple stationary, while if none
of the two conditions for the scal policy rule holds then the system has no stationary
solution and is explosive. This is easily seen since  =  1 and  =  1, while 0 <  <
1, implying that  > .
Proof of proposition 3
The system under a terms of trade scal policy rule and a forward looking Taylor rule
(TT-F) is given by (4:7), (4:8), (4:12) and (4:16). Substituting the Taylor rule (4:12) into
(4:7) and combining this with (4:8) we get the representation of the union system by the
matrix:
BTT F11 =
"
1+ 1kY  1c(1 ')
(1  1c'Y )  
 1c(1 ') 1
(1  1c'Y )  1kY  1
#
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Since the relative subsystem, given by (4:16) is independent of
n
y
W
t ; 
W
t
o
, we need
it to be determinate for the relative subsystem to be determinate. In the above proof of
proposition 1 we show that (4:27) induces a unique stationary equilibrium when the scal
policy rules satises one of the two conditions:
kT
kGR
> gHT + g
F
T (4:18)
or
gHT + g
F
T >
2 (1 + ) + kT
kGR
(4:19)
For the whole system to be determinate, BTT F11 must have both of its eigenvalues
outside the unit circle. We have:
aTT F0 = 
 1(1   1c'Y ) 1
aTT F1 =  
 
1 +  1kY  1c (1  ')

(1   1c'Y ) 1    1
For the eigenvalues of BTT F11 to be outside the unit circle it must be that both
aTT F0  > 1 and aTT F1  < 1 + aTT F0 .
The rst condition
aTT F0  > 1 gives the following constraint for when aTT F0 is
negative:
'Y < 
 1
c
 
 1 + 1

(4:A1)
When aTT F0 + 1 and a
TT F
1 are both negative or positive condition
aTT F1  <1 + aTT F0  implies:
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2 1c (1 + ) > kY ('   1) + 'Y (1 + ) (4:20)
In the case where aTT F0 + 1 is positive and a
TT F
1 negative or vice versa, we have:
0 < (1  )'Y + kY ('   1) (4:17)
If we rearrange (4:17) we have   (1  )'Y < kY ('   1), which can be substi-
tuted into (4:20) and then rearranged to get 'Y < 
 1
c
 
 1 + 1

. That is, combining
(4:17) and (4:20) gives (4:A1), making it redundant. Hence, (4:17), (4:20) and either
(4:18) or (4:19) must hold for the system TT-F to be determinate, which proves proposi-
tion 3.
Proof of proposition 5
The system RI-C of section 4.4.1 is determinate when both of its subsystems are
determinate given that the second or relative subsystem (4:21) is independent from the rst.
The rst subsystem contains the variables
n
y
W
t ; 
W
t
o
and written in the form of (4:13) is
described by the matrix:
BRI C11 =

 1c
 
'Y + 
 1kY

+ 1  1c
 
'    1

  1kY  1

For monetary policy to be determinate BRI C11 must have both of its eigenvalues out-
side the unit circle. Noting that BRI C11 = B
TT C
11 , we refer to the proof of proposition 1
to show that this is the case if and only if the Taylor principle (4:17) holds. For the rela-
tive subsystem to be determinate we require equation (4:21) to be determinate. We have;
+  =
1+ k
GR(gHR+g
F
R
)
1++kT kGR(gHR+g
F
R
)
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and it follows that
 1+ kGR(gHR+gFR)1++kT kGR(gHR+gFR)
 < 1 when the following condition holds:
1 +  + 1
2
kT
kGR
> gHR + g
F
R (4:22)
It is straightforward to see that when this condition is violated it must be that: 1++kT kGR(gHR+gFR)
 <  1 kGR(gHR+gFR)1++kT kGR(gHR+gFR)

and hence the system is explosive and has no stationary solutions in that case.
Proof of proposition 7
The system RI-F is partitioned according to the methodology of section 2.2.3, giving
the key matrix :
BRI F11 =
"
1+ 1kY  1c(1 ')
(1  1c'Y )  
 1c(1 ') 1
(1  1c'Y )  1kY  1
#
and equation (4:21). The above proof of proposition 5 shows that determinacy of
(4:21) implies:
1 +  + 1
2
kT
kGR
> gHR + g
F
R (4:22)
We note that BRI F11 = B
TT F
11 , the proof of proposition 3 shows that this matrix
induces determinacy when these conditions are satised:
0 < (1  )'Y + kY ('   1) (4:17)
and
2 1c (1 + ) > kY ('   1) + 'Y (1 + ) (4:20)
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This gives proposition 7.
Proof of proposition 9
The system with a contemporaneous Taylor rule and a scal policy rule stabilizing
the domestic output gap (DY-C) is represented by the relative subsystem:

T t = 
 1Et(

T t+1) +
 1T t 1   1 (1  %)
 
T t (4:26)
where we have dened  
h
1 +  + kT   kGR

gWY c
1+gWY (1 c)
i
, and the world sys-
tem written in the form of equation (2:13);
BDY C11 =
"
1 +
 1c('Y + 1(kY +kGW gWY ))
1+(1 c)gWY
 1c('  1)
1+(1 c)gWY  1  kY + kGW gWY   1
#
For the model to have a unique stationary REE under the policy rules of DY-C, both
subsystems need to be determinate. For the relative system to be determinate it must be
that  1+1++kT kGR gWY c1+gW
Y
(1 c)

 < 1
following the methodology of the general case outlined above. It is straightforward
to show that this inequality always holds by using the denitions of the Phillips curve
coefcients given in section 4.2.1; kGR  k(1  c) and kT  k(1 + c). We have that:
kT   kGRg
W
Y c
1+gWY (1 c)
=
kT+g
W
Y (1 c)k
1+gWY (1 c)
> 0 and hence 1+
1++kT kGR

gW
Y
c
1+gW
Y
(1 c)
 is always positive
and less than one and the relative subsystem is always determinate. For union determinacy
we further needBDY C11 to have both of its eigenvalues inside the unit circle. Here we have:
aDY C0 = 
 1 1c
n
'(kY +kGW g
W
Y )+'Y
1+(1 c)gWY
+  1c
o
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and
aDY C1 =  
 1c('Y + 1(kY +kGW gWY ))
1+(1 c)gWY
   1   1
aDY C0 is always positive and larger than one. From
aDY C1  < 1 + aDY C0  we
have the inequality:
0 < (1  )'Y +
 
kY + kGW g
W
Y

('   1) (4:27)
Proof of proposition 11
We show in the above proof of proposition 9 that the relative subsystem is always
stable under the scal policy rule (4:15a). Determinacy of the union subsystem is hence
both necessary and sufcient for determinacy of the whole system. We require that both
eigenvalues of BDY F11 are outside the unit circle;
BDY F11 =
"
(1+(1 c)gWY + 1 1c(1 ')(kY +kGW gWY ))
(1  1c'Y +(1 c)gWY )
   1 1c(1 ')
(1  1c'Y +(1 c)gWY )  1  kY + kGW gWY   1
#
This yields:
aDY F0 =
 1(1+(1 c)gWY )
(1  1c'Y +(1 c)gWY )
and
aDY F1 =  (
1+(1 c)gWY + 1 1c(1 ')(kY +kGW gWY ))
(1  1c'Y +(1 c)gWY )
   1
As explained above, for both eigenvalues to be outside the unit circle we must have:aDY F0  > 1 and aDY F1  < 1 + aDY F0 . When either aDY F1 is negative and  aDY F0 + 1
is positive or vice versa, the condition
aDY F1  < 1 + aDY F0  implies:
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0 < ('   1)
 
kY + kGW g
W
Y

+ 'Y (1  ) (4:27)
If both aDY F1 and
 
aDY F0 + 1

are negative or if both are positive we have:
('   1)
 
kY + kGW g
W
Y

+ 'Y (1 + ) < 2
 1
c (1 + )
 
1 + (1  c)gWY

(4:28)
Hence these are the two conditions required for determinacy under a forward looking
Taylor rule and government spending rules stabilizing the domestic output gap. Note that
the condition 'Y < 
 1
c
 
 1 + 1
  
1 + (1  c)gWY

, obtained from
aDY F0  > 1 in the
case where aDY F0 < 0, is redundant as it can be obtained by combining (4:27) and (4:28).
4.B Appendix: Proof of E-stability results
In this appendix we derive the E-stability conditions of chapter 4, using the methodology
outlined in section 2.2.3.
Proof of proposition 2
Where F  (I   

 
b) 1
 and A  (I   

 
b) 1 and where: F =

F11 0
F21 F22

and A =

A11 0
A21 A22

, E-stability results when the eigenvalues of F11; F22; and the cross
products of these and the eigenvalues of A11 and A22, all have eigenvalues with real parts
less than one as explained in section 2.2.3.
For the case of a terms of trade scal policy rule and a contemporaneous Taylor rule
(TT-C) the MSV solution gives the following: bTT C11 = 0 and bTT C22 =
1
q
1  4
2
2 1 , recalling
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that    1 +  + kT   kGR(gHT + gFT ). The rst of these follows from (2:32); given
that TT C11 = 0. The solution for b
TT C
22 is obtained using (2:34) and only the negative
conjugate is ever stable and that is when the determinacy conditions of proposition 1 are
met. This gives;
F TT C11 =
24  1c 'Y +'kY + 1c  1 ''Y +'kY + 1c 
 1c kY
'Y +'kY +
 1
c 
('Y + 1c )+kY
'Y +'kY +
 1
c 
35, ATT C11 = 0
F TT C22 =
2
(1+
p
1 4 2)
and ATT C22 = 2
(1+
p
1 4 2)
Note that F TT C11 = 

TT C
11 and A
TT C
11 = 0, both as a result of b
TT C
11 = 0. Also,
since the relative subsystem was reduced to one equation (4:16), F TT C22 and A
TT C
22 are
scalars. We now need F TT C11 and A
TT C
22  F TT C11 to have eigenvalues with real parts
less then one, while F TT C22 and A
TT C
22  F TT C22 need to have real parts less than one.
Considering rst F TT C11 , its characteristic polynomials has real parts less than one when 
F TT C11   I

has negative real parts. Let the eigenvalues be given by p() = 2+c1+c0,
then these are negative when c0 > 0 and c1 > 0. Here we have:
F TT C11  I = 1('Y +'kY + 1c )
  ('Y + 'kY ) (1  ')
 1c kY  (1  )
 
'Y + 
 1
c 
  ('   1)kY

cTT C0 =
(' 1)kY +'Y (1 )
('Y +'kY +
 1
c )
c1 = c
TT C
0 +
kY '+'Y +
 1
c (1 )
('Y +'kY +
 1
c )
Hence, we require cTT C0 > 0, which gives the Taylor principle:
0 < (1  )'Y + kY ('   1) (4:17)
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which is our rst E-stability condition. We now impose the restriction
F TT C22 =
2
(1+
p
1 4 2)
< 1. This condition always holds for a real and stationary
solution bTT C22 . Similarly, A
TT C
22  F TT C22 < 1 always holds when a stationary MSV
solution exists. This implies that all stationary MSV solutions are learnable under RLS and
we have the following conditions:
kT
kGR
> gHT + g
F
T (4:18)
or
gHT + g
F
T >
2 (1 + ) + kT
kGR
(4:19)
In this paper we do not consider the E-stability of explosive solutions since although
these may be learnable, they are undesirable for obvious reasons. Finally, we use the result
that 0 < ATT C22 = 2
(1+
p
1 4 2)
< 1 holds given bTT C22 , and that the Taylor principle
implies that the eigenvalues of F TT C22 have real parts less than one, to conclude that the
eigenvalues of ATT C22  F TT C11 also have real parts less then one. This follows since the
eigenvalues of ATT C22  F TT C11 are each of the eigenvalues of F TT C11 multiplied by the
scalar ATT C22 .
Proof of proposition 4
We proceed as in the proof of proposition 2 noting that the relative subsystem is again
represented by (4:16). We have:
F TT F11 =

(1   1c'Y )  1c (1  ')
kY (1   1c'Y )  + kY  1c (1  ')

, ATT F11 = 0
4.B Appendix: Proof of E-stability results 216
F TT F22 =
2
(1+
p
1 4 2)
and ATT F22 = 2
(1+
p
1 4 2)
Where the MSV solution, bTT F11 = 0 implies that F
TT F
11 = 

TT F
11 . For E-stability
we require that F TT F11 and A
TT F
22 F TT F11 have their eigenvalues with real parts less then
one, while F TT F22 and A
TT F
22 F TT F22 need to have real parts less than one. It is shown in
the proof of proposition 2 that F TT _C22 andATT _C22 F TT _C22 are always less than one when one
of the determinacy conditions (4:18) or (4:19) is met. Noting that F TT F22 = F
TT C
22 and
that ATT F22 = A
TT C
22 , it is clear that this is also the case for F
TT F
22 and A
TT F
22  F TT F22 .
Given that ATT F22 is smaller than one and non-negative it follows that if the eigenvalues of
F TT F11 have real parts less than one, then so will A
TT F
22  F TT F22 . Hence, for E-stability
it is necessary and sufcient that either (4:18) or (4:19) holds while the eigenvalues of
F TT F11 both have real parts less than one, or equivalently that 

TT _F
11   I have negative
real parts. For the rst subsystem we have:
cTT F0 = 
 1c'Y (1  ) + kY  1c ('   1)
and
cTT F1 = 
 1c'Y + (1  ) + kY  1c ('   1)
= cTT F0 + 
 1c'Y + (1  )
Hence we need cTT F0 > 0 to hold since this implies that c
TT F
1 > 0 as well. It
is straight forward to show that cTT F0 > 0 gives the Taylor principle. Our conditions for
E-stability of the combination of policy rules TT-F are hence (4:17) and (4:18) or (4:19).
Proof of proposition 6
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As in the above proof of proposition 2 we have the REE solution for the union sub-
system solving for; bRI C11 = 0, following from equation (2:32) given that 
RI C
11 = 0. It
hence follows, equivalently to above that FRI F11 = 

RI F
11 and that A
RI F
22 = 0. This im-
plies that we need the following conditions for E-stability: all eigenvalues of the matrices
FRI F11 andA
RI F
22 FRI F11 must have real parts less than one , while the scalars FRI F22 and
ARI F22  FRI F22 must have real parts less than one. Considering rst FRI F11 , we note that
FRI F11 = F
TT F
11 and hence as shown in the above proof of proposition 2, it has eigenval-
ues with real parts less than one when the Taylor principle (4:17) is satised. This is hence
our rst requirement for stability under RLS learning. The RE solution of (4:21) yields;
bTT C22 =
1
s
1 
4(1 kGR (gHT +gFT ))
2
2 1 , while the negative conjugate is stable when (4:22) is
satised, the positive conjugate is never stable. We now have:
FRI C22 =
2


1+
q
1 4(1 kGR (gHT +gFT )) 2

and
ARI C22 =
2(1 kGR (gHT +gFT ))


1+
q
1 4(1 kGR (gHT +gFT )) 2

where we have used the stationary solution of bTT C22 . It can easily be shown that
FRI C22 and A
RI C
22  FRI:C22 are always less than one regardless of the value of the scal
policy coefcients (gHT + gFT ). Finally, we need the matrix A
TT C
22  FRI C11 to have real
parts less than one for the system to be E-stable. We know that FRI C11 has eigenvalues
with real parts less than one when (4:17) is satised and it follows that ATT C22 F
RI C
11 has
eigenvalues with real parts less than one if 0 < ATT C22 < 1. If instead  1 < ATT C22 < 0,
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we need FRI C11 to have eigenvalues with real parts larger than 1. When (4:22) is satised
and there is a stationary REE, then it can be shown that:
 1 < ATT _C22 < 1
This means that we need to prove that the eigenvalues of FRI C11 always have real
parts larger than negative one, given that they are less than one. The eigenvalues of FRI C11
are given by:
RI C11 =
(1+)+c(kY +'Y )
p
((1+)+c(kY +'Y ))
2 4(+c(kY '+'Y ))
2(+c(kY '+'Y ))
since ( (1 + ) + c (kY + 'Y )) and (+ c (kY ' + 'Y )) are positive, it follows
that the positive conjugate has positive real parts. Furthermore, since the positive conjugate
has real parts less than one by the Taylor principle, it must be that the negative conjugate
has a real part larger than negative one. This implies that ATT C22  FRI C11 has eigenvalues
with real parts less than one when the Taylor principle (4:17) and the condition for scal
policy (4:22) are satised, which concludes the proof of proposition 6.
Proof of proposition 8
The proof of this proposition partly follows from the proofs of propositions 4 and 6.
Since 
RI F11 = 

TT F
11 and 
RI F
11 = 
TT F
11 = 0, it follows as above that b
RI F
22 = 0
and hence that 
RI F11 = F
RI F
11 and that A
RI F
11 = 0. We also have the relative subsystem
described by (4:21) as in the case with a contemporaneous Taylor rule (RI-C). This implies
that; bRI F22 = b
RI C
22 , F
RI F
11 = F
RI C
11 and that F
RI F
11 = F
RI C
11 . Because A
RI F
11 = 0 , it
is necessary and sufcient for E-stability that FRI F11 and A
RI F
22 FRI F11 have eigenvalues
with real parts less than one , while the scalars FRI F22 and A
RI F
22  FRI F22 are less than
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one. We show in the above proof of proposition 6 that FRI F22 (= FRI C22 ) and ARI F22 
FRI F22 (= A
RI C
22  FRI C22 ) are less than one when a stationary MSV solution exists under
rational expectations, i.e. when the inequality (4:21) is satised. The proof of proposition 4
shows that FRI F11 (= F
TT F
11 ) has eigenvalues with real parts less than one when the Taylor
principle (4:17) is satised. For E-stability we then require that these conditions are met
and in addition that the eigenvalues of ARI F22  FRI F11 have real parts less than one. As
shown above, when (4:22) holds, then  1 < ARI F22 < 1. Specically,
0 <
 
gHT + g
F
T

< 1
k
GR
=) 0 < ARI F22 < 1
and
0 <
 
gHT + g
F
T

<
(1+)+ 1
2
kT
k
GR
=)  1 < ARI F22 < 0
Since the eigenvalues ofARI F22 FRI F11 are the products of the eigenvalues of FRI F11
and the scalar ARI F22 , it follows that when  1 < ARI F22 < 0, FRI F11 must have real parts
between negative one and one. We know by the Taylor principle that real parts are less
than one, but we also need the conditions for the eigenvalues having real parts greater than
minus one. For the matrix FRI F11 to have characteristic roots with real parts greater than
negative one, it must that the matrix
 
FRI F11 + I

has eigenvalues with positive real parts.
For the general case, the polynomial: p() = 2 + a1 + a0, has characteristic roots less
than one when a1 < 0 and a0 > 0. In this case we have the matrix: 
FRI F11 + I

=

(1   1c'Y ) + 1  1c (1  ')
kY (1   1c'Y )  + kY  1c (1  ') + 1

and
aRI F0 =
2(1+)+c(kY (' 1)+(1+)'Y )

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aRI F1 =  (1   1c'Y )     kY  1c (1  ')  2
aRI F0 > 0 is always satised when the Taylor principle holds, but a
RI F
1 < 0 implies
the following additional constraint:
'Y + kY ('   1) <  1c (3 + ) (4:25)
This condition always holds when the determinacy condition (4:20) holds and this
is hence not a violation of McCallum's (2007) result stating that with contemporaneous
data in the information set, determinacy is sufcient but not necessary for stability under
learning RLS. E-stability is then guaranteed by the Taylor principle (4:17) and either
 
gHT + g
F
T

<
1
kGR
(4:23)
or
 
gHT + g
F
T

<
(1 + ) + 1
2
kT
kGR
(4:22)
and (4:25). When 1
k
GR
<
 
gHT + g
F
T

<
(1+)+ 1
2
kT
k
GR
and'Y+kY ('   1) >  1c (3 + ),
the system may or may not be E-stable. We do not obtain analytical results in this case, but
the non-linear relationship between the policy parameters that needs to be satised in this
case for E-stability to hold is:
(1 kGR (gHT +gFT ))

(1+) c('Y +kY (' 1)) 
p
 4( c'Y )+(1+) c('Y +kY (' 1))



1+
q
1 4(1 kGR (gHT +gFT )) 2
 < 1
where this is the negative conjugate of the eigenvalues ofFRI F11 multiplied byA
RI F
22 .
Proof of proposition 10
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First we note that as in previous cases of this chapter theMSV solution gives: bDY C11 =
0, resulting from DY C11 = 0. This also implies:
FDY C11 = 

DY C
11 =
 1(1 + (1  c)gWY )  1 1c(1  ')
 1
 
kY + kGW g
W
Y
  
1 + (1  c)gWY

 +  1
 
kY + kGW g
W
Y

 1c(1  ')

Further,

T t = 
 1Et(

T t+1) +
 1T t 1   1 (1  %)
 
T t (4:26)
has the MSV solution:
bDY C22 =
1
q
1  4
2
2 1 where  
h
1 +  + kT   kGR

gWY c
1+gWY (1 c)
i
. The negative
conjugate is always stable while the positive never is. To consider E-stability of the stable
solution we compute:
FDY C22 =
2


1+
q
1  4
2
 and ADY C22 = 2


1+
q
1  4
2

The E-stability conditions are then that FDY C11 and A
DY C
22 F
DY C
11 have eigenvalues
with real parts less than one and that FDY C22 and A
DY C
22 F
DY C
22 are less than one. Con-
sidering rst FDY C11 , we need 

DY C
11   I11 to have eigenvalues with negative real parts.
Given the roots p() = 2 + cDY C1  + c
DY C
0 , we need c
DY C
0 > 0 and c
DY C
1 > 0,
where:
cDY C0 =
(1 )'Y +(' 1)(kY +kGW gWY )
'Y +'(kY +kGW gWY )+
 1
c (1+(1 c)gWY )
and
cDY C1 = c
DY C
0 +
 1c (1 )(1+(1 c)gWY )+'Y +'(kY +kGW gWY )
'Y +'(kY +kGW gWY )+
 1
c (1+(1 c)gWY )
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Since kY '+'Y +
 1
c (1 )
('Y +'kY +
 1
c )
> 0, cDY C1 will always be positive when c
DY C
0 is positive.
We have; (1 )'Y +(' 1)(kY +kGwg
W
Y )
'Y +'(kY +kGwgWY )+ 1c (1+(1 c)gWY )
> 0, giving the E-stability condition:
0 < ('   1)
 
kY + kGW g
W
Y

+ (1  )'Y (4:27)
Given that kT >
k
GR
gWY c
1+gWY (1 c)
, as shown in the proof of proposition 9, and given that
0 <  < 1 implies that (1+ )2 > 4, it can easily be veried that 0 < ADY C22 < 1.
Since FDY C22 = A
DY C
22 , it follows that 0 < F
DY C
22  ADY C22 < 1. Finally, this also
implies that when the eigenvalues of FDY C11 have real parts less than one, so do those of
FDY C22  ADY C11 , which concludes the proof.
Proof of proposition 12
As above, TT F11 = 0 implies that b
DY C
11 = 0 and hence that 

DY F
11 = F
DY F
11
and that ADY F11 = 0: The E-stability conditions of section 2.2.3 then implies that FDY F11
and ADY F22 FDY F11 must have eigenvalues with real parts less than one while that FDY F22
and ADY F22 F
DY F
22 are less than one. From the proof of proposition 10 we have that 0 <
ADY F22 < 1, and that 0 < F
DY F
22  ADY F22 < 1, since FDY F22 = FDY C22 and ADY F22 =
ADY C22 as determined by equation (4:26). E-stability then requires that F
DY F
11   I11 has
eigenvalues with negative real parts.

DY F11   I11 =24 (1  1c'Y +(1 c)gWY )(1+gWY (1 c))   1  1c(1 ')(1+gWY (1 c))
(kY +kGW g
W
Y )(1  1c'Y +(1 c)gWY )
(1+gWY (1 c))
(kY +kGW g
W
Y )
 1c(1 ')
(1+gWY (1 c))
  (1  )
35,
In line with the above methodology we then have:
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cDY F0 =
(1 ) 1c'Y +(kY +kGW gWY ) 1c(' 1)
(1+gWY (1 c))
cDY F1 =
 1c'Y +(1 )(1+gWY (1 c))+(kY +kGW gWY ) 1c(' 1)
(1+gWY (1 c))
= cDY F0 +
 1c'Y +(1 )(1+gWY (1 c))
(1+gWY (1 c))
Since 
 1c'Y +(1 )(1+gWY (1 c))
(1+gWY (1 c))
> 0, it sufces to derive the conditions for
cDY F0  >
0. It is clear that this is the Taylor principle:
(1  )'Y + (kY + kGW gWY ) ('   1) > 0 (4:27)
This concludes the proof.
Conclusion
This thesis has examined determinacy and E-stability of economic policy in monetary
union models. The aim has been to compare stability of policy to the closed and open
economy cases and highlight the effects that the key features of monetary unions have on
the determinacy and E-stability of economic policy.
We have shown that in the absence of intrinsic asymmetries, a monetary union can
be regarded as a closed economy for monetary policy considerations. In chapter 1, we
demonstrated that an optimal policy rule in such a union is of the same form as those found
for closed economy models. Hence, the union central bank stabilizes shocks to union-wide
variables, while having no instrument at its disposal to stabilize shocks to relative variables.
This result holds even when there is home bias in input trade.
While the failure to stabilize relative shocks has a negative impact on welfare RE, it
has no effect on determinacy and E-stability of monetary policy. In chapter 2, we showed
that the results from the closed economy literature on learning also hold for quite a general
specication of a monetary union model. Specically, as in the closed economy considered
by Evans & Honkapohja (2003), a fundamentals based policy rule is neither determinate
nor E-stable, while an expectations based policy rule leads to a unique stationary REE that
is stable under recursive leas squares learning. Similarly, the determinacy and E-stability
conditions for general Taylor rules coincide with those presented by Bullard &Mitra (2002)
for the closed economy model of Woodford (1999). That is, the Taylor principle is both
necessary and sufcient for E-stability of contemporaneous and forward looking interest
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rate rules. While this is true for determinacy of a contemporaneous Taylor rule, a forecast
based monetary policy rule may lead to multiple stationary REE if it is very aggressive.
However, when introducing asymmetries into a monetary union, these results no longer
hold.
In chapter 3, we used the monetary union model of Benigno (2004) to examine de-
terminacy and E-stability in a monetary union with asymmetries in price rigidities. We nd
that the higher the degree of asymmetry in price rigidities, the larger is the determinacy and
E-stability region for monetary policy. Furthermore, an interest rate rule that reacts to the
terms of trade in addition to the output gap and ination is more likely to induce stability
in this case. Bullard & Mitra (2007) nd that inertia in the interest rate rule has a positive
effect on stability of policy. Given that the terms of trade is an autoregressive process, we
hence conjecture that the terms of trade induces stability because of the inertia it brings to
the interest rate rule. Llosa & Tuesta (2008) draw a similar conclusion for a Taylor rule
that stabilizes the exchange rate of a small open economy. They point out that the exchange
rate is a function of lagged values of the interest rate, by the interest rate parity condition.
As discussed in the introduction of this thesis, scal policy has an important role in
stabilizing country-specic shocks in a monetary union. However, we show in chapter 4
that if scal policy is too aggressive, it can make all rational expectations equilibria ex-
plosive. Leeper (1991) nds that when scal policy is not well coordinated with monetary
policy, so that both policies ignore the government budget constraint, then this could lead
to an explosive economy. Our results give reason for even more caution; if scal policy is
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overly aggressive following a shock to competitiveness, then the economy could be desta-
bilized regardless of monetary policy. Furthermore, aggressive scal spending by even a
small union member can destabilize the whole union economy. We hence argue for caution
when using scal policy as a stabilization instrument.
When scal policy directly stabilizes domestic output gaps, while monetary policy
offsets shocks to the union economy, then scal policy tightens the Taylor principle condi-
tion for monetary policy and hence potentially destabilizes the union economy. However, if
monetary policy is forward looking and sufciently aggressive to satisfy the Taylor princi-
ple, then an aggressive scal policy rule can actually help induce determinacy. Evans et al.
(2008) nd that an aggressive scal policy rule can help prevent the economy from reach-
ing a deationary spiral, when a liquidity trap exists. Our result suggests that in some cases
it could also help eliminate multiplicity of stationary REE.
In sum, policy markers in a monetary union need to carefully consider asymmetries
that may alter the stability of policy. In particular, monetary and scal policy should be well
coordinated and restrictions on the exibility of scal spending should be abided. Specif-
ically, the union central bank and the national scal governments should have a common
and clear policy objective. In this case asymmetries can help guarantee stability rather than
destabilize the economy.
Appendix A
Glossary of Symbols
Variables and Functions
Variable Description
At;t+1 the pay off in period t from the asset portfolio acquired in period t
Ait the technology parameter facing nal goods rms in country i
Cit(h) consumption bundle of household in country i
DWt demand shock (Ch. 4)
Ft household's returns from ownership of intermediate rms
Git country i government expenditure on the domestic consumption good
IPi;t the price of country i's basket of input goods
IP 0H;t(f) the input price chosen by rm f in the period it gets to adjust price
L() household utility derived from holding real money balances
LCB the loss function of the union central bank
Ms(h) household's holdings of money
MCi;t the real marginal cost for intermediate rms in country i
Ni;s(h) labour supply of household in country i
P is the price of consumer goods produced in country i
Qt;t+1 the stochastic discount factor
rt the nominal interest rate
rrt the natural rate of interest
Tt the terms of trade
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Ut(h) the utility function of representative household h
Qt;t+1 the stochastic discount factor
rt the nominal interest rate
rrt the natural rate of interest
Tt the terms of trade
Ut(h) the utility function of representative household h
ui;t cost push shock to country i's ination in input prices
uit cost push shock to country i's ination in consumer prices
Vt the dispersion of intermediate goods prices
vt the exogenous variable in the univariate difference equation (Ch. 2)
WH;t(h) the wage received by the representative household of country H
wt
the vector of exogenous variables in the difference equation
used to analyse determinacy and E-stability (section 2.2.3)
X generic variable
xt
the vector of state variables in the difference equation used
to analyse determinacy and E-stability (section 2.2.3)
Xji;t
the basket of input goods produced by country i's intermediate rms
and sold to country j's nal goods rms
xji;t
the input good produced by the representative intermediate rm
of country i's and sold to country j's nal goods rms
Yi;t Country i's output in per capita terms
yt generic variable in the univariate difference equation (section 2.2.3)

y
i
t the output gap of country i under sticky prices
 
y
i
t the output gap of country i under exible prices
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zt vector of regressors in the learning process
 t household's wealth
t lumpsum taxes paid by households
t the forecast error of agents under RLS learning
"t random i:i:d zero-mean shock
H;t the wage elasticity of labour hours demanded
wH;t mark-up of real wages
pH;t
the mark-up of input prices over the nominal marginal
cost of intermediate rms
it+1 the price ination of country i's consumer goods
i;t+1 the price ination of country i's producer goods
{t the auxiliary variable dened as the lagged terms of trade
Coefcients and Parameters
Coefcient Description
A matrix whose eigenvalues determine E-stability
AHt the technology coefcient for nal goods rms
a The vector of constants in the PLM
a0; a1
coefcients in the characteristic polynomial for determinacy
(appendices)
B
The matrix of coefcients in the
equation used to examine determinacy
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BHt the technology of intermediate rms
b the matrix of coefcients on lagged endogenous variables in the PLM
bHt log-linearized technology coefcient of intermediate rms (Ch. 1)
c matrix of coefcients on exogenous variables in the PLM (Ch. 2)
c0; c1 coefcients in the characteristic polynomial for E-stability (appendices)
F matrix whose eigenvalues determine E-stability
giT
the coefcient on the terms of trade in
country i's government spending rule
giY
the coefcient on the country /i's output gap
in country i's government spending rule
giR
the coefcient on the relative ination in
country i's government spending rule
ki coefcient in country i's supply curve
kiC
coefcient on the union output gap
in the union supply schedule (Ch. 3)
kGW
coefcient on union government expenditure
in the union supply schedule
kGR
coefcient on relative government expenditure
in the relative supply schedule
kT
coefcient on the terms of trade
in the relative supply schedule
kY
the coefcient on the union output gap
in the union supply schedule (Ch. 4)
n the size of home country
v
the level of substitutability between domestic and foreign
input baskets
Appendix A Glossary of Symbols 231

the coefcient on expected future values in the univariate
difference equation (section 2.2.3 and appendices)

the probability with which producers in country i keep their prices xed
(Chs. 3 & 4)
i
the weight attached to country i's per capita output gap
in the loss function (Ch. 1)
 the household discount factor
  the vector of constants in the difference equation used when looking at E-stability

coefcient in the univariate condition for the terms of trade
under a terms of trade scal policy rule (Ch. 4)
i
the effect of a change in country H's output gap on country i's ination
in producer prices
i0
the effect of a change in country F 's output gap on country i's ination
in producer prices
 the sensitivity of ination to changes in the marginal cost (Ch. 1)

the coefcient on lagged values in the generic univariate difference equation
(section 2.2.3 and appendices)
 the constant elasticity of substitution between domestic intermediate goods
Y the output gap coefcient in the union supply schedule
T the coefcient on the terms of trade in the relative supply schedule
 the inverse of the elasticity of producing goods

the matrix of coefcients on exogenous variables in
the difference equation used when looking at E-stability
 coefcient in the univariate condition for the terms of trade
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H0
the effect of a change in country H's output on
country i's ination in consumer prices
H0
the effect of a change in country F 's output on
country i's ination in consumer prices
#
measures the sensitivity of ination to changes in union-wide and
domestic ination under the optimal discretionary monetary policy rule
i the effect of a change in country H's output on country i's marginal cost
i0 the effect of a change in country F 's output on country i's marginal cost
 the characteristics polynomial (appendices)
i
the weight attached to the basket of home country input,
in the production function of nal goods rms in country i (Ch. 1)
1  i the weight attached to the basket of foreign country input,in the production function of nal goods rms in country i (Ch. 1)
c the steady state consumption share of output (Ch. 4)
i
the probability with which rms in country i get to keep their price xed
(Ch. 3 & 4)
 the relative risk aversion of households (Ch. 1 & 2)
H a subsidy paid to intermediate rms

the weight given to the product of both countries' output gaps
in the central bank loss function (Ch. 1)
 coefcient measuring workers' disutility from working (Ch. 1 & 2)
' the coefcient on ination in the interest rate rule
'Y the coefcient on the output gap in the interest rate rule
'T the coefcient on the terms of trade in the interest rate rule
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	i
the effect of foreign output on country i's ination under
optimal discretionary monetary policy
	i0
the effect of foreign output on country i's ination under
optimal discretionary monetary policy
 coefcient in the univariate condition for the terms of trade
 WY
the coefcient on the union output gap in
the union government spending rule
 RY
the coefcient on the relative output gap in
the relative government spending rule
 WT
the coefcient on the terms of trade in
the union government spending rule
 RT
the coefcient on the terms of trade in
the relative government spending rule
!
the level of trade in intermediate goods,
decreases with the level of home bias (Ch. 1 & 2)
%
the matrix of coefcients on lagged values in the
autoregressive condition for exogenous variables
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